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Hazardous industries in the UK and Europe are under pressure to increase 
the transparency and accountability of the ways in which they manage their 
hazards and the risks they pose to the population and environment. The 
literature has indicated that the field would benefit from a risk-based, 
continuous improvement approach to emergency management in hazardous 
industry. 
The aim of this research was to construct a framework to enable assessment 
of the emergency management performance and capability within UK 
hazardous industry operators. Continuous improvement models from other 
fields were examined, and an established model called the Capability Maturity 
Model was selected to form the basis of the framework. 
A three-stage data collection methodology was designed to gain an overview 
of an organisation's emergency management capability. This methodology 
involved reviewing a sample of emergency plans related to UK hazardous 
industrial sites and observing eight emergency exercises at major hazard 
industrial sites. The third stage was to record the learning capability of the 
organisation by observing their feedback processes and interviewing 
members of staff were necessary. 
Analysis of the resulting data enabled the construction of a set of eight key 
processes that define an emergency management system. Using the five- 
level structure of the Capability Maturity Model along with the principals of 
continuous improvement, an emergency management assessment framework 
was constructed. 
The assessment framework was successfully tested in a large Local Authority, 
using its emergency plan, a major exercise and a follow-up interview to collect 
the relevant information. The assessment provided clear details of current 
capability and maturity of the emergency management system, giving 
structured guidance on weaknesses in specific process areas and more 
generally in particular stages of the emergency management system. This 
ultimately enabled the Local Authority to focus its improvement efforts, 
increasing their efficiency in learning and effectiveness in preparedness and 
response. 
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1.1 Introduction to Emergency Management Assessment 
The core purpose of this research is to provide a method of assessing 
emergency management performance and capability. 
This chapter will present the case for the research through reasoning that 
begins with wider conceptual arguments, and focusses down to the objectives 
of the thesis. The chapter will conclude by briefly stating the researcher's 
learning objectives, and give details of the structure and features of the thesis. 
This research began with a discussion between the research supervisor, the 
researcher and the research sponsors. The three parties contributed different 
aspects to the discussion, and it concluded with three main points. 
The research sponsors were a company called OCTO, who drew from their 
extensive industrial experience in UK Hazardous Industry, and concluded that 
the demands on industry to manage incidents faster, more efficiently and 
more effectively were increasing. These demands were from Europe, the UK 
government and regulatory bodies. The core problem was that industry had 
no method of reasonably justifying their capability in emergency management. 
There was no benchmark they could aim for, which would prove that they 
were capable of dealing with their hazards. 
The research supervisor added that while quantitative methods were available 
for assessing risk and performance of individual emergency tasks, there was 
no means of assessing the capability of the whole organisation. He suggested 
a literature search to see how capability is measured in the organisational 
management field. Cranfield University researchers had previously worked 
together to design a performance measurement system for the Health and 
Safety Executive, (Strutt et al. 2001) and so appreciated how capability could 
not be measured in the same way as performance, as it is a much wider and 
deeper organisational concept. 
The researcher added that EMPIRE (Emergency Management Performance 
Indicators and Risk Evaluation) had focussed mainly on the physical attributes 
of the site and the arrangements for the emergency response. While these 
played an important role, the main focus of an organisational capability 
assessment would be the human parts of the system. As discussed in chapter 
3 the literature search revealed) that one of the most popular assessments of 
capability is the Capability Maturity Model, and this could form a robust 
foundation on which to base an emergency management capability model. 
The following section takes a conceptual step back, to highlight some of the 
wider issues that support this research. 
1.1.1 Why improve emergency management? 
One of the core justifications for this research is that while there will always be 
accidents and injuries as a result of industrial activity, the response to these 
incidents is not as good as it potentially could be. The research sponsors cited 
a number of cases where organisations were satisfied that their emergency 
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management met the regulatory standards. The regulators admitted that 
meeting their standards 'to the letter' represents the absolute minimum 
requirement for an operator to comply with the law, and does not represent 
best or even good practice. Daniell (2000) labels this concept as 'satisfactory 
underperformance', where an organisation is content to perform to a level 
which is below its potential performance standard. 
The continual advance of technology has led to closer coupling between 
humans, technology and the environment. In these increasingly complex and 
interrelated systems, hazards are more difficult to manage and risks are more 
difficult to identify (Perrow 1999). Contemporary methods of emergency 
planning and management are less effective at keeping pace with the 
dynamic nature modem risk. This issue has been recognised by the European 
Union (EU). In 1999 the EU introduced the Europe wide Seveso directives, 
translated in UK legislation as the Control of Major Accident Hazard (COMAH) 
regulations, to manage hazardous substances at storage and process sites. 
They are now introducing the Regulation, Evaluation and Authorisation of 
Chemicals directive (Institute of Chemical Engineers, 2003) which imposes 
risk assessment and risk management responsibility on all organisations that 
produce, import or use hazardous chemicals. The regulations will be phased 
in over the next 11 years, beginning with immediate effect for the most 
hazardous chemicals and persistent biological toxins. 
Steed (1998: 152) also addresses this question in his thesis, stating that 
'A new generation of emergency planners are emerging, who are not concerned with 
preparing for enemy attack, and a tradition of research on emergency behaviour is 
beginning to grow ... This new generation of emergency planners will have the 
responsibility of demonstrating that the answers to the question Why plan for 
emergencies' are that it makes good economic sense, it is good management 
practice and it is what the community deserves and expects. " 
(Steed 1998: 152) 
Steed's last line touches on the expectations of the community, which is an 
important issue. Steed is referring to the community in the sense of a local 
body of residents; however, the wider definition of community also applies. 
This study will refer to everyone with an interest in or concern with emergency 
management as a stakeholder. Stakeholders all have different expectations 
and requirements from hazardous industry, and in general terms, those 
requirements are becoming harder to meet. Communications advances allow 
pressure groups, the public and the media to be aware of any incident within 
minutes of it happening, and pictures can be broadcast live to the world from a 
mobile telephone, using the Internet. Business relationships and clients are 
increasingly working to shorter timescales, lower stock-holding and `just-in- 
time' supply principals. Customers can demand that their suppliers meet 
certain accredited standards of reliability, quality and excellence, such as the 
ISO series. 
There is no such method for demonstration or assurance of capability in UK 
hazardous emergency management. 
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1.1.2 Why should emergency management capability be 
assessed? 
Major Accident Hazard Industry is already demanding assessment and 
recognition of their emergency management systems, and various 
consultancies in the UK are responding by providing their own assessment 
frameworks, the OCTAVE and EMPIRE frameworks offered by OCTO Ltd are 
examples. MAHI is also looking within to compare performance and share 
learning, with regional groups of Hazardous operators and emergency service 
representatives are functioning well in Grangemouth, Teesside and Cheshire. 
The Institute of Emergency Management (Institute of Emergency 
Management 2003) is currently working on a proposal to create an 
accreditation scheme for emergency managers. Based on the system used in 
the USA, emergency managers would have to demonstrate competence and 
knowledge to be awarded a formal qualification, which would have to be 
maintained by refresher courses. 
These indications from the field show that at the individual, organisational and 
inter-organisation levels, emergency management comparison and 
improvement are becoming increasingly important to industry. The same 
situation is arising in Local Authority emergency planning departments, which 
are increasingly reaching the highest levels of business performance 
standards (Investors In People, Business Excellence, ISO 9000) in their 
management and administration activities, but lack a structured approach to 
improving their actual emergency management systems. 
1.1.3 Why assess using a Capability Maturity approach? 
An answer to this question is suggested by Turner and Pidgeon (1997) citing 
Argyris and Schön, 
'... if we are to reduce future emergencies we need to move beyond a simple 
cybernetic single-loop model of behaviour-feedback-change, to a state of so-called 
double-loop learning, where the very procedures for gathering and assessing signals 
about hazards, together with our theories in use for interpreting the world are directly 
challenged" 
(Turner and Pidgeon 1997: 192) 
This concept of double-loop learning is addressed by Capability Maturity 
models, and ensures that a system continually evolves with new knowledge. 
This makes it especially relevant to the emergency management application, 
as new knowledge and experience on safety and risk are continually arising 
on hazardous industry sites. 
There are two additional reasons to select a CMM based approach. The first 
relates to the concept of maturity. Previous methods of assessment have 
focussed on performance, which was proven by carrying out an emergency 
exercise. An assessment of performance in one incident however, is not a 
reliable indicator of future capability to deal with a different incident, or even 
the same incident at some point in the future. A wider assessment of 
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capability is required to determine how well an organisation might manage 
incidents that could occur in the future. Such an assessment would be based 
on more structural factors, such as the emergency plan, staffing structure and 
evidence of learning, as well as demonstration of performance in an exercise. 
Maturity takes this one step further by giving an indication of how an 
organisation is likely to develop in the future, based on its current and 
previous levels of improvement. In an emergency management system, this 
type of output from an assessment could be very valuable to assure 
stakeholders of one's capability and commitment to improvement. 
The second reason to select a CMM based approach is that CMM 
assessment focuses on the process rather than the product. This is especially 
relevant to EM, as the product of an emergency management system is not 
an easily understood concept. Previous methods of emergency management 
system assessment have been product focussed, by assessing the 
emergency exercise. Unless the process that has produced that exercise is 
assessed however, there can be no indication of whether or not the same 
product will be produced again for any incident in the future. 
1.2 Aim and objectives of the thesis 
The aim of the thesis is to develop a risk-based, continuous improvement 
framework that can be used to assess capability and maturity in emergency 
management systems, primarily within major accident hazard industry. The 
model should have a people focus, and provide improvement guidance in 
addition to an assessment of current capability. 
The objectives of the thesis are, first, to study the CMM concept to define how 
it can be changed to be more applicable to the emergency management 
application. 
The second objective is to define the set of organisational processes that 
collectively produce an emergency response. These processes should 
incorporate all aspects of the emergency management system, and will be 
used in a CMM type framework to assess the capability and maturity of an 
organisation's emergency management system. 
Objective three is to develop a protocol for using this assessment framework 
in an organisation. This will include defining how evidence of the processes 
can be found in organisations, and the opportunities and methods for 
assessing the processes. 
The fourth objective is to test the model in an organisation. This should 
indicate the appropriateness of the assessment protocol, the completeness of 
the process set and the potential use and value of the results. 
The final objective is to use the test data and any other available feedback to 
refine and improve the model, and to comment on its effectiveness and 
suitability as an industrial assessment tool. 
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1.3 Researcher's learning objectives 
In addition to the academic objectives of the research presented above, the 
researcher also has a personal agenda to learn and develop as a result of 
designing and implementing this research study. The practical skills that will 
be developed include observation of people and systems leading to 
interpretation of the data and explanation of the outcomes in the context of the 
wider field and theory. The planning, implementation and management of a 
research programme involving several different industrial and governmental 
contributors is also expected to be a valuable and challenging learning 
experience. 
As the interdisciplinary study of disaster and emergency management in the 
UK is becoming more established, it is hoped that this research will make a 
useful contribution to that field, and also encourage others from an 
interdisciplinary background to take part, and make a valuable contribution to 
research which has previously been the domain of specialist disciplines. 
1.4 Structure of the thesis and explanatory notes 
This thesis follows the classic learning-cycle structure, which involves defining 
a set of questions which need to be answered, then developing a model to 
answer those questions. This is followed by testing the model and using the 
test data to further refine and improve it. 
CMM and PCMM are Registered Trademarks of SEI, Carnegie Mellon 
Institute. All data connected with this study has been kept confidential at the 
request of the organisations involved in the research. 
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2 Review of the literature 
Literature relating to this subject is spread across many disciplines, from the 
social sciences to engineering, disaster management and organisational 
management fields, in addition to work conducted in the political and industrial 
arenas. This review will determine the important theories from the literature, 
and highlight the questions and issues that are raised. There are two main 
parts to the review and an additional description and review of capability 
assessment models presented in Chapter 3. 
This chapter comprises two main sections. The first section reviews the 
subject of risk, bringing together the social scientists' view of risk with more 
theoretical work to describe what it is, how it is perceived and why it is 
important that risk forms the foundations of emergency planning and 
management. 
The second section reviews literature from the emergency planning and 
management field. It identifies the important issues in emergency planning 
policy, training and testing, followed by the maintenance and improvement of 
the plan and emergency response capability. The theme of capability 
improvement and assessment continues into Chapter 3, which describes 
models used for capability assessment and improvement in the organisational 
management field, and how they might be applied to emergency 
management. 
2.1 What is risk 
There are many different meanings of the term 'risk' in current use. Financial 
risk, business risk and health risk are well researched and will be briefly 
discussed where they relate to the main focus of the chapter, which is risk 
from major hazard industry. 
A dictionary definition of risk is 
"A dangerous element or factor, a hazard Possibility of loss, injury, or damage. The 
chance of loss or the dangers to that which is insured in an insurance contract. " 
(Allen 2002: 764) 
Renn (1998) believes that neither scientific understanding nor the public 
domain has a commonly accepted definition of risk. Renn recognises however 
that a common thread linking the majority of definitions is a distinction 
between reality and probability. He notes that risk can be associated with the 
possibility of an undesirable state of reality, or adverse affects, occurring due 
to human or natural actions, and defines risk as 
'... the possibility that human actions or events lead to consequences that have an 
impact on what humans value". 
(Renn 1998: 51) 
This definition highlights the link between risk and uncertainty and that there is 
an aspect of risk which is outside human control. The consequences 
mentioned by Renn could be positive or negative. For clarity, this thesis will 
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refer to the negative outcomes of risk as costs and the positive outcomes as 
benefits. Renn's final notion is the concept of `what humans value', suggesting 
that the impact of risk could have a subjective impact, in addition to the 
objective costs and benefits. 
2.1.1 Probability 
Renn uses the word 'possibility', which is only usually used in fuzzy logic 
terms to indicate a value between 0 and 1. Possibility is the non-quantified 
chance that an event could occur. The term probability is more commonly 
found in risk literature. Risk is defined in engineering as 
Risk = Frequency x Consequences 
or 
Risk = Probability x Consequences 
Probability is a numerical measure of the chance of an event occurring, 
usually based on the frequency of previous occurrences of the same or similar 
event. Consequences in engineering risk are usually stated in terms of 
financial loss or human fatalities. 
Figure 2-1 Definition of ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) 
The diagram above shows that if an event occurs with low frequency and 
incurs low consequences, then the risk of that event is acceptable and 
measures to address are not required. Risk classified as ALARP (As Low As 
Reasonably Practicable) should be reduced as much as practicable, whereas 
risk identified as unacceptable by their high frequency or consequences must 
be addressed and reduced. The common definition of ALARP risk is where 
the risk to an individual falls between 10"3 andl0-5 or 10-6, depending on the 
industry concerned (Strutt, 1999). Risk lower than 10-6 is acceptable, and 
higher than 10-3 is unacceptable. 
It is usually the case that there is a distribution of uncertainty surrounding the 
frequency with which an event may occur, and uncertainty associated with the 
consequences of that event, so the risk is not precisely quantified. 
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Renn's allusion to human values is concurred by Cvetkovich and Earle (1992) 
who present a `constructivist' definition; 
"... assessment of risk involves judgements about what is valued. Risk is not an 
inherent quality of the physical world, but represents an interaction between physical 
and psychosocial characteristics. " 
(Cvetkovich and Earle 1992: 6) 
Cvetkovich and Earle also draw attention to the subjectivity of risk, mentioning 
judgement about what is valued. These authors present the useful concept of 
risk as an interaction between physical, engineered systems and the 
psychological and social characteristics of humans. This dual view of risk will 
be revisited throughout this review. 
2.1.2 Daniell's model 
Figure 2-2 Daniell's model of risk and capability 
Consequence 
RISK Probability 
RESPONSE 
; S. 
Adapted from Daniell (2000) 
Daniell (2000) describes four aspects of risk, as illustrated above, and claims 
that risk is systemic and therefore must be addressed from all of the four 
perspectives. Risk management would therefore be tasked with reducing the 
scale of harm and the likelihood that the harm occurs, and increasing the 
ability to respond and the likelihood that a response would take place. With 
some similarity to Renn's argument, Daniell also mentions the idea of value, 
stating that the harm or negative side of risk is only half of the picture. The 
positive aspect of risk focuses on opportunity and also has four elements; the 
value of the opportunity and the likelihood that the opportunity will occur, and 
the capability to capture that opportunity and likelihood that the capability will 
be deployed. The concept of the capability of an organisation to respond to 
and benefit from risk is an important one to be carried forward through this 
study. 
Pidgeon (1998) acknowledges two approaches to risk acceptability; firstly the 
psychometric group who use examinations and surveys to determine attitudes 
to risk, and secondly the socio-cultural camp who study societal groups and 
cultural factors for their understanding of risk. Beck (2001) extends the 
academic investigation of risk beyond just social science, asserting that 
"The calculus of risks connects the physical, the engineering and the social sciences" 
(Beck 2001: 51) 
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He further acknowledges that the technical fields also have a role to play in 
the risk arena, stating that 
"Risk statements are by nature statements that can be deciphered only in an 
interdisciplinary (competitive) relationship, because they assume in equal measure 
insight into technical knowledge and familiarity with cultural perceptions and norms". 
(Beck 2001: 138) 
The president of the US National Academy of Sciences, cited in Douglas and 
Wildavsky (1983), agrees that the estimation of risk is a legitimate activity of 
scientists in governments, universities and research bodies, as it is a scientific 
question. The acceptability of risk however is a political question and should 
be determined in the political arena. It would seem from the authors cited 
above that risk acceptability is not only political, but also a social and cultural 
concern. The cultural and social aspects of risk acceptability are discussed by 
several authors, reviewed later in this section. 
2.1.3 World Risk Society Model 
The work of Beck (2001) addresses risk in a political and philosophical 
context. His theory of the World Risk Society is based on the changing global 
political arena, which he calls the transition from first to second modernity. 
Beck writes that first modernity was a Nation-State system of networks and 
communities within a territorial scenario, which has been undermined by the 
destabilising influence of globalisation, individualisation, gender revolution, 
underemployment and global environmental hazards. In the second 
modernity, the developed and developing world's societies share these global 
challenges in different environments and through differing cultural and political 
perceptions. Beck's work is macro-political in its focus, and it provides insight 
into the international backdrop against which this study is conducted. 
2.1.4 Risk Culture Theory 
The relationship between risk acceptance and culture is explored by Douglas 
and Wildavsky (1983: 186) who allude to three main types of personal 
outlook, or culture on which people base their risk selection. Adams (2000: 
37) also discusses the risk cultural theory, suggesting that it provides a means 
of organising responses to uncertainty. He states that the different categories 
identified within the theory hold unique views on how risk might be better 
managed. Adams illustrates this by transposing human nature onto physical 
nature, dividing the human race by their attitude to risk, into four (as opposed 
to Douglas and Wildavsky's three) groups. The black balls on the diagram 
below represent the human and the line represents their boundaries. This 
approach to cultural outlook on risk is useful, as it gives risk and emergency 
planning professionals some concept of the potential reaction to and 
implications of their decisions. 
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Figure 2-3 Adams' Risk cultural groups 
FATALIST 
Not governed, unpredictable 
HIERARCHIST 
Governed within limits, relied on to an extent, tolerant 
INDIVIDUALIST 
Predictable, stable 
EGALITARIAN 
Fragile, precautious, unforgiving 
Adapted from (Adams 2000: 37) 
The ways in which different groups and individuals response to risk are widely 
discussed, with different perspectives being provided by Cvetkovich and Earle 
(1992), Sjöberg (1996) and Tierney (1999). An important point to take forward 
is that different people react to risk in different ways, and individuals may react 
differently at different times, to the same risk. 
2.1.5 Risk based decision making 
The authors cited in the previous section differ in their opinions of whether risk 
decisions should be based on statistics and probabilities of a hazardous 
event, or on human perceptions and opinions regarding danger and potential 
loss. There have been attempts to simplify risk decision making by grouping a 
population's aversion to risk based on sex, nationality, social status and other 
factors. These will be discussed later in this section. An interesting discord 
between the work of Tierney (1999) and of Beck (2001) is that Beck does not 
consider natural hazards as part of his World Risk Society model, as he 
deems there to be little decision making involved. Tierney regards natural 
hazards in the wider sense of human vulnerability, which is decision based, 
and hence should be considered similarly to anthropogenic hazards. 
2.1.6 Vulnerability and risk 
Vulnerability, or the state of being open or susceptible to damage or attack, is 
created by decisions. In their examination of natural hazards, Blaikie et al. 
give a working definition of vulnerability as 
"... the characteristics of a person or group in terms of their capacity to anticipate, 
cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard. " 
(Blaikie, Cannon, Davis & Wisner 1994: 9) 
This definition clarifies how vulnerability affects people. These effects are the 
same irrespective of whether the hazard is natural or technologically based. 
Vulnerability is well illustrated by the Bhopal disaster of 1984 (Shrivastava 
1992, Weir 1987). Inhabitants of the squatter settlements surrounding the 
plant were vulnerable in the sense of their close proximity to the plant and well 
ventilated shelters into which the toxic gas could easily pass. They were made 
more vulnerable by their lack of detailed knowledge of the hazard or any 
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coping strategies they could use. Finally their vulnerability was further 
increased by a lack of financial capacity to recover from the consequences of 
the disaster. Brojendra et al. (1986) concur, stating 
The gas victims were mostly the poor and famished slum dwellers. The worst 
affected were the old, the infirm and the children. Only the rich were spared. " 
(Brojendra, Nath, Banerjee 1986: 21) 
This point was reinforced by Weir (1987), who stated that those fortunate to 
live in upper floors of solid houses with sealed windows and roofs were 
'spared' by the gas. Most of these people, according to Brojendra et al. (1986) 
were warned by telephone at the same time as the Chief Minister and other 
officials living in the high-class area of New Bhopal. 
As shown above, the vulnerable are more likely to bear the cost of risk than 
the people who enjoy the benefit. The following section briefly discusses how 
cost and benefit of risk are analysed to make a judgment on risk acceptability. 
2.2 The costs and benefits of risk-taking 
One factor which motivates people and organisations to take risks is the 
potential benefit or reward. Benefits are usually measured in terms of financial 
reward or savings. They are specific in time and magnitude and directed to 
particular recipients. It is difficult to find a common unit of measurement for 
both cost and benefit, and so comparison of the cost of risk versus the benefit 
is rarely simple, however this analysis is a crucial part of risk-based decision 
making. Reaching a decision about the acceptable level of risk involves 
different groups of people with differing agendas who are motivated by a 
range of factors. The final subsection will investigate how risk decisions are 
made, and the variables which form part of that decision making. It will 
examine the theory of risk from three perspectives. The first perspective is 
cost, which is the negative aspect of risk. 
2.2.1 Types of cost 
Beck (2001) suggests that even without the risk being realised or an event 
occurring, there is a cost in terms of the loss of trust and security. He defines 
risk as 
"... no longer trust or security, not yet destruction or disaster. " 
(Beck 2001: 135) 
These costs are not easily measured or quantifiable, but on a personal and 
social level they are recognised as negative effects. This psychological cost, 
commonly known as `living in fear', is often underestimated. After the 
Chernobyl accident in Ukraine, other nuclear reactors on that site continued 
operating for 14 years. To date, 45,000 people in that region have received 
psychological care and over 3 million are estimated to suffer from Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), related to the insecurity and fear they 
experience, living close to the site of an incident which has been responsible 
for the deaths of over 7000 people over the past 16 years (UNDP 2002). 
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The second level of cost is the potential range of physical effects that an 
incident could inflict on the community if the risk was ever realised. Lind 
(2002a: 21) states that a characteristic of public risk is that the loser is 
unknown in advance of a loss. 
2.2.2 Gender related vulnerability 
Inequality in the distribution of risk throughout society is further discussed by 
Tierney (1999: 70), who identifies women as being disproportionately affected 
by the cost of risk. The release of MIC gas in the Bhopal chemical disaster 
effected a disproportionate burden on the female victims. Exposure to MIC 
resulted in reduced fertility, an increase in gynaecological difficulties and still- 
born or deformed children, in addition to a poor state of general health and an 
inability to work. These factors have added immeasurable pressure to the 
already difficult life of a lower-caste woman in India (Basu 1994). Further work 
into the subject of gender division in risk has been carried out by Sjoberg 
(1999) and Anderson and Manuel (1994) among others. 
2.2.3 Global system risk 
There are now a number of hazards which have no geographical boundaries. 
The interconnected nature of the food chain, global wind and air circulation 
and the water cycle mean that it is not possible to contain or isolate some 
pollutants. 
Beck (2001: 77) asserts nuclear and genetic hazards cannot be constrained in 
time, or place and therefore exceed our capacity to cope with them. The 
effects cannot be compensated for and the perpetrators are not accountable 
to the rules of liability, causality or blame. The Chernobyl incident caused the 
severe radioactive contamination of an area spanning 160,000 sq km of 
Ukraine and Belarus. The medical professionals in the region expect to 
diagnose 8000 cases of cancer over the coming years (UNDP 2002). 
`... the injured of Chernobyl are today, 16 years after the catastrophe not even all born 
yet" 
(Beck 2001: 77) (Emphasis as in source. ) 
The cost of over 17,000 cases of cancer and 200,000 people living in 
conditions of severe radioactive contamination is immeasurable. Grazing for 
livestock in some areas of the UK has just been declared safe following 
radioactive contamination. Sjöberg (1996) also states the cost in terms of the 
public perception of nuclear energy as irreparable. Although considered to be 
improbable events, high-impact major industrial catastrophes are often the 
catalysts for change in the emergency and disaster field. They reinforce the 
need for other industry to assure its stakeholders that the necessary 
safeguards and plans are in place to prevent such consequences occurring 
again. 
2.2.4 Measurement of cost 
"The only person who knows the value of loss is the one suffering it. " 
(Adams 2000: 23) 
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This clear statement from Adams enforces the argument that those who are 
responsible for risk decision-making are rarely aware of the full potential cost 
of that risk. Adams uses the term `value' rather than cost in this quote, a. 
concept discussed by Pidgeon (1998), who distinguishes between the values 
individuals hold, for instance the protection of animals, and things we place a 
value on, such as fresh air, clean water and public transport. Pidgeon 
questions whether one can place a value, monetary or preferential, on things 
in life which we value. Insurance companies place a monetary value on our 
sight, hearing, limbs and mobility but. the value of our freedom of movement 
and expression are much more difficult to quantify in monetary terms. 
Tierney (1999) makes a clear distinction between value and cost using the 
example of two buildings, each worth $1.2 million. One building is the country 
residence of two wealthy bankers. The other building is an inner-city 
apartment block housing ten low-income families. Quantitative Risk 
Assessment (QRA) would 'value' both buildings at $1.2 million, giving them 
equal standing. What is not recognised by QRA is that the bankers are heavily 
insured against damage to their building, and could easily replace it. The ten 
low-income families have no insurance, and would be unable to replace their 
homes. The value of the building is therefore far greater for the ten families, 
than it is for the two bankers. 
Terminology can be a problem in the study of risk. Cost and value are used 
interchangeably; however they can mean different things. Cost is defined by 
the dictionary (Allen 2002: 190) as "the price paid or charged for something", 
and value has definitions relating to monetary worth, as well as usefulness 
and importance. The distinction between cost and value is important in 
emergency planning, as items which might not be very costly in financial or 
QRA terms may have a high value in emotional and sentimental terms, to the 
owners. This human aspect of emergency planning is addressed more 
thoroughly later in this chapter. 
2.2.5 Value of life 
A second area where the terms `value' and 'cost' are confused is in so-called 
'Value of Life' (VOL) calculations. Ives, Kemp and Thieme (1993) recognise 
the controversial nature of their work in this area and are careful to stress the 
pitfalls. They describe earlier work, such as the concept of Human Capital, 
favoured in the 1970s. It attributed direct costs to grief, pain and other morally 
inestimable factors. A contemporary technique is called `Willingness to Pay' 
(WTP), which measures the monetary figure people would be willing to pay for 
and increase in safety or for example the retention of an historic artefact. WTP 
and its counter-measure 'Willingness to Accept' (WTA) will be discussed later 
in this section. 
Many ethical questions arise when discussing the value of life. Are all lives 
equal? Is the value of a future life equal to the value of a current life? With so 
many difficult questions, it is clear that VOL can only be used to aid risk-based 
decisions, and must be carefully placed in context. Lind (2002b: 27) agrees 
that VOL is an ethically difficult subject to approach, and suggests that it is 
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preferable to compare projects on the basis of number of lives lost or saved 
relative to the cost. 
In 1992 Marin (cited in Adams 2000: 23) gives an equation for the cost per 
head of population of a change in risk to life. The equation is convenient and 
simple, but it assumes that risk is evenly distributed over the whole 
population, which is rarely the case. The second assumption is that the VOL is 
equal across the population. This is ideologically correct, but invites 
arguments on the relative VOL across society. 
In risk assessment it is important to recognise that not all of the 
consequences of an incident can be generalised across the affected 
population or classified in terms of monetary worth. The psychosocial 
consequences of disaster are equally important considerations when writing 
an emergency plan and carrying out preparedness measures. In this context, 
guidance on meeting the social and psychological needs of disaster victims 
has been provided in `Disasters: Planning for a caring response' (Disasters 
Working Party 1992), discussed later in this review. Beyond the scope of this 
thesis, Gerrity and Flynn (1997) provide a thorough analysis of the mental 
health consequences of disaster, which examines the range of human 
responses to stress and disaster along with interventions that can benefit the 
victims. 
2.2.6 The benefits of risk 
In addition to the potential and real costs or loss arising from risk taking, there 
are also potential benefits. In extreme sports the individual benefit is 
sensuous. Pleasure is created by adrenalin and endorphins released into the 
blood stream. In business, the benefits from risk-taking can be increased 
productivity and profit. 
In Daniell's model (Daniell 2000) discussed in section 2.1.2, the four aspects 
of risk are mirrored by the four facets of opportunity he associates with risk. 
He alludes to the value of the opportunity, the likelihood of that opportunity 
arising, the capability to take advantage of that opportunity and the likelihood 
of deploying that capability. In order to take full advantage of the opportunity, 
all four angles must be addressed. While Daniell portrays this model as being 
equal and balanced in terms of risk and opportunity, organisational reality 
seems to differ. Organisational attitudes to negative risk are often 'it could 
never happen to us', but their attitude to profiting from the same risk is 
proactively managed to ensure that it does happen to them, and they make as 
much from it as possible. 
This is a view supported by Douglas and Wildavsky (1983: 88) who state that 
an organisation's latent goals are more influential than the goals which an 
organisation makes known to the public. An example of this is the oil industry, 
which vehemently publicises its goal of environmental protection. Their true 
organisational objective is to make money from selling the oil to customers 
who will bum it. Their benefit is the profit from oil sales, which supports the 
argument that Daniell's model should actually be lop-sided, with far greater 
emphasis being placed on ensuring that opportunity is exploited than effort 
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placed into preventing negative consequences. Focussing on the 
improvement of emergency management, it is important to recognise the 
constraints of working within an organisation whose principal goal is to 
generate profit. 
2.2.7 Measuring and comparing benefit 
Comparing the consequences to the benefits of a particular risk in a balanced 
and equitable manner is difficult. Benefits and costs may not occur at the 
same time, in the same location or to the same population. Their units of 
measurement might mean comparing quantitative benefits to qualitative 
losses or vice-versa. This is illustrated using the example of a chemical plant 
on the banks of a fast-flowing salmon river. Upstream, the community benefit 
from the employment and revenue the plant provides, which is quantifiable. 
Downstream, the community suffer from the water pollution and environmental 
degradation, which is less quantifiable. In many cases however, the true cost 
of risk is deliberately hidden behind complex equations and lengthy time- 
spans, because equitably exposing the true costs of many risks would render 
them unacceptable. 
2.3 Perceptions of acceptable risk 
With so many factors influencing the comparability of risk costs and benefits it 
is difficult to see how individuals and organisations decide an acceptable level 
of risk. This part of the review will discuss some of the models and 
frameworks used to justify risk-related behaviour, and what influences risk- 
based decision making. The issue is summarised succinctly by Renn who 
states 
"People are willing to suffer harm if they feel it is justified or if it serves other goals. At 
the same time they may reject even the slightest chance of being hurt if they feel risk 
is imposed on them or violates their other attitudes and values. " 
(Renn 1998: 58) 
2.3.1 Psychometric approach 
Given minimal information about a risk, there are several factors which can 
help form the basis of an opinion. These factors were distilled in Starr's work 
of the late 1960's, developed further as the 'psychometric approach' to risk 
perception by Slovic and Fischhoff in the late 1970s, and described in Sjöberg 
(1996). The approach is based upon nine risk dimensions; 
Figure 2-4 Psychometric approach, risk dimensions 
Voluntary -* involuntary 
Delayed effect 4 immediate effect 
Known precisely to exposed person 4 unknown 
Known precisely to science 4 unknown 
Controllable 4 uncontrollable 
New 4 old 
Chronic 4 catastrophic 
Common 4 dread 
Certain not to be fatal -3 certain fatality 
Sjöberg (1996: 220) 
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Whilst these factors remain a useful distillation of how risk might be perceived, 
the work was criticised because the dimensions were not proven conclusively 
through experiment, and the sample of people Starr chose was selected for 
convenience and was not representative of the population. 
2.3.2 Inequality in risk decisions 
The dimensions illustrate that there can be lesser and greater risks, evaluated 
by many different factors. Risk-based decision-making can begin only when 
such an evaluation has been made. The decision-making is rarely in the 
hands of those who may suffer the costs of the risk, however. As stated by 
Adams; 
°The people with greatest responsibility for decisions about societal risks of a physical 
nature are usually the best insulated from those risks. " 
(Adams 2000: 190) 
This is proven in the Bhopal example, where the technology and design of the 
Bhopal plant were imported to India from the United States. Pearce & Tombs 
(1998), Khare (1989) and Meshkati (1991) describe how the high-hazard 
Union Carbide plant was built in India despite widespread lack of faith in 
India's ability to operate the plant safely. UCC along with the Government of 
India (Gol), decided that the risk was acceptable, as they were physically 
isolated from that risk, and focussed on the gains rather than the potential 
losses. 
The same theory is played out in the political arena, where International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) instigated a policy known as the Green Revolution 
to increase India's debt repayments by encouraging focus on chemically and 
mechanically intensive farming. The IFIs' decision to implement the Green 
Revolution was also taken by people who would never suffer the 
consequences if the project failed. Without the Green Revolution induced 
demand for pesticides, the Bhopal plant would not have been built. 
The above examples show that different groups can find the same risk 
acceptable to a greater or lesser extent. Just as different cultures have 
varying risk perceptions, there are also divisions within cultures. The review to 
this point suggests that there are three main views of risk, held by different 
groups. These groups are the public, which includes pressure groups, 
individuals and local representative bodies; the political group which is made 
up of political parties, intra-governmental bodies and supra-national 
organisations such as the United Nations (UN); and the professional group, 
which comprises of industrial experts, risk managers and academics that have 
specialist knowledge in the field of risk. These three groups form a useful 
framework upon which to base the review of risk acceptance and risk-based 
decision making. 
2.3.3 Public acceptance of risk 
The public's attitude to risk is based around shared experience, according to 
Douglas (1986). They use joint knowledge to determine which of the 
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foreseeable losses are most likely to occur, which of those probable losses 
would be most harmful and which aspects of the harm might be preventable. 
The public also construct a scale of values ranging from serious to trivial, 
against which different consequences are evaluated, a concept which is in 
agreement with the Psychometric approach, risk dimensions shown in Figure 
2-4 and based on the original work by Starr. Douglas suggests that public 
rejection of a risky concept may not necessarily be due to ignorance, but 
instead may be a reaction of anger and objection to involuntary risk and the 
system which imposes it. Douglas (1986) voices the rather radical view that 
rather than committing resources to reducing risk, the way forward is to 
increase public tolerance to higher levels of societal risk-taking. Pidgeon 
(1998), however warns against organisations focussing on reducing the 
perception of the risk rather than reducing the actual risk. 
Douglas's approach is based in social science, and is a useful concept for 
emergency planners and risk managers. The views of the public, rather than 
traditionally disregarded as irrelevant and uninformed, should be encouraged 
in a structured format. This can provide the organisations with boundaries of 
acceptability within which they must operate. Eliciting these boundaries and 
the requirements of different stakeholder groups is a key part an 
organisation's emergency and risk management responsibility, and will be 
discussed later in this research. 
2.3.4 Right to participate 
Public inclusion in risk decision making has long been a contentious issue. 
Beck (2001: 43) cites the work of Frankfeld who details the goals of 
citizenship as dignity, autonomy and assimilation of members of the polity. 
Citizenship therefore includes participation and the joint right to knowledge 
and information. It also includes the right to informed consent and limitation of 
endangerment of collectives and individuals. One could define this as 'risk 
citizenship'. 
Cvetkovich and Earle (1992) illustrate the concept of risk citizenship, referring 
to the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorisation Act (SARA) Title 3, in the 
United States. The Act established Local Emergency Planning Committees 
(LEPCs) which were given the mandate of planning community response to 
chemical incidents. Some of the committees have now become effective 
discussion forums for a wide range of hazards. The United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is considering the LEPC approach for 
utilising community participation in other environmental issues. 
2.3.5 Risk thermostat model 
Adams (2000) has developed the 'risk thermostat' model graphically to 
illustrate the behaviour of individuals making risk-based decisions. 
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Figure 2-5 Basic risk thermostat 
Propensity 
to take Rewards 
risks 
-malump- 
--&. Balancingº 
behaviours 
Perceived Accidents 
danger 
Adapted from (Adams 2000: 15) 
The basic risk thermostat (Figure 2-5) illustrates the influences on an 
individual's attitude towards risk. Rewards for risk-taking affect the person's 
propensity to take risks, and accidents shape the person's perception of 
danger. These factors then shape the behaviour of the individual to balance 
the rewards against the accident risk, and modify his or her actions. The 
nodes can be shifted to indicate bias within an individual. Balancing behaviour 
can either be influenced by objective rewards and accidents, or subjective 
risks and danger. The thermostats can also interact in systems where the 
behaviour (risk-taking or perceptive of danger) can influence the behaviour of 
other parts. Examples of this include the behaviour of busses influencing the 
behaviour of cyclists, or the commercial behaviour of suppliers influencing the 
behaviour of manufacturers. 
Acceptance of risk is strongly linked to what people value, according to 
Sjöberg and Torell (1993). These authors also clarify that this evaluation is not 
solely based on moral values, but also economic and cultural values, which 
highlights an important point for emergency planning and management. 
Stakeholders in an emergency management response can include the local 
population, an organisation's personnel, the wider public, political groups as 
well as suppliers and clients. Each stakeholder has his or her own framework 
for evaluating what is acceptable in terms of the risk to health, job, beliefs, 
security and assets. Emergency planners and managers should be aware of 
their stakeholders' requirements if the emergency management system is to 
be acceptable. 
2.3.6 The use of public risk perception 
Given the variability of public opinion and perception of risk, caution must be 
exercised in recommending its use and value in risk management and 
regulatory decision making. Pidgeon (1998) provides a comprehensive 
argument on the topic, giving five reasons for and against using risk 
perception in this way. 
In favour of using risk perception, Pidgeon states that technocracy should 
always come second to democracy. The public should always have a say in 
something which will affect them. Participation in design also gives a greater 
sense of ownership to the public, and increases their commitment to and faith 
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in a particular course of action. This is in agreement with the comments on 
citizenship by Beck (2001) cited in 2.3.4. 
Pidgeon also states that decisions will be more easily accepted if they reflect 
the preferences and values of the people found in risk perception. The fourth 
reason in favour is that social amplification of risk has resulted in a 
heightening of interest in such matters, and the public in general have strong 
opinions on issues of risk. Research has been carried out at the Universities 
of Birmingham, East Anglia, Surrey and Queen's (Belfast) to investigate the 
mechanisms and factors which influence public opinion on risk matters. The 
research concluded that the public react strongly to events which have an 
impact on a large number of people and have the capacity to generate 
outrage and an emotional response (Department of Health, 2001). 
Pidgeon finally alludes to the value of Special Interest Groups (SIGs), made 
up of lay people who have carried out extensive research into the particular 
risks involved. In comparison to experts who are likely to conceal bias, lay 
people are more inclined to declare their partiality and personal opinions. 
Public perceptions and the contribution of SIGs are likely to enrich the expert 
approach, which is inclined to focus on quantitative costs and number of 
fatalities rather than distribution of risks and societal effects. 
Pidgeon (1998) also gives five reasons against using public risk perception in 
regulatory decision making. He notes that the public are not sufficiently 
knowledgeable to accurately evaluate what may harm them. Their views are 
not grounded in science, and could result in the misdirection of resources, a 
view concurred with by Fiorino. 
"Given the sheer complexity of the issues, the trans-scientific nature of the factual 
premises and the rapid changes in definition of the problems and their solutions, the 
lay public lack the time, information and inclination to take part in technically based 
problem solving. 
(Fiorino 1990: 227) 
Fiorino later states that he would welcome a mechanism to explore and 
integrate public perception of risk. 
Pidgeon's second reason is in the interests of equality, and Pidgeon notes 
that public risk perceptions may sometimes be biased against certain groups. 
This could steer public policy into damaging and discriminating actions. One 
example is the areas of the world where HIV is blamed on the sufferer, and 
there is a stigma attached to the virus and those who are infected with it. 
Thirdly, as mentioned in 2.3.3, if public perception played the major role in 
decision making, then the organisations causing the risk would simply have to 
manage the perceptions through public relations and image management, 
rather than manage the risk itself. Ultimately this would be a regressive step 
for the field of risk management. 
The penultimate reason given is related to the heterogeneity of the public. 
Individuals and groups select different risks on which to focus their concern, 
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and represent them in different ways. With such a range of views, it would be 
difficult to satisfy a majority, and reach an acceptable representative decision. 
Finally, Pidgeon states that public perception is socially constructed from 
numerous influences and interactions in the cultural and social arena. 
Justifying and accounting for perceptions and therefore the nature of the 
aversion to or acceptance of risk would be difficult. Each risk decision would 
have to be dealt with individually, as it could not be assumed that previous 
decisions could be replicated to a different location or point in time, as is 
common practice with technical risk assessments. 
2.3.7 Professional decisions on risk acceptability 
The title of professional in the field of risk can include scientists, engineers, 
organisations, academics and consultants. Their opinions and evaluation of 
risk are traditionally given higher credibility than public opinion. It is only with 
the growing interest in risk from the social sciences that the authority of some 
of these professionals is being questioned. 
Douglas and Wildavsky (1983) recognise the limitations of the scientists 
involved in the risk profession. However professional their attitude, their 
opinions will have been unconsciously polarised towards either risk taking or 
risk aversion through their life experience and personality. Conversely 
however, Douglas and Wildavsky go on to state (1983: 73) that the 
engineering expert's risk assessment is often de-contextualised and 
dissocialised. 
Rather than the experts being at fault, it seems they are placed in an almost 
impossible position. They are berated for allowing their personal experience to 
affect their judgment of risk acceptability, and berated for ensuring that their 
judgement in risk assessment is not affected by context and social condition. 
A good deal of the conflict in this field can be attributed to misunderstanding 
and distrust between the social science field and the engineering 
mathematicians. One solution is to adopt an attitude of accountability in all risk 
and emergency matters. The mechanisms for achieving this in an emergency 
plan and management system will be discussed later in this study. 
2.3.8 Engineering risk acceptability 
A number of methods are used to represent acceptable risk criteria, including 
the use of f. Nmax plots. These graphs show incidents plotted according to 
their frequency on the Y axis against number of deaths (or quantity of loss) on 
the X axis. Acceptability can then be indicated on the graph, showing which 
incidents were acceptable, and the likely acceptability of any future incidents 
of a certain magnitude. An example of this can be found in the work of Hirst 
and Carter (2002) who have devised a method for measuring societal risk 
from a hazardous installation. The use of f. Nmax plots attract controversy in 
the literature, as certain social scientists see this effective means of displaying 
data as an example of engineers attempting to impose acceptable risk criteria. 
This view is voiced by Lind (2002b: 27). 
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Hoegberg (1998) describes an alternative to f. Nmax plots. The Swedish 
nuclear regulator uses risk profiles rather than a single worst case numerical 
risk estimate favoured by Hirst and Carter (2002). Risk profiles include 
quantitative and qualitative descriptions of scenarios, which are made up of 
events, sequences and processes. These scenarios also have detrimental 
consequences and estimated probabilities. Risk profiles can be compared to 
social activities and natural examples, and the value judgments compared 
where appropriate. 
Both methods have benefits and disadvantages, and should be used as 
specific circumstances dictate. The important point to draw from this is that 
the acceptability of risk is a complex issue, and it is not easy to summarise it 
with a single model, equation or theory. 
2.3.9 Political risk decisions 
In many cases the final decision regarding the acceptance of a risk lies with a 
political body. These range from specially commissioned enquiry groups to 
government departments and regulators such as the Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) and Environment Agency (EA). Responsibility and 
accountability in political organs are sometimes difficult to guarantee. 
This is illustrated by Douglas (1986: 63), who cites the Kemeny report into the 
Three Mile Island (TMI) accident. The National Radiological Commission 
(NRC) was responsible for safety of operations at the plant, but did not have a 
remit or staff to investigate or monitor Man-Machine Interface (MMI) issues. 
The control room at TMI during the accident had three audible alarms 
sounding, many of the 1600 warning lights activated and the warning 
computer was running far behind the sequence of events. Over 40 people 
were present in the control room, and telephones were ringing constantly 
(Perrow 1999: 28). The NRC was democratically constructed by society, and 
its remit was dictated by the wider populace, who are unlikely to have a wide 
appreciation of operations systems in nuclear power generation. 
2.3.10 Influences on decision making 
The previous section determined that the public, professionals and politicians 
are responsible for deciding the level of acceptable risk to be faced by society. 
Their decisions are influenced by many factors, the more salient of which are 
discussed in this subsection. 
2.3.11 Media influence 
The media are one of the major influences on risk decision making. Sjöberg 
(1999) emphasises the influence of the media on risk perception, and the 
often oversimplified picture of risk that they represent. Tierney (1999) agrees, 
stating that the media generally favour monocausal explanations, especially 
focussing on the actions of a single actor in order to attribute blame. Sjöberg 
does not however, distinguish between different media organs, which operate 
to different agendas in different countries. The media has a much more varied 
influence than is often recognised. 
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The information output of the media is also used and interpreted by the public 
in a range of ways. Trumbo (1998) suggests from his experimental work that 
relationships exist between the type of communications channel used, and its 
cost and utility. Cost in this sense is the amount of effort needed to access the 
information. 
Douglas (1986) argues that the public tend to focus on media enhanced risk, 
such as nuclear power, HIV and cancer, and to underestimate familiar, 
situational risk such as asthma. She discusses the concept of salience, which 
means making one interpretation more available or visible than another. 
Salience could help explain the difference in perceptions of risk between 
cultures and at different points of time, as the media gives salience to large 
scale disasters for a time after the impact, but coverage fades once the drama 
ends. 
Public concern about technical risks and heightened media reporting may also 
intensify the responsiveness of the official decision makers, keen to be seen 
by the public to be contributing and taking positive action. Cohen (1998), a 
staunch supporter of 'hard science' over perception and public concern, states 
that the media is directly responsible for the public perception of nuclear 
power being totally out of touch with the results of scientific risk analysis. 
Whilst it is clear that the media in general have not supported the nuclear 
industry in the UK or USA, the public distrust of nuclear concepts is more 
likely to stem from a lack of understanding of radiation. As illustrated in Starr's 
work in 2.3.1 a factor which is dreaded is likely to be perceived as highly 
negative. Radiation, an energy that the public cannot see, hear or taste and 
yet can cause incurable disease and death, is certainly dreaded. 
The media are an important tool and should feature in any emergency 
management system. If managed well, the media can be an asset to the 
emergency response. If neglected or managed badly they can compound the 
negative consequences of any incident. In a multi-agency emergency 
response, the media may be one of the agencies and so a means to formally 
acknowledge this and develop the relationship with the media in emergency 
planning is regarded as an important issue for the research. 
2.3.12 Social and Cultural influence on risk decision making 
Cultural factors have been shown to influence risk decision making. This is 
discussed by Douglas (1986: 67). Culture is defined as a publicly shared 
collection of values and principles used at a particular time to justify 
behaviour. An individual's decisions and views are moderated and 
homogenised by the groups which they are part of. Acting as a group, 
Douglas (1986) suggests that they essentially carry out cost-benefit analyses 
of the decisions, and decide on the most beneficial course of action to 
maintain their group interests. Douglas also suggests that groups of people 
are likely to make riskier decisions than individuals. Research in the 1970s 
labelled this as the risky shift phenomenon, and it is known in contemporary 
work as group polarisation of attitudes or group choice shift. 
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One of the pertinent problems of judging and assessing the value of cultural 
inputs into the risk field is that every human is part of, or affected by culture in 
some way. 
"There is no impartial referee available to judge the appropriateness of cultural 
constructions. 
(Renn 1998: 59) 
Renn (1998) argues that the selection of risk issues for concern and 
motivation for action is based on cultural conventions and social 
constructions. 
The Royal Society (1992) cites the key work of Starr in 1969 which used the 
method of revealed preferences. This investigates the implicit trade-offs made 
in a society, balancing the risks and the benefit of a hazard by analysing 
currently accepted levels of accidents. Four of Starr's key points are cited by 
Douglas (1986) and looked upon as defining points in the risk field. Starr 
concluded that victims and benefactors of risk will have differing views. This 
point is echoed by Beck (2001: 10). People also have expectancies of control 
over the risk they are exposed to. Voluntary and involuntary risk attracts 
different reactions from the public and perception is affected by the magnitude 
and visibility of the type of risk. 
2.3.13 Risk Compensation theory 
Considering an individual's acceptance of risk, Douglas (1986) questions a 
link between the level of risk experienced in that person's occupation and the 
level of risk they expose themselves to in their social life. Douglas offers no 
answer to this, whereas Adams (2000) proposes the Risk Compensation 
theory, which suggests that if the environmental circumstances change to 
reduce the risk we are exposed to, we will adjust our behaviour to restore their 
original level. 
Adams (2000: 60) supports his theory by citing the trend in number of deaths 
by accident and violence on a global scale between 1900 and 1980. Overall, 
the trend for the 31 countries studied remains constant over the 80 year 
period, with no major fall or rise in the death rate. Major wars and disasters 
show small blips in the trend, but it returns to a similar level, despite advances 
in risk reduction and technological advancement. Adams argues that this is 
because as we gain control over a particular risk, another risk emerges. 
2.4 Risk literature conclusions 
In order to use aspects of risk-based emergency planning later in this study, it 
was necessary to develop a clear understanding of risk. This section of the 
literature review introduced risk from several different perspectives, looking in 
detail at the cost, the benefit and achieving an acceptable balance. 
Global-level risk, including environmental, transport, energy and terrorism, has 
no boundaries and has the potential to affect millions of people. These people 
will perceive and react to risk in different ways, influenced by different factors, 
depending on their culture, social group and background. 
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Risk is different according to population and location, and it also varies in 
time. The concept of risk includes people and a hazard in an environmental 
context. None of those variables is constant, and so risk is continually 
changing. A risk evaluated ten years ago will not be the same today, and a 
risk acceptable today might not be acceptable in ten months' time. The 
dynamic nature of risk demands a dynamic and adaptive approach to 
emergency management and planning in MAHIs, and this will be a large focus 
of the following chapters. 
2.5 UK Emergency planning and management 
The first part of the literature review looked at the risk basis of emergencies, 
including the organisational and public perceptions of 'what could happen'. 
This part of the review examines literature on emergency planning, which is 
one of the main tools organisations use to address risk. 
This section will review literature concerned with the construction of 
emergency plans, the training methods used to support plan users and 
exercising methods used to test the plan, test the response and demonstrate 
performance. The section will conclude with a look to the future of UK 
emergency planning and response. 
The aim of this thesis is to develop a framework to assess emergency 
management performance and capability, as stated in Chapter 1. One of the 
primary steps to achieving this aim is clearly to define the scope of the 
assessment. This chapter will determine from the literature how emergency 
management is performed, and what factors will influence the assessment. 
Chapter 3 will then explore how performance and capability are assessed in 
other fields, and whether anything useful can be transferred. 
2.5.1 UK Regulatory regime 
There are several pieces of UK legislation that require organisations and local 
authorities to carry out emergency planning and management. A broad duty is 
outlined in the Health and Safety at Work (HaSaW) Act 1974 conferring on 
organisations the responsibility for protection of the 
`... health and safety of people liable to be affected by work activities'. 
(HSE, 1999) 
This is supplemented by the Management of HaSaW Regulations 1992 which 
clarifies the obligation of 
`... employers and the self employed to identify hazards arising from their activities 
and make suitable arrangements to ensure they are fully controlled' 
(HSE, 1999) 
There are three specific Statutory Instruments that outline the duty of 
hazardous installations. The first of these is the Nuclear Installations Act of 
1965 which states in Licence Condition 11 that installations licensed under the 
Act must have in place adequate arrangements for dealing with accidents and 
emergencies. With reference to emergency arrangements, Licence Condition 
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11 also demands that sites submit emergency arrangements and any 
alterations to the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, consult any organisations 
involved and rehearse the arrangements. They are also responsible for 
training employees in the necessary procedures. 
The Pipeline Safety Regulations (HSE, 1996) require that 
"... emergency plans to be prepared for hazardous pipelines... Proper planning 
minimises consequences. Good planning will also optimise the use of resources 
emergency planning is part of an overall strategy for preventing and minimising the 
effects of major accidents to people and the environment. " 
(HSE 1996: 5) 
This 'overall strategy' mentioned, is a three-part strategy for major accidents 
and was developed following the Flixborough disaster in the UK in 1974, and 
is described below. 
Identification - notify the enforcing authorities of the hazardous 
presence 
Prevention and control - by applying appropriate controls based on 
an assessment of the hazards, risks and possible consequences, the 
likelihood of a major accident can be minimised 
/'r Mitigation - even with the best controls, major accidents will never be 
totally eliminated so the effects of any that do occur should be kept as 
small as possible. Emergency Planning is one of the principal steps to 
achieving this. 
Steed (1998) claims that the Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards 
(CIMAH) regulations 1984 were first directly to mention emergency planning. 
CIMAH was superseded by new Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) 
regulations in 1999. 
The aims of COMAH are 
`... to prevent major accidents involving dangerous substances and to limit the 
consequences to people and the environment if accidents do occur. COMAH requires 
on-site and off-site emergency plans to deal with the potential major accidents for 
those sites with the greatest hazards. 
(HSE 1999b: v) 
COMAH implements the Seveso II Directive (96/82/EC) which is the European 
Union legislation that replaces the original Seveso Directive (85/501 /EEC). 
The S6veso Directive was drawn up in response to an incident in a suburb of 
Milan, Italy in 1976. An explosion had resulted in the formation of the defoliant 
chemical known to the military as Agent Orange. Hundreds of residents 
suffered violent inflammation of any exposed skin. The long-term effects 
resulted in cancer and there was immeasurable environmental contamination. 
The long term effects are still not fully known. There was little analysis of the 
risk posed by the chemicals used at the plant, and as a result, no preparation 
for the incident. The European Economic Community (EEC) passed the 
Seveso Directive to enforce risk assessment and emergency planning within 
hazardous industry. Site operators must take all the measures necessary to 
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comply with the regulations, and are required to demonstrate their compliance 
to the competent authority. This requirement to demonstrate compliance will 
be discussed in greater depth in later sections. 
Sites holding or processing above a certain quantity of hazardous substances 
are classified as being 'top-tier'. They are required to produce site and off-site 
emergency plans. Site plans are produced by the organisation and off-site 
plans should be constructed by the Local Authority (LA) in cooperation with 
the site. The plans should link well, and enable a coordinated response, as 
detailed in Dealing with Disaster (Home Office, 1994). This should be ensured 
by a process of consultation with the public and other agencies. The 
regulations also state that the level of planning for catastrophic failure type 
incidents should be appropriate to the probability of an incident occurring. 
The Civil Defence Act 1948 forms the basis of Local Authority (LA) emergency 
planning and management activities (Home Office, 1999). The Act was 
supplemented by legislation in 1983,1986 and 1993. Until 1996 authorities 
were only permitted to use their funding from central government for conflict- 
related emergency planning. Permission was given in 1996 for civil defence 
funds to be used for peace-time emergencies. Vary (2001: 11) states that 
despite attempts to change the regulations to 'Civil Protection' in 1993, there 
was no change. The Civil Defence (General local authority function) 
regulations 1993 (1) section 6, that highlight the duty of metropolitan councils 
to 'Make, keep under review and revise plans, carry out exercises and 
arrange for training of staff and others, take preparatory steps and carry out 
any of these plans' legally, only refer to civil defence plans, however. Vary 
goes on to state that other than these core legislative requirements and the 
government publication 'Dealing with Disasters' (Home Office 1994) there is 
no single statement of national policy concerning disaster management. 
Since Vary's work the Emergency Planning portfolio has been moved to the 
Cabinet Office, and is now dealt with by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat. 
Work is underway to redefine the role and responsibility of LA emergency 
planning departments and regional government in civil protection, which will 
culminate in the Civil Contingencies Bill, which is being issued as this thesis is 
being completed. 
2.5.2 To defend or to protect? 
Alexander (2002b: 210) argues that a move towards civil protection is a 
necessary progression towards collaboration and information sharing. Civil 
Defence is associated with military and paramilitary forces, acting under an 
authoritarian command structure. It favours plans and strategies which are 
kept secret from enemy powers. Such a system is based around the 
withholding of information, and therefore is not totally compatible with 
accountability and transparency. Alexander notes that by the late 1960s, 
research in the social sciences had cast doubt on efficacy of using 'command 
and control' based military systems of emergency management. 
Alexander (2002b: 209) notes that civil defence plans to protect the public 
from nuclear attack in 1948-9 were 'pretty useless'. Clarke (1999) goes on to 
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say that even now, plans to deal with and recover from nuclear disaster are 
based on conjecture rather than scientific certainty, and as such, bear little 
resemblance to reality. Clarke's work refers to such plans as 'fantasy 
documents' which are described as 
"... symbolic documents... rhetorical instruments that have a political utility in reducing 
uncertainty for organisations and experts" 
Clarke (1999: 13) 
Dynes (1990) concurs with Alexander, Clarke and Vary in the unsuitability of 
the military command and control model as a basis for civilian, peacetime 
emergency management. Dynes' main argument describes the difference in 
behaviour between military and civilian populations. The former are 
regimented, obedient and organised whereas the latter can be fragmented, 
heterogeneous and unpredictable. Dynes goes on to advocate an alternative 
model based on continuity, coordination and cooperation which help form the 
foundations of research-based planning. 
The military command and control model assumes that people are weak and 
helpless and therefore need an authority figure to command and control them 
in an emergency (Dynes 1990). Plans based on this model tend to have four 
main assertions: 
Figure 2-6 Command and control assertions 
Command and Control model 
IndividU is not 
likely to perform 
well due to 
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people in line. 
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function 
effectively, ,... __ 
Strong 
authority must 
be created, to 
control any 
anti-social and 
irrational 
behaviour. 
Local rc 
institutions 
should be 
replaced by 
outside, 
preferably 
military on 
Adapted from Dynes (1990) 
Plans based on these assumptions try to impose a uni-directional authority on 
the emergency situation, whereas normality is based on multi-dimensional 
authority structures. Emergency plans create unfamiliar situations, which 
cause departure from normality, in addition to the disruption already caused 
by the actual disaster. There is an inferred distrust of emergent groups, which 
stems from the notion that the public should obey any instruction they are 
given, and do nothing else. 
Dynes (1990) advocates the use of a problem-solving type model of 
emergency management, which makes full use of existing social structures in 
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the incident response. Using existing social structures minimises further 
departure from normality, and minimises disruption to the public. Dynes 
argues that existing social structures can evolve a more adequate response 
than the traditional command and control model. He considers the key 
advantages to be continuity rather than chaos, coordination rather than 
command, and cooperation rather than control. Dynes suggests the theory 
that behaviour before the emergency is a good predictor of behaviour in an 
emergency if existing social structures are used. 
Alexander (2002a) suggests that there are different types of organisations in 
emergency response. The `adapting' organisation retains its original structure 
and personnel, and adapts its operations to the needs of the incident. An 
'expanding' organisation increases their complement in order to cope with the 
disaster, perhaps taking on volunteer workers or recalling workers on leave, or 
employing consultants. An `extending' organisation increases their activities to 
cover the needs generated by the disaster. An example is a civil engineering 
company becoming involved in structural damage assessment following an 
earthquake. Bardo also mentions `emerging' organisations, which are created 
during the incident and can include survivor and victim support associations. 
Examples include a group of wives who lost their husbands in the Piper Alpha 
disaster, and the Disaster Action group, which represents victims and 
survivors of several disasters in the UK. Sociologists have labelled such 
groups as examples of a `disaster sub-culture'. The final group noted by Bardo 
are `redundant' organisations, who have no role to play in a disaster and are 
discontinued by their members for the duration of the incident. They can 
include sporting and cultural groups. 
Alexander (2002a: 104) compares the hierarchical command and control 
method of emergency management to the newer Incident Command System 
(ICS). The latter is found to be more flexible and dynamic and can change to 
meet new challenges and novel situations that occur in emergencies. ICS is 
based on an optimum structure of 'one leader to seven operators' team. The 
system has two main difficulties, in accounting for the person who wants to 
operate alone and in the difficulty of observing work from a higher level. It is 
however a rapid response solution, as individual teams can be set to work on 
a part of the response without stalling if other teams or parts of the response 
are not ready. This system depends heavily on structured information flow, 
and requires a well practiced and honed information management system. 
2.5.3 Examples of overseas regulatory regimes 
Dynes (1990) suggests that the UK lags behind the USA in reforming the civil 
defence establishment, with major UK change only taking place after the 
World Trade Centre catastrophe of September 11th 2001. The USA began the 
move away from civil defence in the 1970s, with The Disaster Relief Act 
closely followed by the establishment of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA). Some aspects of USA emergency management still 
incorporate elements of command and control however. 
Steed (1998) describes the Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) 
regime which was introduced under President Carter in 1979. CEM is based 
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on preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation. Steed's interpretation 
indicates that the sequence begins with an incident, with the first stage being 
response. If correct, this would mean that the system had a reactive capacity, 
with an incident providing the motivation for preparedness measures. This is 
possible, but wider reading on the subject suggests that Steed has 
misinterpreted the sequence. Steed also mentions the goals of Integrated 
Emergency Management (IEM) in the USA, which are to develop and 
maintain a credible, national emergency management capability by integrating 
emergency management activities by their functions, relevant to all hazards. 
This 'all-hazards' approach of looking at the common management functions 
across all possible hazards is an important point, and is developed later in this 
study. 
The USA also has stern penalties for organisations which do not comply with 
emergency management legislation. LAs and companies which do not comply 
are heavily fined, up to $75,000 per violation per day for districts, and $50,000 
or 5 years imprisonment for organisations which cover up hazardous 
incidents. 
Steed (1998) also cites the practice in Australia, which changed from a British 
style civil defence focus to state level emergency management organisations 
in 1989. New Zealand has an all-hazards approach, with a mainly civil 
defence and protection based system. Denmark boasts a highly trained group 
of volunteers. They also have a high level of technical skill, and a specialist 
college for staff training in civil defence, with a strong exercise focus to their 
training. 
Porfiriev (2001) discusses the situation in Russia, where radical change 
followed Chernobyl in 1986 and the Armenian earthquake in 1988. 
Emergency management policy has existed as part of the National 
Development Policy for little over 10 years in Russia. There is now a relative 
increase in the role of mitigation, implying a gradual move from reactive to 
proactive flexible approach. Russia has an agent based planning system, 
rather than an 'all hazard' reaction based approach. Seveso II is interpreted 
into the 1997 Industrial Safety of Hazardous Production Facilities Act. 
2.6 The emergency plan 
This subsection will review literature on the construction, function and 
elements of emergency plans. The focus is on UK hazardous industryand 
Local Authority plans, however where useful comment is made on different 
types of plan, this has been taken into account. 
2.6.1 The role and purpose of emergency planning 
The UK regulatory guidance (HSE 1999) defines a Major Accident according 
to COMAH as 
"an occurrence (including in particular, a minor emission, fire or explosion) resulting 
from uncontrolled developments in the course of the operation of any establishment 
and leading to serious danger to human health or the environment, immediate or 
delayed, inside or outside the establishment, and involving one or more dangerous 
substances. " 
(HSE 1999: vii) 
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The environment in relation to COMAH comprises of built features, water, air, 
soil, flora and fauna. Just as the hazard to off-site populations should have 
been mapped and considered, so should the hazards to the relevant 
environmental features. Detailed environmental risk assessment should have 
been carried out by the establishment. The Fire Service, the Environment 
Agency and specialist contractors might need to be consulted about pollution 
control and restoration of the environment following any incident. 
The COMAH regulations (HSE 1999) give the objectives for off-site and site 
emergency plans as 
/Y Containing and controlling incidents so as to minimise the effects, and 
to limit damage to persons, the environment and property; 
l' Implementing the measures necessary to protect persons and the 
environment from the effects of major accidents; 
Communicating the necessary information to the public and emergency 
services and authorities concerned in the area, and; 
/ Providing for the restoration and clean-up of the environment following 
a major accident. 
In addition to the plans and procedures, the commitment of the organisation is 
mentioned by The Home Office (1999) in the Standards for Civil Protection in 
England and Wales document, stating that 
`... to be fully effective, EM arrangements must have the positive support of elected 
members and senior staff. Arrangements should be corporately owned and all those 
likely to be involved in a response should feel they have an investment in the 
planning process and its successful operation. " 
(The Home Office 1999: 4) 
It also states that senior staff within the local authority should have their 
emergency management responsibilities noted in their job descriptions, and 
any department or service which has a role in the emergency arrangements 
must also be involved in the emergency planning process. 
The Home Office (1999) also give an inclusive definition of resources as 
... people, finance and equipment but also include mechanisms to access 
alternatives and the development of practical arrangements to contact and callout 
staff. " 
(Home Office 1999: 10) 
The plan should also initiate a responsible and precise warning process for 
the general public and specialised groups. The structure and responsibility for 
warning should be detailed in the plan, and there should also be a mechanism 
for feedback on the effectiveness of the warning. Public warning in 
emergencies is a very sensitive topic, and involves politics and economics as 
much as it includes technical knowledge and communication. Alexander 
(2002b: 147) notes succinctly 
'... flexibility and marriage of technical and social expertise are the key to success of 
the warning process. " 
(Alexander 2002b: 147) 
33 
Paton and Jackson (2002) enhance the definition of an emergency plan 
beyond the document, stating 
"Plans should be based on a detailed and comprehensive analysis of operational 
demands, linked to action (e. g. training programmes, resource allocation, simulation 
exercises) and reviewed regularly. " 
(Paton and Jackson 2002: 115) 
The extent of emergency planning efforts is an issue of some disagreement in 
the emergency management field. Nuclear sites in the UK, under the Nuclear 
Site Licence Condition 11, must identify the most significant hazard which 
gives the 'reference accident' against which the site and off-site plan can be 
designed. Non-nuclear sectors are less prescriptive however. Terms including 
'worst case scenario', 'worst credible event', 'beyond design-basis accident', 
'worst credible incident' are used interchangeably, and no clear delineation is 
available. Ramsay (1999) offers some clarification, in noting that a plan should 
be capable of dealing with the largest reasonably foreseeable incidents, but 
detailed planning can be focussed on the more probable events, the 
emergency plan taking a risk-based approach. Risk-based emergency 
planning will be discussed further in the following section, as the literature 
concerning the structure and content of emergency plans is examined. 
2.6.2 Structure and content of plan 
The essential purpose of an emergency plan is given by Alexander (2002b) in 
his description of the process of planning. 
«In this process [emergency planning], technology must mesh with geophysical, 
social and cultural factors to produce a multi-faceted document flexible and detailed 
enough to direct operations in a wide variety of circumstances but simple and well 
structured enough to be understood by a wide variety of users. 
(Alexander 2002b: 95) 
Alexander also emphasises that the purpose of the plan is to inform, instruct 
and direct participants, highlighting two specific sections of plan. These are 
information management in terms of communications channels, protocols, 
priorities and public information and the command structure; which must be 
clearly structured and understood. A flatter organisational structure is 
favoured, incorporating parallel operational units under a single tier of 
strategic direction. 
The merits of different plan document styles will be discussed further in the 
Data Analysis; however Alexander (2002b) suggests that the plan itself should 
be a three part document, consisting of an abbreviated synthesis of the 
actions, the actual planned structure of the response, and an annex 
containing the data and appendices. The synthesis of actions should be a 
document which can be used in an emergency, and provides easy access to 
the required information. The full section of the plan should be the main 
document which can be used in exercise planning and training, and with 
which all teams should be familiar. It may not be appropriate for reference in 
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an incident however. The diagram below summarises the key components of 
the emergency planning process (HSE 1999: 7) 
Figure 2-7 Key components of emergency planning process 
types, scale and the objectives of Identify the 
consequences of the response in components required 
potential Major technical and to achieve a 
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malicious acts. terms 
responsibilities fo 
the response and 
associated 
routine procedures & means to ensure 
resources are the plans will be 
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sufficient, and what to intended - duty 
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Adapted from (HSE 1999: 7) 
The regulations also prescribe some contents of the site plan, including the 
details of how the plan can be initiated and who is responsible for taking 
charge of the site response. The plan should also include details of liaison 
with off-site agencies, and how they are warned and the off-site plan is 
activated. Details of how to control smaller events which could trigger a major 
accident and limiting risk to the site population are also required. 
Arrangements for training staff in their emergency duties, and plans for 
providing assistance to the off-site response are also prescribed components 
of the plan. 
Coordination between teams and organisations is facilitated by the adoption of 
a common terminology. The COMAH regulations encourage this, as it aids 
consistent emergency planning across the country. COMAH adopts standard 
names for the role and responsibilities of each emergency team member 
(HSE 1999: 14). This uniform approach to emergency management also 
assists regulation. 
As indicated in Figure 2-7, the operator has a duty to ensure the plan is put 
into place as intended. The guidance suggests that an operator can ensure 
this by training the emergency planners, training those with a role in the plan, 
detailing how the plan components will be tested & updated, and how plan 
components will be reviewed & revised to account for changes and lessons 
learned. The importance of learning the lessons from emergency response 
are echoed in the responsibilities of the Site Main Controller (Emergency 
Manager), to 
means to ensure 
the plans will be 
put into effect as 
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response 
coordination 
including any sub- 
"arrange for an ongoing record to be kept of the emergency and the responses 
undertaken to mitigate its effects, to provide evidence of the decisions made, the 
mitigatory action taken, and to ensure that lessons are learned from the response to 
the emergency. " and "Ensure that full consideration is given to the preservation of 
evidence" 
(HSE 1999: 15) 
The EM oversees the response from the Emergency Command Centre 
(ECC). The guidance prescribes several requirements of the ECC, including 
good communications links, facilities to record the development of the incident 
to assist incident management and decision making. Record keeping is 
essential for any subsequent inquiry. The ECC should have facilities to record 
messages sent and received, and access to data on the site population at the 
time of the incident. The site should also identify any circumstances where the 
ECC could be compromised by the incident, and if such circumstances exist, 
a back-up ECC should be constructed. 
The off-site emergency plan for a COMM establishment should be 
constructed by the Local Authority, in close collaboration with the site and the 
Emergency Services. It is a tool to coordinate the existing emergency 
services, hospitals and LA plans with the site plan. The District Off-Site 
Emergency Command (DOSEC) should have similar facilities to the ECC and 
the off-site plan based on hazards which can affect people and environment 
outside the site boundary. As with the site plan, it should concentrate on 
events most likely to occur, but be flexible enough to deal with other less 
probable events. 
Domino sites are nearby industrial installations that could be affected by an 
incident at a neighbouring site. Information exchange and planning 
consultation should occur between these sites if it is appropriate. Where the 
site or consequences straddle boundaries, more than one LA may need to 
collaborate. If any incident has possible trans-boundary effects within the 
European Community then details of informing other member states should be 
included, as recommended in the Seveso legislation. DOSEC should have 
similar facilities to accommodate all off-site groups. 
The National Audit Office carried out work in 2002 which assessed Health 
Authority emergency plans across the UK. They produced a useful checklist of 
the criteria for plan assessment (see Figure 2-8). 
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Figure 2-8 NAO checklist of emergency plan elements 
Requirement In dicators 
Plan is part of a " Evidence of amendment sheets, as statement as to when 
continuous process the plan was last updated and by whom 
" Evidence that the plan had been reviewed and updated 
since events of September 11th 2001 
" Evidence of version control and a style conducive to a 
continuous process 
" Evidence of a statement to say plan is under constant 
review 
" Evidence of endorsement by Chief Executive. 
Plan incorporates up- " Evidence of reference to relevant guidance/legislation 
to-date national " Evidence of reference to legislation post September 11th 
guidelines 2001 
Plan incorporates all " Clear alerting and activating procedures 
elements of the trust's " Clear statements of roles & responsibilities 
response as outlined " 
Clear arrangements for hospital control team, Incident 
in national guidelines 
Management team and documents and logs 
" Coordinating NHS Communications at the scene 
" Clear procedures for initial triage 
" Action cards for all key staff/functions 
" Arrangements for relatives, VIPs and media 
" Clear Identification of resources for response 
" Clear arrangements in case of communications failure or 
transport disruption 
" Arrangements for debriefing and subsequent support for 
staff, patients and relatives 
" Arrangements for epidemiological follow-up. 
Plan is flexible " Plan defines and covers both external and internal 
enough to meet all incidents and identifies risks/hazards. Must refer to 
possible causes of a 
separate plan if it does not cover internal hazards 
. major incident. 
covers CBRN incidents. 
Plan is clear, " Easy to read language and format 
unambiguous and " Plan has comprehensive index, cross-referenced as 
easy to use appropriate 
" Action cards/lists are simple prioritised and accessible 
" Does not require use of other documents or references 
not in annex 
" Brief & concise and contains key information only. 
Plan states " Statement of other key organisations and their roles 
relationship to " An indication of the interface required, and the 
external organisations procedures.. 
including NHS, their 
respective roles and 
how the organisations 
will interface with 
each other. 
Adapted from (National Audit Office 2002: 46) 
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The checklist mentions the events of September 11th 2001, as the UK 
guidance and requirements for Health Authority planning were revised in light 
of those events in the USA. Emergency plans were assessed on the basis of 
whether the indicator was satisfied, with no further detailed investigation. This 
gave a quick overall assessment of the state of the UK's Health Authority 
emergency planning. September 1 1th is noted as a turning point for many 
organisations in the context of their emergency management and business 
crisis planning adequacy. Many organisations have reconsidered their remit 
for emergency management, and the scale of events they need to plan for. 
The scope and focus of emergency plans for other industry is not well defined, 
and will be discussed further in the following section on risk-based emergency 
planning. 
2.6.3 Risk-based emergency planning 
Mountain (2002) suggests that strategically based emergency plans should 
drive, but also be informed by, the operational response during major 
accidents and incidents. He defines risk-based emergency planning as being 
based on the full range of credible accident scenarios, which have been 
analysed in terms of consequences. The plan should provide different 
response strategies specifically for the purpose of addressing the different 
major accident consequences. The plan should also ensure that the potential 
consequences are well understood and can be acted upon through 
appropriate responses. 
The previous section of Chapter 2 discussed the broader field of risk, and the 
conclusions of this chapter will integrate some of the important concepts of 
emergency planning with key lessons from the risk literature. 
The focus of risk-based emergency planning is that the plan is based on a 
measured representation of the risks, rather than on one hazard or a single 
'worst credible event'. There is an assumption that by planning for the worst 
case, the organisation and the plan would be capable of dealing with any 
lesser incident. This is not a sustainable basis for planning an emergency 
response, and the alternatives will be argued later in this chapter. 
2.6.3.2 Human aspects of emergency planning 
The Disasters Working Party report (1992) notes that the needs of the 
`disaster affected' are quite well documented, however the ways of meeting 
those needs are not. The Home Office (1999) state that beyond the duty to 
plan for emergencies 
'Authorities will also need to consider the human, or emotional aspects of a 
community's recovery from a major incident and the part that elected members and 
the media might play in the restoration and rebuilding of the community. " 
(Home Office 1999: 9) 
Alexander (2002b: 188) emphasises how good emergency plans should 
account for vulnerable sectors of the community, namely the young, the old, 
the sick, those who are imprisoned, asylum detainees and the mentally ill. 
Alexander also advises caution in dealing with bereavement and death in 
emergency plans. This is an area where consultation is essential to find the 
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most appropriate and acceptable solution, especially with respect to diverse 
faiths and cultures. 
The remit of the Disasters Working Party (1992) was to provide guidance on 
meeting the social and psychological needs of those affected by disaster. The 
group was made up of the Department of Health, Local Authorities and 
bereavement counselling groups. The report reviews current good practice 
and experience, and provides guidelines for an action plan. Its remit considers 
that the majority of UK experience is from man-made incidents rather than 
natural disasters. An interesting comparison, but beyond the scope of this 
thesis, is the difference between human reactions to natural and man-made 
disasters examined by Hodgkinson and Stewart (1995). 
The approach of the working party supports Dynes' (1990) work, which 
recognises the value of using established social groups as the foundation of 
the response plan. It states that primary support for individuals is likely to 
come from their friends and relatives and community, and that any formal 
response is to complement that. They define complementary support as 
emotional and practical support given by individuals who have been selected 
and trained for this purpose (Disasters Working Party 1992: 3). 
The report also comments on the lack of learning which has taken place after 
many of the disasters it reviewed. 
"Although reports on some of these disasters have been published, little has been 
done to draw out the useful lessons from dealing with trauma in a disaster aftermath. " 
(Disasters Working Party 1992: 3) 
The working party states that studies in USA and Australia following both 
natural and technological disasters reveal that between 
'40% and 70% of those directly involved in an incident, experience psychological 
distress and impairment during the first month following the disaster" 
(Disasters Working Party 1992: 3) 
This figure drops to 25-40% after one year has passed. This highlights an 
important point for emergency planners. Bereavement and psychological care 
following a disaster situation are not a short-term commitment, nor can their 
importance to be taken lightly. The trauma following a disaster brings about 
post-traumatic stress (PTS) which has implications for the physical and mental 
health of the victim. If left untreated, the temporary effects of PTS can 
escalate to the more permanent post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) which 
has deeper and more long-lasting implications for the sufferer. 
It is clear from this section that an emergency plan should recognise the need 
for, and provide appropriate levels of, psychological support within a short 
time-frame after the disaster has occurred. This rapid action needs to be 
instituted and planned before the incident occurs. It should be noted at this 
stage that where children are involved in an incident, there is a critical time- 
frame in which psychological intervention should be made. This is discussed 
further by Hodgkinson and Stewart (1995). It is also clear that full use of the 
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existing structures and systems of social care should be made, in order to 
ensure a coordinated and sustainable response. 
Alexander (2002b: 127) draws attention to the protection provided by a good 
emergency plan. It guards the organisation, emergency planners and owners 
of the response against unnecessary exposure to risk of prosecution. The 
quality of the plan can also be an important factor in matters of liability, 
insurance and the corporate responsibility of the organisation. 
A second means of shielding the organisation from legal accusations and 
damaging publicity in a crisis is carefully to plan the media response. It is 
good practice to prepare news-ready background footage of the organisation 
and information on its sites and business to inform media if anything happens. 
Prepared press-releases are also important, and can take the pressure off 
during the first hour of response. Media information must be accurate, 
consistent and timely. Having the media response as part of the emergency 
plan ensures that this important aspect receives due attention, and is 
implemented efficiently. Further work on media emergency planning can be 
found in Deacon and Deacon (1999). 
An important aspect of any emergency plan is that it avoids discrimination. In 
this context, Alexander (2002b: 127) refers to the rights of women throughout 
the emergency planning process. Consultation with a representative sample 
of any population or workforce should ensure that the plan does not 
inadvertently discriminate against one group. The special needs of pregnant 
women and those with new babies should be considered, noted by Clarke 
(1999) as especially relevant to nuclear emergency planning, as even small 
doses of radiation can have a harmful effect on the unborn child and infant. 
Female head-of-households, orphans and culturally or religiously defined 
groups (for example Indian castes) should also be considered in societies or 
cultures which discriminate against them. The aim of the plan should be to 
protect all those at risk, regardless of their background, sex, race or culture. 
2.6.4 Revision and updating 
'Emergency plans are 'living' documents. They should be kept up to date... " 
(HSE 1999: 10) 
Although the HSE guidance states the intention of continuous improvement, it 
fails to describe how to achieve this. There is no detail given on practices that 
enable an organisation to learn from response, or capture the knowledge and 
lessons and integrate them into future planning and development. As COMAH 
encourages much more of a common structure, a common language of 
emergency management can now be expected across the UK hazardous 
industry, which facilitates common sharing of experience and knowledge, if 
the learning mechanisms are developed and put in place. 
Alexander (2002b: 128) agrees that plans should be dynamic in nature. His 
work emphasises the need for a review of the plan at least once every three 
years, and should take into account changes to the activity or layout of the 
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organisation or site, staff or the emergency services and organisations with 
which it interacts. New knowledge from research or lessons from exercises 
and other incidents should be incorporated into the plan to ensure that the 
best available techniques are available to the response. The revision of the 
plan should also include changes which have taken place outside the 
organisation. Environmental and infrastructural changes can affect wind 
direction around a hazardous site, and changes to watercourses could open 
new routes for pollutants to enter sensitive areas. Population movements, 
growth and change of demographics can also affect assumptions made in an 
off-site emergency plan. A good plan will have safeguards in place to ensure 
that any changes to the site or off-site should be risk-assessed and 
incorporated, and continually improve. This is discussed further in the 
following section. 
2.6.5 Continuous improvement 
Continuing his argument for the use of existing social structures in emergency 
situations, Dynes (1990) cites the advantage of improved learning capacity. 
Established systems can learn from the emergency and develop during the 
inter-incident period. They are then better equipped to cope with the next 
incident. 
The Home Office (1999) also supports a continuing commitment to response 
improvement. It recommends a programme of training and exercising which 
includes opportunities for training with external organisations. To facilitate 
improvement, the programme should continually evaluated and following 
exercises action plans should implement the lessons learned. They 
recommend the use of qualitative and quantitative measures of success, but 
give little detail regarding the methods of evaluation or means for continually 
improving. 
Alexander (2002b: 130) discusses ways of assessing an emergency plan's 
functionality. He supports the use of field exercises as part of this 
assessment, providing that they are thoroughly debriefed and the results 
recorded accurately. Alexander also advocates the use of data from live 
incidents in enhancing and developing the planning process. Logs and 
records of the incident progress should be kept by a nominated member of 
staff, who in appropriate circumstances can be assisted by computer software 
designed for this purpose. It may also be useful to consider near-miss 
incidents, and extrapolate the consequences as a test of the emergency plan. 
This is especially useful for discovering links between the trigger events and 
the underlying unsafe conditions, which combine to create an incident. This 
concept is formally described as the Pressure and Release model (PAR) by 
Blaikie et al. (1994). 
The need for dynamic plans is recognised by Toft and Reynolds (1994: 79) 
using the example of a building which changed use, but did not change its 
safety precautions to support its new role. Toft and Reynolds also note the 
change of use from a large house into an old peoples' home. The authors cite 
the Fairfield Home incident of 1974. A fire destroyed the building, killing 18 
residents. One of the main reasons for the rapid spread and high death toll of 
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the fire was the polyurethane foam armchairs, which created vast amounts of 
dense toxic smoke. The fire exits and emergency lighting in the building had 
not been altered to take account of a new layout and occupancy. A 
contributory factor was the fact that for the comfort of the residents, the central 
heating in the building had been at a particularly high level for a number of 
years, which had effectively dried out the fabric of the building making it much 
more flammable. The example illustrates the need for flexibility and innovative 
thinking in emergency planning, as well as a continuous approach to plan 
updating and continuous risk analysis. 
The emergency plan may need to be implemented at any time. For this 
reason, it must be kept up to date and current at all times. The specific parts 
of the plan that refer to its implementation are discussed in the following 
section. 
2.6.6 Information management 
A key task in emergency management is dealing with information in a 
structured and orderly manner. Turner and Pidgeon (1997: 55) consider the 
problems of managing the vast amounts of information which are generated 
during an emergency. They give seven aims of good information management 
in an emergency. 
Figure 2-9 Information management in emergencies 
Alexander (2002b: 94) notes the importance of four aspects of communicating 
emergency information. These layers in the process are the technology, the 
procedures, the human factors and the organisational context in which the 
communications occur. The science of information communication is 
discussed by Wickens and Hollands (2000). 
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Adapted from (Turner and Pidgeon 1997: 55) 
Figure 2-10 Signal Detection Theory diagram 
State Response Result 
p [- Correct reject-ion 
Adapted from (Wickens and Hollands 2000: 18) 
Figure 2-10 is a graphical interpretation of the Signal Detection Theory (SDT). 
There is a broad psychological literature associated with the SDT; however it 
serves a useful purpose for emergency planning in its basic form. If 
information management tasks are considered with the above four outcomes 
in mind, communications can be managed to ensure that signals are clearly 
broadcast and confirmed, and noise is reduced. This applies to radio 
messages, verbal messages between individuals, the man-machine interface 
between the operator and any warning alarms, lights or displays, and written 
messages coming into the ECC. To increase accuracy of signal detection, 
both the strength of the signal and the sensitivity of the responder can be 
adjusted. Further detailed work on SDT can be found in Wickens and 
Hollands (2000: 21) 
2.6.7 Decision Support and other IT for emergency planning 
Throughout the past 20 years, there has been a rapid advance in computer 
technology. Electronic capacity for information storage and processing is 
limited only by the ability of the programmer and user, and graphical displays 
and manual controls now provide the user with 'virtual reality' systems. The 
use of computer technology has had several impacts on emergency planning 
and management, the use of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) is a 
strong example. A GIS is an electronic, detail-rich map. A computer 
programme stores information about a specific area of land, and can display 
those data on the map. Several different factors can be overlain at one time, 
giving for example, a street map with traffic flow data, density of housing and 
population demographics. Real-time information such as wind direction and 
vehicle flow can be displayed, and additional software can plot the movement 
of chemical plumes over an area, taking into account meteorological 
conditions and the built environment layout. An example of such a system is 
the USA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) computer 
-based emergency system called CAMEO (Computer Aided Management of 
Emergency Operations), which is software to plot plume-dispersion patterns. 
(Lillibridge 1997: 365). GIS is also widely used by UK emergency response 
services to plot safe routes of approach to fires and chemical leakages, and 
plan evacuations. 
Aleid's thesis (1999) develops a Group Decision Support System GDSS for 
crisis management. He describes the GDSS as a framework to support 
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knowledge enhancement in both the scenario and the planning stage. Using 
linked computer displays, responders evaluate the current reality of a crisis 
compared to the knowledge and information stored in the system and make 
the necessary decisions. Previous tools have been designed for the planning 
and training phases, to be used in preparation for an incident or in exploring 
planning options. Aleid (1999: 51) aimed to provide a tool to support decision 
making during the 'live' crisis phase, which he terms a 'hot tool'. 
Aleid (1999) bases some of his work on a list of 56 factors which he defines 
as a 'wish-list' to aid crisis management decision making. The list contains 
some practical and valid points; however one would question the validity of 
transcendental meditation as a suitable strategy for use during a crisis 
situation. 
Although decision support should aid decision making, the ease with which it 
provides information can be adjusted to enhance creativity, notes Aleid 
(1999). The mechanisms and interfaces must not allow quick and 
unconsidered decisions to be made by the user; rather the DSS should 
introduce an aspect of `conceptual discomfort'. This will help ensure that the 
decision maker justifies the solution and has considered the available 
alternatives. The use of innovation in emergency response will be discussed 
later in this thesis. 
De Silva (2001) describes an IT based Spatial Decision Support System 
(SDSS) called the Configurable Evacuation Management and Planning 
Simulator (CEMPS). This tool is a GIS combined with a DSS, and was 
designed as an interactive planning tool. Scenarios can be analysed using the 
system, and the planner can alter elements of the evacuation and observe the 
effects in the simulation. CEMPS allows various assumptions to be used 
regarding evacuee response delay and traffic flow data for example, and is 
flexible to allow the user to work at different levels of detail. 
Also of interest is the joint European project called `MEMbrain', which involves 
the development of an integrated software platform for major emergency 
management. The platform would support a GIS and a decision-support 
system that will aid public protection and off-site emergency management. It is 
also incorporating an interactive triage training module for medical doctors. 
The project is partially funded by the EUREKA programme and is ongoing 
(Risr 2002). 
It is clear from this section that the purpose of a DSS is to support a human 
decision maker, and must offer a level of guidance that informs the user in 
making a structured and accountable decision. The DSS does not give the 
answer to a situation, whereas the computerised control systems of aircraft 
and nuclear facilities can take command of the situation and make the 
necessary adjustments to bring the system back to safe parameters, or shut it 
down. 
De Silva (2001: 17) also cites a point of caution, asserting that as the real 
world is dynamic, its problems and systems should also be dynamic. Models 
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can not always be validated against the real-world system they represent, 
because the real-world system continually evolves while models can often 
remain static. 
2.7 Training 
An emergency plan is of little use unless the people with roles to play and 
responsibilities in the response are trained to carry out their assignments. This 
subsection will briefly review the emergency management training literature. 
2.7.1 Purpose of training 
The subject of emergency management training is difficult to review 
succinctly, as there are many aspects which are subjects in their own right. In 
the context of this thesis, an examination of the vast psychological literature 
relating to training theory, learning and memory (Wickens and Hollands 2000) 
and leadership training (Flin 1996) would be unwarranted. The texts cited 
above give a robust introduction to those subjects, and provide detailed 
reference to the subject from the psychological perspective. This study 
proposes therefore to focus on the role of training in relation to emergency 
planning, and issues specific to emergency management training, and how 
they are commonly addressed. 
The role of training in emergency management is important, as it is a 
legislative requirement. HSE (1999) notes that a COMAH site must show 
evidence that its Safety Management System includes suitable arrangements 
for training individuals in emergency response. The type of training should 
cover the appropriate roles, and should be maintained. Training should also 
be carried out to defined objectives, and effectiveness should be reviewed 
and evaluated. 
An interesting point is noted by Bolk et al (1997) citing Levy and Merry. He 
makes the point that only people can learn, and what they learn can be 
embedded in computers, however everything else is a construction of human 
endeavours. He offers three degrees of learning, the first being that existing 
viewpoints are reinforced by the processing of information (no change to 
viewpoints). The second results in the slight amendment of existing viewpoints 
by the additional information (first order change), and the third results in the 
radical alteration of viewpoints (second order change). Since Bolk's work, 
advancement in the field of artificial intelligence has been such that computer 
systems can now adapt their programmes to new information and also 
recognise and react to patterns and changes. This could be defined as 
learning, although the capacity to carry out that activity has ultimately been 
created by a human programmer. The dictionary defines the verb 'to learn' as 
"... to gain knowledge of or skill in... to come to realise or know" 
(Allen 2002: 503) 
It could be noted that with advancement in the fields of knowledge capture 
and knowledge management there is now a stronger argument in favour of 
organisations having the capacity to learn, in the literal sense. If learning is the 
gaining of knowledge in a certain area, and an organisation has the means of 
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ensuring that any knowledge benefits, and is retained by the wider 
organisation, then the organisation has learned. The way in which the 
organisation responds to the experience and knowledge of the individual can 
be labelled as organisational learning, whereas the way in which individuals 
respond to the learning and change is connected more to the organisation's 
culture. In a key management text, Handy (1993: 180) defines organisational 
culture as 
"... -cultures - sets of values, norms and beliefs - reflected in different structures and 
systems. And the cultures are affected by the events of the past and the climate of 
the present, by the technology of the type of work, by their aims and the kind of 
people that work in them. " 
(Handy 1993: 180) 
Organisational culture is an important concept to the study of emergencies 
and disasters, and holds a prominence in many UK disaster inquiries. Fennell 
(1988) alludes to the culture of the railwaymen in the Kings Cross fire. The 
senior members of London Underground staff had all reached seniority 
through internal promotion. Little or no influx of new staff at managerial level 
can indicate stagnation of thinking and unwillingness to change. This was the 
case at Kings Cross, where there had been no change in the way the workers 
treated a fire or `smouldering' located at an inconsequential location on the 
track, and the way they treated such an occurrence at a safety-critical location 
on the stations. Fennell (1988), in concluding the Kings Cross enquiry, states 
that "London Underground has accepted that a cultural change is required 
throughout the organisation" 
Skriver (1998) cites the Piper Alpha oil platform disaster of 6th July 1988 in 
which 167people died. The system of command on the installation had broken 
down. Senior staff were unprepared for the type of emergency that occurred. 
Lord Cullen's Enquiry into the disaster cites the lack of commitment to 
emergency training. Concluding the Piper Alpha enquiry, Cullen (1990) notes 
"it is essential to create an atmosphere or culture in which safety is 
understood to be, and is accepted as, the number one priority". 
This section has illustrated that training alone will not ensure capability. The 
culture of the organisation must enable the individual to learn from the 
organisation, and the organisation to gain knowledge and benefit from the 
experience of the individuals. For training to be effective, it must be conducted 
in a receptive organisational culture. The specific problems of defining, 
delivering and maintaining such levels of training are discussed in the 
remainder of this section. 
2.7.2 Problems with emergency management training 
Ford and Schmidt (2000) introduce three unique problems of emergency 
management training that are not encountered in other areas of training. 
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Figure 2-11 Emergency Management Training Problems 
Emergency Management training 
provisions of emergency from specific effective mechanisms 
plans and procedures trained conditions for teamwork under 
over long periods of time to potentially very conditions that limit 
until an emergency different incident retention and 
fii membimil" 
Adapted from (Ford and Schmidt 2000) 
Most mainstream training methods assume that skills learned in training will 
be put into practice and honed through application. There is limited 
opportunity to apply emergency management skills, and so the training 
requires a different focus. 
The second illustrated problem recognises that while training provides the 
trainee with certain solutions to specific problems, the emergency situations 
can often deviate from the training scenarios. This leads Ford and Schmidt to 
define two types of expertise. Routine expertise is the internal capability 
quickly to apply solutions and strategies to well learned and familiar contexts 
and situations. They state that while it is necessary for success in the job, 
focussing on routine may impair ability to address a novel task. Adaptive 
expertise is defined as simultaneously integrating multiple sources of 
knowledge for use in addressing unfamiliar situations and changing 
conditions. It requires a deeper conceptual understanding, and an ability to 
recognise that a novel situation requires deviation from the routine 
procedures. Adaptive experts realise that the most significant developments 
in learning and continuous improvement require connection across people. 
The third illustrated problem is that emergencies demand a coordinated 
response from teams of interdependent members. This puts extra pressure on 
the coordination capabilities of the teams, and introduces further complexity 
into the training. This issue is exasperated by the fact that most industrial 
emergency management teams do not work together on a permanent basis. 
Their work is based on nuclear reactor emergency scenarios, and they 
criticise current emergency management training practice because it tends to 
focus on narrow technical and job competency, whereas system and 
interpersonal skills also need to be addressed. They define learning as 
"... involving the building of technical/job competencies, interpersonal/relationship 
building competencies and systemiprocess competencies. " 
(Ford & Schmidt 2000: 96) 
Ford & Schmidt (2000) advocate active learning which involves providing 
learners with control over their own learning. They give three examples of 
learning types. Experienced based learning works on the theory that job 
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activities invoke continuous improvement and learning. They describe 
incremental learning occurring in situations where time is provided to clarify 
role expectations and flexibility for self-paced learning is available, and 
competencies are gained in a linear fashion. Frame-breaking learning is in 
difficult circumstances with little time for thinking. Their competency-based 
approach to training will be developed further, later in the thesis. 
The rapid and complex decision making in emergencies and the challenging 
information management circumstances can leave an emergency manager 
struggling to choose the best path to take. Experienced emergency managers 
in such circumstances might rely on their intuition. Burke and Miller (1999) 
carried out research on a group of (non-emergency related) industrial 
professionals in the USA. His aim was to examine the use of initiative in work 
situations, a relatively unexplored area in the literature. 
gTraining and experience are the fuel and then intuition and deduction are the engine. 
You put those two together and you end up being able to move forward. " 
(Burke and Miller 1999: 93) 
When asked how often they used intuition in their workplace, 30% said 
sometimes, 47% said often and 12% said always. The majority claimed to use 
their intuition where there were no predetermined guidelines to follow or the 
objective data did not seem correct. Burke and Miller add that intuition is most 
appropriate when decisions need to be consistent with an organisation's 
culture and values, when time is short, when explicit cues from policy and 
guidelines are lacking, when uncertainty prevails and when the problem 
requires a balance of intellect and cognitive skill. These characteristics reflect 
an emergency management situation rather well. Burke and Miller (1999) 
state that intuition might be used when quantitative data are lacking, or in 
cases of extreme information overload. 
Paton and Jackson (2002) advocate the use of assessment centres for 
emergency management training. Assessment centres allow both the specific 
aspects of complex and multi-faceted emergency management roles and 
tasks to be developed and practiced individually and, by using multiple 
exercises and simulations. They also provide an opportunity for participants to 
foster a more holistic appreciation of the overall disaster management role. 
Assessment centres facilitate the development of core cognitive competencies 
that are fundamental to emergency performance; specifically they develop 
tacit knowledge and self-efficacy. 
Peterson and Perry (1999) support this view, stating that the experience of an 
exercise shapes the responders perception of the emergency management 
system and their capability to deal with the threat. Paton and Jackson (2002) 
also found that assessment centre participation had a positive impact on 
candidates' self-assessments, which persisted over time, and suggested that 
this was instrumental in increasing individual and collective levels of self- 
efficacy and task performance in crisis situations. 
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2.7.3 Leadership and team competency 
Ramsay (1999) describes an alternative means for organisations to learn to 
manage emergency situations. 
"Because large-scale crises threatening the entire business are not frequent, learning 
from experience must be replaced by competence-assurance based on systems 
thinking, on risk assessment, on wide scenario simulations and on rigorous training. " 
(Ramsay 1999: 131) 
His recommendations highlight a need for a competence-based approach to 
emergency management training. Competence is defined by Sandberg (2000) 
as not all knowledge and skills, but those required to do the job. The benefits 
of a competence focus were first brought to the fore by Taylor in 1911 (Mullins 
1996), who published his 14 scientific principles of leadership. 
"Taylor demonstrated that managers could set up systematic training and 
development activities that yielded improvements in workers' competence and 
consequently, increased effectiveness in organisations. 
(Sandberg 2000: 10) 
Competence is primarily seen as composed of the knowledge, skills and 
abilities of the individual. As competencies are generic and often context 
independent, they can form part of many different work activities. 
Three models of emergency management training described by Alexander 
(2002b: 290) help clarify what is meant by competence-based training. The 
first model is the cause-effect curriculum, which is based on dealing with 
particular types of disaster from cause through to effect. The second is a 
concept-based approach which approaches training through the concepts of 
planning, vulnerability, prediction, warning and logistics, with the type of 
emergency being less relevant. This is the most competence-focussed model, 
as it does not focus on the agent causing the incident; rather it focuses on the 
skills and knowledge to respond, elements of which will be generic across 
many incidents. It is sometimes known as the `all-hazards approach' as it 
builds competence which can be applied to all hazards. The final model is the 
Scenario-based curriculum, which is entirely focussed on training for specific 
incident scenarios. 
Flin & Slaven (1996) note that the Cullen enquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster 
(1990) cited poor training and inadequate leadership capability as causal 
factors. Thorough selection of Offshore Installation Managers (OlMs) was 
recommended. Skriver (1998) cites the Offshore Installations (Safety case) 
regulations 1992 which state that there should be 
"... adequate provision for: a) establishing and maintaining a command structure by 
competent persons throughout an emergency, including arrangements for people 
who become disabled; " 
(Skriver 1998) 
As discussed earlier in this section, the command and control model of 
emergency management is looked upon less favourably for use in civilian 
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incidents. On an offshore platform however, the need for very rapid decision 
making and the limited options for survival action require the security and 
speed of an authoritarian response. 
Different models of leadership and authority are relevant in different situations; 
however there should be a strong team focus in emergency management, 
partly because of the benefits of a common view and understanding of the 
situation. Flin & Slaven (1996b) advocate the benefits of a shared mental 
model of the situation amongst team members. They refer to 'cross training' 
where members learn about the roles of other members, with the ultimate aim 
of becoming more aware of each others' roles, rather than intersubstitutability. 
A method of training which can assist in building common mental models 
throughout an emergency team is an IT based system. Many such systems 
are information based, and ensure consistency in communication of 
information to different team members. The following section briefly examines 
examples of IT based training systems for emergency management. 
2.7.4 Role of IT in EM training 
QinetiQ (2002) describe their simulation software known as TUTOR (definition 
of this acronym is not given in the paper) which has been designed to train, 
test and develop management skills, and as a tool for operational planning 
and performance analysis. The authors claim that it can be used as a 
simulation to predict effects of an event, or as an interactive training (gaming) 
facility to practice resource management. No evidence is given of successful 
application of TUTOR, results from use as a training tool or details of how it 
was constructed, so the claims of the authors can not be substantiated. 
Command And Control Training and planning using knowledge-based 
Simulations (CACTUS) is described by Williams (1996). The software project 
was funded by the Department for Trade and Industry and New Scotland Yard 
to simulate public order offences and assist the police in planning and training. 
CACTUS uses multi-media case studies and GIS scenarios, and has an 
integral logging system. The concept of CACTUS is good; however its aims 
are to test the routine tasks the police might face, rather than developing their 
capability to deal with novel concepts, so the model is unlikely to be valuable if 
transferred to the emergency management domain. 
It is recognised that IT based systems are used by private EM training 
consultancies in the UK, but despite requests, there is insufficient information 
available on these systems for this study to comment on their efficacy. 
2.8 Exercising and testing the plan 
In order to keep the emergency plan and trained personnel current, the 
common practice is to carry out simulated emergencies, or emergency 
exercises. This subsection will review the reasons behind exercising and the 
types of exercise available, and discuss some of the problems encountered 
with emergency exercising. 
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2.8.1 Purpose of exercising in emergency management 
"Exercises may be seen as a form, perhaps an extension, of training in the sense 
that individuals are rehearsing response measures. 
(Peterson & Perry 1999: 243) 
Peterson and Perry's study (1999) is based on exercises carried out by a Fire 
Department in the USA. The purpose of their work was to investigate the 
value of exercises to their participants. The authors tested the perceptions of 
a fire crew before and after an emergency exercise. As a control group, they 
also tested the perceptions of crews who had not been involved in the 
exercises at the same intervals. They used a hazardous materials exercise 
and a medical triage exercise for the study. 
"Often the utility of the exercise depends in part upon the participant's (emergency 
responder's) perception of its 'believability; which itself hinges upon the realism of the 
scenario" 
(Peterson & Perry 1999: 244) 
Scenario realism can often be misinterpreted to mean that the scenario has to 
incorporate expensive measures to make it look, sound and smell like the real 
event. Realism is found in the pace of the exercise, and is created by the 
ownership and the commitment of the players. Creating realism, to an extent, 
can only be partially achieved in the planning stage. The realism depends on 
how the exercise is performed by the players. Peterson and Perry (1999) 
concluded that the exercises shaped the respondents' perception of the 
emergency management system, and its adequacy. The exercises also 
affected the respondents' views of their own capability and the capability of 
their equipment and team. The detailed results appear later in this section. 
They summarise the study suggesting five principal benefits of disaster 
exercises (Figure 2-12). 
Peterson and Perry's work illustrates useful points, including the differences in 
emergency and disaster terminology between the USA and UK. Fire response 
in the UK would not be referred to as Emergency Management, whereas in 
the USA it is. Although their work looked at operational fire response, the 
conclusions on emergency exercises appear to hold true for emergency 
management in the UK, and will be discussed further at a later stage in this 
chapter. 
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Figure 2-12 Benefits of disaster exercises. 
Benefit " disaster exercise Explanation 
Inferential testing of the adequacy of the An exercise represents and event response 
disaster plan designed using premised and resources 
described in the plan, the extent to which the 
exercise is successful demonstrates the 
efficacy of the plan. 
Exercises allow - again by inference - Involve incident scenarios that are intended 
testing the adequacy of training of to replicate the demands on knowledge, skills 
personnel and abilities posed by real events, and which 
an effective training programme should 
create. 
Exercises may be publicised in the Reassuring the public that the emergency 
community consequently enhancing the authorities are aware of dangers and 
visibility of the agencies involved prepared to take measures to reduce 
(demonstrating their readiness and negative impacts. 
possibly increasing their public 
credibility) 
Exercises provide "hands on" checks of *Ensures readiness and suitability of 
communications systems, equipment and equipment. 
other materials 
Well designed exercise tests the viability *Supports the accuracy of the risk 
of the emergency response network assessment. 
relative to the threat exercised. 
*Not part of original source, added for clarity. 
Adapted from (Peterson and Perry 1999) 
The National Audit Office (2002) commissioned a report to determine the 
status of NHS emergency planning. One of the aims of this report was to 
consider the adequacy of emergency plan testing. Health Authority 
emergency plans were examined and the results indicated that one third of 
the Authorities were not prepared, in terms of testing their plans. Visits were 
made to the authorities to validate questionnaires and these indicated that the 
Authorities had 
"... over-stated, in key areas, their degree of preparedness to tackle major incidents, 
or could not provide evidence of claimed improvements... " 
(National Audit Office 2002: 3) 
The report recommended that Authorities 
"... pursue options for better knowledge management in planning for and reporting on 
major incidents... should include better collection and dissemination of good practice. " 
(National Audit Office 2002: 6) 
The collection and dissemination of good practice and the issue of knowledge 
management in planning and reporting on major incidents are factors which 
result from a thorough and well supported programme of exercising. Further 
details from this report will be discussed later in this section. 
2.8.2 Types of exercise 
Peterson and Perry (1999: 244) identify three types of exercise which they call 
table-top, functional and full-scale. Table-top has the advantage of being able 
to stop time for 'Time-out' evaluation and a progress review. Functional 
exercises test one or two functions of a wider response scenario, for example 
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the medical and fire response. They are usually conducted in real time. 
Peterson and Perry state that in the USA they would usually employ actors 
and field elements in this category of exercise. In the UK that level of 
resources would only be considered for a full simulation, or live exercise. Full 
scale exercising provides the total response experience, which is, however, 
resource intensive. 
The Home Office (1998) states that the type of exercise should "provide the 
most appropriate and cost effective way of achieving its aim and objectives. " It 
also shares common recommendations with Home Office (1994) and HSE 
(1999) in stating that there should be a set of debriefings, concluding with a 
multi-agency debriefing. Hot and cold debriefing reveal different things and 
both are helpful. Hot debriefing takes place immediately after the exercise, 
and cold debriefing takes place some time after. Neutral debriefing 
coordinators can be useful too. They should be non-threatening, and simply 
act as impartial chairmen to allow everyone to contribute. The purpose of 
debriefing should be to share outcomes and identify future training needs. 
The Home Office (1998) also states that a final written exercise report is good 
practice and proves the value of the exercise. It also ensures that the teams 
and the organisation get the best out of learning. The report should be brief 
and well presented. Recommendations should be followed with action and a 
follow-up report compiled six months later. This is a way of sharing expertise 
throughout the emergency planning community. 
2.8.3 The process of exercising 
The COMAH regulations demand that site and off-site plans are tested at 
least once every three years (HSE 1999). The test should indicate that the 
plan would work as intended, and the initiating measures would lead to the 
necessary mitigation, control and restoration of the environment. The test 
should also be based on a scenario that is built from an accident that has 
been identified in the safety report as being reasonably foreseeable. 
Alexander (2002b) gives some objectives of civil protection in field exercises 
(illustrated in Figure 2-13). A number of the objectives have numerical targets. 
They are otherwise quite broad and should provide a substantial feedback on 
the performance of the team and the plan. Predetermined targets and 
objectives are an essential element of exercising. With targets in place, the 
exercise can then be evaluated once complete. 
The HSE (1999) state that the objectives of plan test should be to give 
confidence in the completeness, consistency and accuracy of the emergency 
plan and other documentation used by response organisations. The test 
should also provide reassurance of the adequacy of the equipment and 
facilities and their operability under emergency conditions. It should finally 
reinforce the competence of staff to carry out the duties identified for them in 
the plan, and demonstrate their ability to use the equipment and facilities in an 
emergency situation. 
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Figure 2-13 Objectives of field exercises 
HSE (1999) give a comprehensive list of exercise types. The most basic is a 
drill, defined as testing a relatively simple and specific aspect of the plan in 
isolation. Seminar exercises focus on a discussion environment to train staff 
and develop the plan, whereas walk-through exercises examine the response 
in slow-time. Table-top exercises test the information exchange within and 
through the ECC, and practice dissemination and decision making. They are 
usually not dependent on vast quantities of resources, and use a site plan or 
model or an IT representation of the scene as the main focus. Control post 
exercises test communications facilities in real-time, using the actual 
positioning and functioning of the equipment, with appropriate staff that would 
be present in an emergency. The most resource intensive scenario is the live 
exercise, which fully tests some or all aspects of the emergency plan for the 
site and off-site response. Live exercises are almost always in real time. 
Rasmussen & Gronberg (1997) highlight the need for emergency managers 
and risk analysts to exchange information and experience. These authors' 
work aimed to develop a model for translating knowledge and experience from 
risk analysis and accident investigation into emergency scenarios for training. 
The study focuses on the Uncontrolled Flow of Energy (UFOE) concept, 
defined as the state of a substance which has stored energy in terms of 
tension, pressure or heat in its confined state. The energy is safe when the 
pressure is confined in a vessel and the tension within a structure, but once 
control is lost, the energy becomes unconfined and hazardous. 
The authors defined two types of accident. Static accidents are where there is 
one 'bang' and no further escalation of consequences, and a dynamic 
accident is an ongoing escalation. This further divides into static and stable, 
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Adapted from (Alexander 2002b: 88) 
and static and unstable. It can be difficult to categorise accidents sometimes, 
but this classification is important in executing an appropriate response. 
McKay & Heathcote (1999) note that while 
"Desk-top exercising of emergency scenarios will provide the most valuable 
information on how the plan may operate in theory, but it is only by full unannounced 
activation of the plan that the overall picture will emerge. " 
(McKay & Heathcote 1999: 8) 
The authors also stress that debriefing and feedback from the exercise are 
essential if the organisation intends to learn from the exercise, and influence 
the revision of the plan. This is in agreement with the COMAH regulations that 
state 
"For organisations to get the most out of participation in emergency plan tests, it is 
important to evaluate the lessons learned, to determine whether modifications are 
required to the emergency plan and to promote good practice" 
(HSE 1999: 36) 
Ramsay (1999) also recommends thorough record-keeping and analysis as 
the predetermining factors of learning from exercises 
"The amount of wisdom and the benefit that can be gained from an emergency 
exercise is highly dependent on the quality of the recording for subsequent analysis. " 
(Ramsay 1999: 137) 
It is possible that different organisations involved in an exercise will use 
different evaluation methods, and each may want to establish its own 
measures of the response, for example quantitative measures such as 
timeliness or subjective measures such as quality of performance. It is 
important that the evaluation include a means of sharing the lessons between 
the organisations, and ensure that information regarding recommendations 
and action plans resulting from the exercise is kept updated and the 
organisations are kept informed of progress. 
2.8.4 Outcomes from exercises 
Aleid (1999) defines principles for enhancing creativity in decision support 
systems. Mead suggests that depth & tenor of feedback enhances creativity. 
Aleid states that nice, kindly feedback is not likely to have a great impact of 
the quality of the decision making and unlikely to be appreciated in the 'strictly 
business' crisis environment. Aleid cautions that harsh feedback would have a 
negative effect. It is doubtful that this can be supported by the data, however 
further discussion might be appropriate later in this study, however as a rule, 
interpersonal communication should be firm and fair during a crisis. 
Toft & Reynolds (1994) emphasise the importance of feedback and learning 
from exercises and incidents. They attribute a number of nuclear incidents at 
plants around the world to the lack of learning from previous incidents. The 
plants in question share common components. The Three Mile Island (TMI) 
reactor incident in March 1979 involved a valve failure. The same type of 
valve stuck at Crystal River plant in Florida on February 26th 1980, causing 
contained leakage of 190,000 litres of highly radioactive water. An identical 
valve failed at Davis-Besse plant in Ohio on June 9th 1985, but was noticed 
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early, limiting any damage or leaks. A similar valve also failed at the Heysham 
reactor in UK during the interim period. Toft & Reynolds found no evidence of 
sharing the knowledge of this potentially faulty valve type or learning from 
these incidents anywhere in the nuclear industry. 
A similar chronology of failure can be mapped for the Kings Cross Fire 
(Fennell 1988). The table below shows fire related incidents leading up to the 
Kings Cross fire in 1987. 
Figure 2-14 Fires in underground stations preceding the Kings Cross disaster 
Oxford Circus Nov. 1984 25 mins 
Green Park Jan. 1985 30 mins 
Manor House May 1985 25 mins 
Holborn Dec. 1985 30 mins + 
Sandberg (2000) further supports the value of post-incident information 
dissemination by suggesting that competence is primarily defined as the 
meaning or conception the work takes by the worker, rather than just a set of 
attributes. This is supported by Bolk et al (1997) who state that gaining the 
true lessons and meaning from an experience is always retrospective, since 
any meaning to information can only be constructed through interaction 
related to that information. This argument suggests that in order for an 
emergency event to be meaningful, interaction must take place after the 
event. In the form of debriefing, this interaction could ensure that knowledge 
and learning is captured after the emergency or exercise. 
This is supported by Drucker (1974: 7) who states 
"... management is not just common sense. It is not just codified experience; it is, at 
least potentially, an organised body of knowledge" 
(Drucker 1974: 7) 
Drucker is effectively suggesting that experience is only useful if time is spent 
organising and analysing the knowledge. 
In his thesis on emergency exercises, Smith (1999: 48) gathered data on the 
cost in man-hours of two different types of exercise undertaken by UK local 
authorities. His data were based on the average over several different 
exercises, including three major live exercises. A noteworthy point is that none 
of the exercises was debriefed, evaluated or measured in similar ways and so 
they could not be compared directly. Comparison and sharing of lessons from 
exercises and incidents is only possible if the data are recorded and 
measured in a similar manner. Any assessment framework should aim to 
incorporate a mechanism for facilitating this, and this issue will be addressed 
later in the study. 
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2-15 Average man-hours spent on exercises 
1106 1 2586 1 387.5 1 4079.5 
610 400.5 53.5 704 
Adapted from Smith (1999: 48) 
Smith's aim was to investigate the financial implications of emergency 
exercises, but his data are also useful in the context of this study, as it 
illustrates the small proportion of time spent on exercise review and learning. 
The results above indicate that 9% of time in live exercises is spent on post- 
exercise activities, and 7% of time in table-top exercise. That 9% and 7% 
would also include other post-exercise activities of accounting, cleaning-up 
and reporting. Considering the financial cost of a 4079.5 man-hour event, 
spending such a small proportion of the time on learning and reviewing could 
not give the best value for the investment. 
In his research, Snelling (1997: 24) states that the evaluation of exercises has 
three purposes. These are proving, improving and learning. Snelling's work 
came up with five recommendations relating to local authority emergency 
exercises. 
Figure 2-16 Snelling's exercise recommendations 
07 Decision Support Systems only valuable where ALL data known 
Microcomputer exercises are not viable 
E 
E Exercise evaluation criteria must be predetermined 
An emergency exercise is a test of the plan and process 
L 
W The validation of the plan should be separate from the exercise 
Adapted from (Snelling 1997: 24) 
His conclusion that computers do not have a role to play was appropriate at 
that time of writing, however advancement in the quality and reliability of 
computers and software since Snelling's work mean that they now have a 
meaningful role, at least in the provision of GIS, in LA emergency exercises. 
Decision support systems do require all the data on a particular issue to be 
known, and so their utility in more unpredictable events may be limited. The 
remaining three conclusions above are supported by other authors throughout 
this section. 
Snelling (1997: 59) analysed 93 exercise reports and found no benchmark or 
way of assessing the outcome against intention. He concluded that there was 
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no tangible outcome for most exercises held by local authorities. He 
developed a list of exercise management protocols and evaluation measures, 
which he suggested would make exercises more productive and measurable. 
Figure 2-17 Snelling's exercise management protocol 
Consider the needs 
and capability of 
the organisation 
What type of Realistic objectives 
exercise fits that fit with needs 
these needs best' and capability 
resource 
uirement 
physical facilities 
are in place 
for implementing 
changes and 
amendments for 
Adapted from (Snelling 1997: 61) 
The exercise evaluation protocol presented by Snelling (1997: 61) simply 
gives four focus points for the review, and the suggestion that the review 
should be directed and coordinated. His four key areas are the control and 
command centres, the use of resources, the effectiveness of communications 
and the effectiveness and implications of training. Evaluating an exercise with 
these factors in mind should ensure that areas of potential improvement are 
defined. 
Peterson and Perry (1999: 245) note that a successful exercise outcome 
should increase participants' perceptions that teamwork can be achieved. 
Peterson and Perry (1999) also state that exposing employees to experiences 
consistent with job demands reduces their perception of danger associated 
with job execution. They extrapolate this theory to suggest that realistic 
scenarios, if performed well, reduce the participants' perception of risk in the 
situation, and therefore 'form a path to stress reduction for emergency 
responders'. The full conclusions from Peterson and Perry's study are 
tabulated in Figure 2-18. 
58 
benefit and 
Figure 2-18 Peterson & Perry's conclusions 
Perception 
Adequate level of teamwork Insignificant 
. "-Exercise 
Significant increase 
Level of response network 
effectiveness 
Insignificant Significant increase 
Adequacy of training Significant Increase Significant increase 
Adequacy of planning Insignificant Not assessed 
Adequacy of equipment Significant increase Significant increase 
Level of job risk Significant decrease Not assessed 
Adapted from (Peterson & Perry 1999: 248) 
The data were compared to a 'control' team who worked for the same unit but 
did not attend the exercises. The control team maintained stable scores 
throughout. 
Peterson and Perry (1999: 252) suggest that their results might be reversed if 
the exercise had an unsuccessful outcome, giving participants a decrease in 
perception of adequacy. This is untested, and can only be a guarded 
hypothesis from the data. 
2.8.5 Simulation, IT and exercising 
Smith et al. (1998) discuss 'Narratran', which stands for narrative training and 
was developed for the Emergency Planning College at Easingwold, UK. It is 
an authoring tool for multi-agency response training exercises. Their work 
acknowledges the problem of training for infrequent emergency events, as 
discussed earlier in this section. Syndicate based discussion exercises, which 
are very similar to table-top exercises, are suggested as one way of ensuring 
regular training. Through face-to-face discussion, players are exposed to each 
other's technical language, priorities and preferred solutions. This type of 
exercise also facilitates the development of a shared mental model, and helps 
develop the team's ability to apply certain techniques and methods to specific 
problems. 
Smith et al. state that training exercises can be split into three stages, 
beginning with authoring, then delivering the exercise, and finally evaluating 
the exercise. They claim that Narratran is designed for the authoring stage of 
that process. Without examining Narratran in detail, it is difficult to say 
whether the designers have considered how the authoring objectives of an 
exercise should be similar to the evaluation objectives, and structured the tool 
to build exercises that can be easily evaluated. 
2.8.6 Changes in UK emergency planning regulations 
As this thesis is being finished, the UK emergency planning community is 
going through significant changes. Much of the change could be attributed as 
a response to the increased terrorist threat following September 11th 2001, 
following the lead of the USA who established the Homeland Security 
Directorate in 2002. Regional emergency planning in the UK will be backed up 
by a reserve military capability called the Civil Contingencies Reaction Force, 
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who can respond to a range of incidents and take on a number of armed and 
unarmed roles at the request of the government. 
A change in terminology has also taken place, with emergency planning and 
civil protection being operated under the banner of 'resilience'. If resilience 
were being used as a concept change rather than a slogan, then the impact 
could be quite large, as resilience is defined as 
"Resilience is the capacity to use change to better cope with the unknown; it is 
learning to bounce back. " 
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1983: 196) 
And also 
`... able to recover from or adjust to misfortune or change" 
(Allen 2002: 753) 
Reading literally, whereas emergency planning and civil protection indicated a 
focus on preparing for an incident, resilience suggests a concentration on 
activity after the incident, to return to normal. It is unlikely that a change in 
terminology reflects a conceptual change in terms of emergency management 
policy from the British Government, as there are suggestions that the new bill 
will be less of a radical reform than it will be a different style of structure, 
framework and terminology. Douglas & Wildavsky (1983) Cite CS Holling who 
warns that 
"A system can be very resilient and still fluctuate greatly - i. e. have low stability. " 
(Douglas & Wildavsky 1983) 
2.9 Conclusions 
This short section will conclude this part of the literature review, bringing 
together the main points from the work that has been studied. These points 
will complement and direct the aims of this thesis, by identifying areas of 
concern and weakness in the field. Chapter 3 will identify how the objectives 
of the research and the weaknesses recognised in the literature can be best 
addressed using elements of existing models. The methodology described in 
Chapter 4 will then describe how the research will address these issues 
through the collection of new data, and through analysis. 
2.9.1 Conclusions from the risk literature 
The section of the review dealing with the risk literature concluded that public 
perception and professional assessment often come to different conclusions 
regarding the acceptability of risk, but both are valid and should contribute to 
the decision making process. There are benefits associated with risk taking, 
and costs connected to the presence of risk, and if that risk is realised. There 
is difficulty in comparing costs and benefits, when they are rarely measured in 
the same way and can often exist in different time-frames. The costs and 
benefits do not often apply to the same parties, and there is widespread 
inequality in where the costs of risk are borne. A number of factors, including 
culture, media, background, and proximity to the risk, influence a person's 
attitude to that risk. 
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It is important to ensure that groups which are vulnerable to risk are 
accounted for in any emergency planning efforts. Public perception of risk is 
also a vital consideration when planning warning and evacuation measures, 
and designing any measures requiring public participation. 
2.9.2 Conclusions regarding emergency planning and management 
The second part of the review looked at emergency planning, training and 
exercises. It emerged from the literature that although continuous feedback 
and learning are recommended throughout the emergency management field, 
there is very little guidance on how to carry them out in practice. Innovative 
approaches are required for emergency management training, because of the 
special skills required and the infrequent opportunities to use the training. 
IT is useful in some aspects of emergency response; however, the data and 
knowledge required to provide useful IT decision support for live emergency 
situations are not yet of a standard to be widely used throughout industry and 
local authorities in the UK. While emergency exercises are used to test 
emergency plans, train staff and demonstrate competence, there are 
deficiencies with using an exercise-only approach to assessment, and there 
are limited alternative solutions. Assessing the capability of an emergency 
management system to meet the demands of an incident is a difficult task, 
and little evidence has been found in the literature of any attempts to carry out 
structured, detailed and improvement-focussed assessment of emergency 
management capability. 
Toft & Reynolds (1994) define the concept of organisational learning which 
has been identified as an important but missing part of many emergency 
management systems by a number of authors reviewed in this section. 
11 organisational learning - cumulative, reflective and saturating process through 
which all personnel within organisations learn to understand and continually 
reinterpret the world in which they work by the means of the organisational 
experiences to which they are exposed. " 
(Toft & Reynolds 1994: 7) 
They also mention the importance of learning from positive and negative 
events. Positive events can include consultancy input, exercises and third 
party experience. The negative events they refer to ones which are damaging 
to the organisation, usually emergencies and disasters. Near-miss events, 
which Toft and Reynolds do not mention, are negative in the respect that they 
are the beginning, or trigger of a potential emergency, but positive in the 
sense that they are sufficiently well controlled to prevent escalation into a full 
emergency. 
2.9.3 Research in emergency planning and management 
A number of theses have been referred to in this chapter, and in preparation 
for Chapter 4 which details the methodology used for this research, it is 
helpful to reflect on some of the conclusions of other research work and the 
methods used elsewhere in the field. 
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The aim of Steed's thesis (1998) was to generate baseline information on 
emergency planning in the UK. Steed used a questionnaire which was 
distributed to all 54 local authorities in the UK. Some 29 authorities returned a 
completed questionnaire. The questionnaire used by Steed was rather 
simplistic, seeking only yes or no answers. Where individual respondents 
provided written comment supporting their views, Steed provides scant 
analysis of this, stating 
a... where individual comment appears to be relevant, reference is made to them to 
aid interpretation. " 
(Steed 1998: 90) 
One of the more surprising conclusions to be drawn from Steed's work was 
that 80% of respondents indicated that a particular incident prompted them to 
prepare incident plans. This suggests that emergency plans were not created 
using a risk-based approach; they were instead based on a reactive premise. 
The work of Peterson and Perry (1999: 252) was methodologically sound and 
produced some good results. Their results highlighted the difference in 
practice between the UK and USA, especially in terminology. Their 
conclusions are firm and valid for emergency responders, rather than 
emergency managers. However, their suggestion that their results might be 
reversed if the exercise had an unsuccessful outcome, giving participants a 
decrease in perception of adequacy is untested, and would require further 
investigation. Notably, they state that exercises are both an important part of 
emergency management and an avenue to continuous quality improvement. 
Carthey (1998) studied the Nuclear Emergency Management (NEM) system 
at several nuclear sites in the UK. Her research focuses only on simulated 
nuclear emergencies involving a theoretical release of radioactive material. 
The sites involved held five exercises per shift per year. Exercises are the 
only opportunity to train for Nuclear Emergency Management in a realistic 
setting, as events are very rare and it is most unlikely that an event escalates 
as far as a release. 
Carthey mentions that the problems of field research include difficulty in 
developing a data collection method that allowed data to be collected in a 
robust and consistent manner. This referred to the fact that the researcher 
was unable to control the exercise scenario, and the research had to balance 
the aims of the project against the resources available. 
That study focussed on site emergency procedures, and Carthey agreed with 
the views expressed elsewhere in this section regarding the fortunate rarity of 
nuclear incidents, but the unfortunate lack of opportunity to practice nuclear 
emergency management skills. 
The following chapter will give details of the model framework that has been 
adapted to assess emergency management. This will be followed in Chapter 4 
by a detailed examination of the methodology chosen for this research, taking 
into account the research methods popularly applied in the field and 
discussed above. 
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3 Review of capability assessment models 
3.1 Basis of assessment framework 
"Management has been studied systematically and scientifically since the mid- 
twentieth century, although remarkably few research findings have been applied to 
the coordination of disasters and emergencies. Indeed, throughout the world in this 
field of endeavour it seems to be considered normal to muddle through, managerially, 
rather than apply the principles of human organisation. " 
(Alexander 2002b: 135) 
As suggested by Alexander, there has been a recognised academic interest in 
the study of management and human organisation for some time. The 
literature suggested that a model to assess emergency management should 
not only investigate performance, but also the wider issues of organisational 
capability It was appropriate therefore to use the management field as a 
source of theory and inspiration on which to build the assessment framework. 
The lack of learning and progress within the emergency management field 
has also been identified as an ongoing problem, and one which this study 
aims to address. Any suitable models should also take into account the need 
for multiple levels of stakeholder involvement in emergency management, as 
the risk literature identified different groups that are affected in different ways 
by risk. 
Several approaches to capability assessment are discussed briefly here, 
before a detailed description of the model chosen as the basis for the 
framework. 
3.1.1 Computer based simulation 
The first methodology which could be considered is a computer-based 
assessment of emergency management performance. The technology exists 
to create a high level of reality in simulations, through the use of video, 
computer generated images and live information feeds. These systems are 
available in the commercial sector, and can provide feedback on performance 
in one of their scenarios. A typical system is discussed by Flin (1996) as being 
used at the Montrose training facility, where the control room of an offshore 
platform is simulated to assess the capability of the Offshore Installation 
Manager and his team in dealing with an emergency. The systems are 
however expensive and require training in order to be able to operate them 
and design simulations. A framework based on computer simulated 
performance testing would not give an overall measure of capability, and 
would have to be accompanied by additional assessment measures. 
3.1.2 Balanced Scorecard approach 
The Balanced Scorecard was used for the EMPIRE project described in 
section 1.1. It proved a useful basis for the risk-based performance 
evaluation. The Scorecard framework was however a numerical scoring 
approach, which depended on assessing the relative values of each indicator 
and scoring accordingly. The scorecard was based on an exercise 
assessment, including site briefing and document review. While it provided a 
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reasonably wide-ranging assessment, the scorecard was a wholly numerical 
scoring system, which provided feedback related to the scoring band in which 
an organisation was performing. The EMPIRE methodology also did not make 
a detailed assessment of the emergency plan, a recommendation made in the 
EMPIRE report (Strutt et al. 2001). 
3.1.3 Capability Maturity Model 
The Capability Maturity Model (CMM) is a framework for measuring 
continuous capability improvement in an organisation. The model was 
designed for the software industry, to specifically address the problems of the 
software development process. The current commercial version of the model 
has been developed by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at the 
Carnegie Mellon Institute, University of Pittsburgh. The model has been used 
as the basis for other research, mentioned in Chapter 1. The model also 
considers the requirements of multiple stakeholders in the assessment, and 
so fits the criteria defined from the literature. The following parts of this 
chapter present the background of the CMM, and discuss how it can be 
adapted to assess emergency management performance and capability. 
3.2 Origins of Capability Maturity Modelling 
The principles of CMM originate from work on quality control in the 1930s. 
Control of quality using performance statistics was pioneered by Shewart, and 
developed further by Deming, then later by Juran (Paulk et al. 1993). The five 
levels of maturity at the core of CMM, are based on work carried out by 
Crosby in the early 1970s, which developed a five stage framework to 
measure and manage quality in organisations. Crosby was one of the early 
quality pioneers who demystified quality and made it accessible and 
achievable throughout organisations. Through his work at the ITT Corporation 
and personal study and observation, he strove to prove that quality is 
"... too important to leave to the professionals... the execution of quality is the 
obligation and opportunity of the people who manage the operation. " 
(Crosby 1979: 23) 
Crosby realised that there was a need to provide a tool which could show the 
impact and performance related benefits of implementing quality management 
in an organisation, so he designed the Quality Management Maturity Grid. It 
allows an organisation to assess the level of implementation of its quality 
practices. The grid is divided into five evolutionary stages of maturity. 
Figure 3-1 Crosby's Quality Management Maturity levels 
(Crosby. 1979) 
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Six performance indicators are also given down the columns of the grid. For 
every performance indicator, a statement describing typical characteristics of 
an organisation at each level of maturity is provided. The assessor selects 
the most appropriate statement to his own organisation's status. Crosby 
recommended that the assessment be carried out by that section's operations 
manager, a shop-floor worker from another section and the operation's quality 
manager. 
Crosby suggested that for each performance indicator, a score between one 
and five should be given, according to the level at which the organisation was 
estimated to be performing. This gave a maximum achievable score of 30 for 
the grid. The grid can be used to compare different companies or sections 
within a company, and more importantly it provides an indication of the next 
level of improvement for that company. In 1985 however, IBM adapted 
Crosby's Quality Management Maturity Grid, and found use for his theory in a 
new context. 
To summarise Crosby's contribution, there are several aspects of his work 
which form the basis of later CMM development. His Quality Management 
Maturity Grid introduced the idea of five hierarchical levels of maturity. By 
examining certain characteristics and processes in an organisation, its 
maturity can be classified. Once its status is known, the objectives for further 
improvement can be defined. Crosby also made clear that the improvement 
process is continuous, which means installing feedback and learning cycles 
within the normal operating structure of an organisation. He also advocates 
that the true aim of improvement is to prevent defects from happening, rather 
than appraise and repair once the defect has occurred. These three principles 
can be tracked throughout later development of the models, described below. 
66 
(Q 
3 
y (i C 0 Im ß, - a 
öý :r cc JD acs ý:. =ä '< 33 '.. o 0 ä 
°' 
OcD- 
2 ý cviE : dcD 
ZZ ' 0 0 l< 
ýý 
cö3 ý'"ý ýäý re 9 r O. _0 3 P* 0,2 (0 0. e 
SC 
cm 
zz D; 0 °' o-m - 
O CD 
° MM S (D 3 £J 
O a1 "D aö 3M Z < 
O 
noO 
S 
51 (D 
c 
OO 
oý< 
y7Oc Cl. ;Z -C3 mm 
<p OcO m a- - 
a 
v0 
° 
C). (0 
fl? ° ZI 
(D 
OCo 
n .. «o° 
cn zr omOc. 0(D 
°' OMr: ö rný 
cy- : rj ä 
C7O Cý = -. 0OO 51 - 
3 
OOyß 
N 
f nC 
O 
D G) C 
O a 
öC ý_ OO 
OVO 
p@ 
Om 
-, >> aOd 
C= 
D 
27 N (D cn CL a) 
O0 
ýO cQ O. (D 
O 
:3 
0 
O ýp OQO 
0 
- O fD OS :3ZZ7 
ui» 
m7 
N ° CD 0) «2 Ul ö0 0) :3 
(D 
:3 
c-° Cß Q m --i ö : 
Dm 
° C 
° i; ' °' -, °°ö= 03 ý3 D Boa o_ýaiý, 
33°3 
nýo°nýcm 
_O cD N 
3 ýO .. O «2 
r- 5 
yQ Q" 
OO (D 7r 
CD O<G. ' 
73 0 (D r-, :3 M 
7rO ýG Cý 
(D OQ cQ " V iS 
O (0 OQ a 
-Oy 
ID 
«2 
51 - g» ß=N O° O0Ný ,2 0 O< NMp Co W o 
(D CD 
Q ÖO 
OS C 0= OO = (D -1 3-0 ID 
,. 
m 
S p< O 
S lG (0 U) 
0 y 
Q R. N _ co °y2 
0) 
O -0 C Q 
< ö f ý, c 
' 
0 0. ai Wir; O y `C 
( 
gmM. 
< ý CD ce -º 
=) 'O °Na 
Q( p äc 
O ay O- 
CL 3 .. 5a (D pO 
-". (D 0 - 
c3 ý ° 
r. E) 
Z -0 pý O r_ 039 M Cß O0 m3 ° m O- .. °m ý 'C 
O 
°ö3 
ö m 
ý. D m a 2 Mo ( 
aQ3 
g0 a i 
vý 
A `< 
öö cn 2 ý (0 
fD (D 3 (CD 
S mö QC N"" N (ýD (SD 
j 
C<D 
3 (Dm 3 lmC 
ý ýco 
00 
N 
2 CD (O 0ß 
0 
(D fD 
M ä 
°m 
=rC 3 3 :3 ö«° 
Z 
o 21 
-- 
a oý 
E; 
CD Ci. (0 (D (D 
(D 
Z °° '< ä°Q ý°m Sm ýö 
U )o ", 2 c (DM 0 ä-= O ci 3ö0°. - 0 ß° 
c N( 
C s* ZZ fD O O Ui ß CD , .. NO C - _ . 213-0 0 
zr 
ä 
i3 
:3 L 
0 
l< 
c 
CD 
_ l< 
°C 
ö0 
- 
51 cö 
cD °' 
< Ei -0 
34 
=ý 
O y 
3 
(D Ma C -U 
) -m0 
_! 7r (Q 
O 
0 C . f0 S. (D ýG Q .OO 
(D pO0=d zi. 
O 
0-0-0 
0OO 3Z 7- 
ZZ 
ýä 
<OOO 
-' (D 
CD Z -0 N ý 
Ul ZßO 
m a< CD 3 
ýG 
ö '3 
MM 
m ý c0 öR '' 3 (p ON (D CD O 
3 
Oa :E ID n0m ZmNO n < 
o (<D 
5. 
O u+ . 
O+ d cü r3 yy pý 
0 
ýsý OýM «D tu -,, 
o -°ý 
0. a. °D nö<((0 D 
(D cy -(D " 
-1ý C- C iý°" (0ß3o 
° a)0) - =` 51. ö- (D p 
( 
0 p 
C CL Z 
c 
.0 -a a- °° "D Dm ýv c m° -0 0.00 g 30 
ý QOO " Q? Cß 
fl-H 
_ 
3Ö .c Co =ZÖ cu 
Nw CO ä 
m ni ä3 
cý, a äc0 ö 3 p° o 
CD ,ý 
ºS 
CL (D 
:3 51 (P 
zr 
fD (D fD 
m 
O (A 
3(Dc 
- 
S .º 
< ö N 
cu G) 
ýQ 
fR O 
(DD N f/f fD -' O 
^: 
3"7 '< 
.r 
NO (A 
m 
cQ 
c 1 cD 
(A) N 
0 
0 
(A 
Q 
fÄ 
A 
CD 
N 
CD 
CD 
3 
CD 
CD 
. -r 
6) 
: 3. 
a 
C) 
0 
cn 
CD 
co 
N 
(3) 
V 
3.2.1 Early CMM framework 
Crosby's framework originally addressed the problem of implementing a new 
practice within an organisation. Humphrey and his colleagues at IBM saw the 
success of Total Quality Management and wanted to install a 'Shewart- 
Deming' improvement cycle (plan-do-check-act), continually to improve 
software development processes. Similar improvement measures had been 
implemented in software industry processes on many previous occasions 
however, without a great success. Humphrey realised that improvements 
were unsustainable because of culturally ingrained problems, and that an 
approach was required that addressed the organisation, not just its individual 
processes. Humphrey's breakthrough was realising that change must be 
implemented in stages in an organisation continuously to remove 
impediments to improvement. His innovative insight was that organisations 
had to eliminate barriers in a specific order, if they were to create the correct 
environment to support continuous, sustainable improvement (Curtis, Hefley & 
Miller 2001). Humphrey's framework was designed to guide an organisation 
through a series of cultural transformations, each of which supports the 
deployment of more mature development processes. 
The improvement of the organisation was believed to be dependent on 
repeatability, as without that stability of structured repeatable practices, there 
was too much variability in the process and product. A variable environment is 
not a sound basis for sustainable improvement. The removal of variability 
created a more stable organisational structure, and ensured that CMM was 
not the silver bullet that many previous management fads proved to be. 
The first process maturity framework was designed in the form of a maturity 
questionnaire in 1986, to address the problems within the software 
development industry. These problems were of particular concern to the U. S. 
Department of Defence (DoD) as they were the world's largest software 
customer. DoD required a methodology for the assessment of their software 
contractors' capability. Humphrey moved to the Software Engineering Institute 
(SEI) in 1986. The questionnaire evolved into the software process maturity 
framework over the following four years, as a result of experience in software 
assessments and feedback from government and commercial clients. Version 
1.0 of the CMM was released in 1991, and has been developed and 
enhanced through several revised versions. The basis of the Software CMM 
(SWCMM) is detailed below. 
3.2.2 Software CMM (SWCMM) 
The SWCMM was designed for assessing the maturity of the software 
production process. The output of that process is a tangible product, the 
quality of which can be measured physically and quantitatively. The five-level 
model provides a sequence of stages for continuing improvement, and 
presents priority actions for improving software practice. The table below 
illustrates how Crosby's original three factors of continuous improvement, 
prevention of defects and a five-stage hierarchical structure have been 
continued throughout the new framework. The second maturity level also 
reinforces the importance of repeatability as a foundation for continuous 
improvement. 
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Figure 3-3 Maturity levels of SWCMM 
Level Key characteristics of process 
5-Optimising Continuous improvement. Double-loop learning - feedback on 
performance is used in refining the process. Proactively identifies 
strengths & weaknesses. Goal is prevention of defects 
4-Managed Quantifiable and predictable. Process is measured and operates within 
quantitative boundaries. Defects fed back into process for attention 
3-Defined Standard and consistent. Stable, documented & used 
2-Repeatable Disciplined. Planning & monitoring of process, and success can be 
repeated 
1-Initial Organisation does not provide a stable environment for process 
(www. software. org 2001) 
CMM places an organisation in one of the five maturity levels described 
above. The placement of an organisation on the above scale is achieved by 
assessing approximately 18 Key Process Areas (KPA's). A KPA is a cluster of 
related activities which must be carried out together. 
Figure 3-4 Key Process Areas and maturity levels of SWCMM. 
Level Focus Key Process Areas 
5-Optimising Continuous Process Change Management 
improvement Technology Change Management Defects Prevention 
4-Managed Product & process Software quality management 
quality Quantitative Process Management 
3-Defined Engineering process Organisational process focus 
Organisational process definition 
Peer reviews 
Training programmes 
Inter-group co-ordination 
Software products engineering 
Integrated software management 
2-Repeatable Project management Requirements Management. 
Software project planning 
Software project tracking & on-site 
Software subcontract Management 
Software QA 
Software configuration management. 
1-Initial Heroes No KPA's available 
(www. sottware. org 2001) 
An organisation must exhibit all of the Key Process Area (KPA) at a particular 
level, in order to be graded at that maturity level. Assessors seek evidence of 
KPA achievement through visiting the organisation, interviewing key 
managers, carrying out a survey of a sample of the operational staff and 
reviewing the organisation's documents and procedures. From this evidence, 
the maturity of the organisation is evaluated, and by focussing on the KPAs 
which are not currently in place, capability improvement recommendations 
can be made. 
In a survey of organisations (Paulk et al 1995) that have used SWCMM and 
implemented change, SEI has shown quantified improvement in the 
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performance of those organisations. Their analysis shows that when an 
organisation moves from maturity level one to level three, its. ability to meet 
schedules improves from 32% to 80% and the perception that their product 
quality is good or excellent improves from 64% to 100%. The advantages to 
an organisation of using this process improvement methodology appear to be 
substantial. 
The survey also shows the range of maturity levels across all of the 
organisations assessed, which gives some indication of the maturity of the 
software industry as a whole. SEI data indicate that 75% of organisations 
assessed with SWCMM (Paulk et at. 1995) are categorised at level 1 and 15% 
of organisations are placed at level 2. Level 3 is home to 8% of organisations, 
whose processes are defined and consistent and only 1.5% of assessed 
organisations reach level 4. A meagre 0.5% of organisations achieve level 
five, which dictates that they must be continuously improving their processes 
and products. The model has been applied widely throughout the software 
industry in the UK and USA. It has also been customised to monitor 
processes in the telecoms industry. 
In summary, the SWCMM provides a structured assessment of an 
organisation or project based on its key processes, and indicates the level of 
maturity at which that organisation / project exists. Based on this maturity 
level, the implementation of further key practices can be recommended to 
improve the capability of the organisation. The framework is adapted easily to 
other applications where a process results in a physical product. The 
popularity of the SWCMM in the early 1990s resulted in a number of requests 
from the software industry for a similar tool to improve their workforce 
practices. The process maturity framework was designed to be applied to 
practices which influence performance and business objectives. Therefore it 
was considered an appropriate basis for a new tool, as workforce practices 
are critical to organisational performance. 
3.3 People CMM (PCMM) 
The first version of PCMM was introduced in 1995 and widely used in large 
manufacturing engineering organisations. The primary purpose of PCMM is to 
improve the capability of the workforce. The workforces are responsible for 
carrying out the organisation's key business activities, and therefore should 
have a range of knowledge, skills and process abilities at their disposal. 
Workforce capability indicates an organisation's: 
" Readiness to perform 
" Likely results from performing business activities 
" Potential for benefiting from investment in process improvement or 
advanced technology 
(Curtis, Hefley & Miller, 2001: 4) 
In a similar way to the software production process, workforce management 
fads have been around for a number of years, yet there have been no 
significant advances in workforce practice. The reason is thought to be the 
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lack of management commitment, and an unintegrated approach to 
implementation. PCMM was designed to 
"... integrate workforce practices into a system and involve management early in their 
deployment" 
(Curtis, Hefley & Miller, 2001: 8) 
PCMM has five levels of maturity, and KPAs assigned to those levels, which 
must be achieved before progression can occur. The diagram below illustrates 
the five maturity levels of PCMM, and to which aspects of the workforce they 
relate. 
Figure 3-5 PCMM levels applied to workforce 
Level 5- workgroups are empowered to function 
independently within organisation. 
Level 4- interaction between workgroups, units and 
competency groups is managed. 
Level 3- workgroups / teams are managed 
within organisational units. 
Level 2- individuals are managed 
in the organisation. 
° 
o .. 
Level 1- ad hoc - no real 
workforce management. 
3.3.1 Maturity level 1 
The initial maturity level of the PCMM is a default stage, where all 
organisations who fail to meet the criteria for level two reside. Performance at 
this level is unmanaged and ad-hoc and any success would be the result of 
the problem-solving skills and performance of specific managers and 
individuals. 
3.3.2 Maturity level 2 
Level 2 indicates that an organisation is performing the basic management 
role, in developing and taking care of their workers. Focusing on the unit level, 
workers are trained to carry out their assigned tasks and compensated 
appropriately for their work. Their work environment is managed to ensure 
that any threats to health, safety or efficiency are dealt with. The aim at this 
level is to establish practices which address basic problems and prepare 
managers for the more sophisticated concepts which will be necessary to 
improve further. Basic communication between the organisation, unit and 
worker are essential foundations for progression to higher levels of maturity. 
3.3.3 Maturity level 3 
A level 3 organisation identifies common skills and knowledge required for 
carrying out business activities. It develops competencies in its workforce 
which help to achieve its business objectives. Each competency is made up 
of an integration of the knowledge, skills and process abilities. The workforce 
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competencies are the mainstays of the strategic business plan, and together 
make up the core competency of the organisation. At level 3 the workforce 
competencies are mapped against current and future work commitments and 
the practices implemented at this level are important in enabling business 
strategy. Once the workforce competencies are defined, other processes such 
as training, staffing and development practices can be focussed on 
developing the knowledge, skills and process abilities to achieve them. 
Workforce practices are also adapted to an organisation's business needs by 
the motivation and enabling of the workers. The development of a common 
organisational culture is essential at this stage. The professional workforce 
now shares the responsibility for achieving business objectives. 
3.3.4 Maturity level 4 
Organisations which are assessed at level 4 maturity manage performance 
and capability by quantitative means. The organisation has predictive 
capacity, and therefore is far more accurate in commitment to work and 
planning schedules. Using competence-based processes to complete work, 
the products can be relied upon and are consistent. The workforce can then 
be empowered to deal with their own practices, leaving the management free 
to concentrate on strategic issues. Competency-based processes can also be 
integrated into a larger, multidisciplinary process which is proven to accelerate 
business results. 
Quantitative process management provides data to managers in level 4 
organisations, which enables them to make better strategic decisions. Trained 
mentors can pass on their knowledge, skills and process experience through 
a structured, targeted programme to junior workers, enhancing learning 
throughout the competency community. 
3.3.5 Maturity level 5 
Organisations which reach level 5 maturity are classified as optimising. The 
whole organisation is focussed on continual improvement. The capability of 
individuals, workgroups and units, competency-based processes and 
workforce practices and activities, are all continuously monitored and 
assessed. Individuals and workgroups are empowered to control their own 
style of operating, and the workgroups absorb and learn from different working 
practices. Continual maintenance is required to ensure that performance at all 
levels is aligned to the organisational objectives. 
Each maturity level (2-5) has between 3 and 7 process areas, known 
previously as KPAs in the SWCMM. A process area is 
'a cluster of related practices that, when performed collectively, satisfy a set of goals 
that contribute to the capability gained by achieving a maturity level. " 
(Curtis, Hefley & Miller, 2001: 29) 
PCMM focus and process areas according to maturity level are shown in 
Figure 3-6. 
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Figure 3-6 Process Areas and maturity levels of PCMM. 
Level Focus Key Process Areas 
5-optimising Continuously improve Continuous workforce innovation 
and align personal, Organisational performance 
workgroup and alignment 
organisational Continuous capability improvement 
capability 
4-predictable Empower and Mentoring 
integrate workforce Organisational capability 
competencies and Management 
manage performance Quantitative performance 
quantitatively management 
Competency-based assets 
Empowered workgroups 
Competency integration 
3-defined Develop workforce Participatory culture 
competencies and Workforce development 
workgroups and align Competency-based practices 
with business Career development 
strategies and Workforce planning 
objectives Competency analysis 
2-managed Managers take Compensation 
responsibility for Training and development 
managing and Performance management 
developing their Work environment 
people Communication and coordination 
Staffing 
1-initial Workforce practices 
applied inconsistent) 
(Curtis, Hefley & Miller, 2001) 
3.3.6 Origins of workforce management principals 
PCMM is not the first set of principles designed to improve workforce 
practices. In 1916, one of the classical management theorists Henri Fayol 
published his fourteen principles of management, stating clearly that they 
were by no means exclusive, and management should remain flexible and 
adaptable in order to survive (Mullins 1996). Several of Fayol's principles are 
similar to the PCMM process areas. 
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Figure 3-7 Comparison of PCMM and Fayol's principals 
Fayol's principals parallel 
Division of work - better work for Competence-Based practices - 
the same effort, advantages of focus on improving knowledge, skills 
specialisation and process abilities for each worker 
Unity of direction - one plan and Organisational performance 
one head for any group of activities alignment - aligning the activities of 
with same objective the workgroups and units to the 
objectives of the organisation 
Subordination - interest of the Participatory culture - individuals 
organisation should dominate involved in contributing to all levels of 
individual / group interests organisation 
Remuneration - to satisfy employee Compensation - workers should be 
and employer, reward effort rewarded for their efforts 
Order - material order prevents Work environment - an environment 
material loss conducive to effective and efficient 
operations 
Stability of tenure of personnel - Career development - organisation 
prosperous organisation should have should provide a tracked and 
stability for personnel developed career path for individuals 
Initiative - represents a source of Continuous workforce innovation - 
strength for the organisation seek and test new ideas and 
developments from workforce 
t-ayol's pnnciples taken from (Mullins, 1996) 
3.3.7 Structure of PCMM and assessment 
One of the key strengths of CMM, demonstrated from Crosby's early work, is 
that it is a tool for continuous improvement rather than just an assessment 
technique. The five evolutionary levels clearly prescribe what an organisation 
needs to have in place before it can attempt higher level practices. PCMM is 
based on the same hierarchical principal. Level 3 workforce developments 
and workforce planning can not take place until level 2 staffing, compensation, 
communication and effective work environment are in place. 
3.3.8 Suitability of a PCMM basis for Emergency Management 
Improvement 
In the same way that the original model (SWCMM) addresses the software 
production process, PCMM looks at the maturity of the workforce, workgroups 
or units which make up the organisation. Rather than the quality of the 
software product being the ultimate concern, the competency of the workers is 
the focus of the PCMM. 
An emergency management can be summed up as the actions of people, 
taken within a system to reduce loss of life and assets and limit environmental 
damage. The knowledge, skills and competencies of the individuals and 
teams are critical to the success of emergency management. For this reason, 
PCMM appears be a good basis for the framework to assess emergency 
management capability and continuous improvement. 
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Using PCMM as a basis would give a number of advantages over using the 
more technical, production-process oriented SWCMM. The PCMM model is 
focussed on the competency and interaction of people and teams, which is 
the basis of most emergency management systems in MAHI. The alignment 
of these teams to the goals and objectives of the organisation is vital for the 
success and efficiency of the response. 
PCMM also enables cross-organisational benchmarking, which has great 
benefits in emergency management, as discussed in Chapter 2. CMM and 
PCMM help organisations to improve the efficiency of their processes, to 
improve their competitive position and increase their profits. An organisation 
which has effective means of increasing its profits, is likely to keep those 
methods to itself in the interests of competition. An organisation that has new 
and effective techniques for emergency management however, should find 
ways to share these with its peers, as the common goals of saving life, 
protecting the environment and safeguarding assets are shared by all 
organisations. 
3.4 Conclusion of model selection and description 
This chapter has moved the progress of the research from the problems and 
issues identified in Chapters 1 and 2, to inspiration for solutions identified in 
the literature. Chapter 3 has identified a model and theory basis for a 
framework assess emergency management capability. Chapter 4 will now 
detail the method by which that assessment framework will be constructed. 
75 
Chapter 4 
4 Research Methodology ........................................................................... 77 4.1 Background discussion and expert counsel ...................................... 
77 
4.2 Purpose, focus of study and units of analysis ................................... 
79 
4.3 Literature review methodology .......................................................... 80 4.3.1 Search methods ....................................................................... 81 
4.4 Qualitative research method ............................................................. 81 
4.5 Model adaptation .............................................................................. 83 4.6 Pilot interviews .................................................................................. 83 
4.7 Sampling strategy and security ......................................................... 84 4.7.1 Ethical considerations in research ............................................ 85 
4.8 Emergency plan analysis .................................................................. 
86 
4.8.1 Sample selection ...................................................................... 86 
4.8.2 Analytical approach - content analysis .................................... 86 4.8.3 Validity and confidence ............................................................ 87 
4.9 Exercise observation -gaining entry & training ................................. 87 4.10 Audit of Local Authority Emergency planning department ............... 90 4.10.1 Emergency exercise ................................................................. 91 4.10.2 Emergency Plan review ............................................................ 91 
4.10.3 Interview with key staff ............................................................. 91 4.11 Expert validation review ................................................................... 92 4.12 Conclusions of the research methodology ....................................... 92 
76 
4 Research Methodology 
In Chapter 2 appropriate literature was reviewed and questions and issues to 
be answered by this research were identified. The research methods of other 
academic studies in this field were also briefly discussed. Recognising the 
aims and objectives stated in Chapter 1, a model framework that could be 
adapted to assess emergency management capability was identified in the 
literature. Chapter 3 presents a detailed discussion of this model, and the 
ways in which it can be adapted for use in this study. 
This Chapter presents the research methodology. It shows how the structure 
of the Capability Maturity Model (CMM) has been strengthened by data 
collected from the emergency management field, to construct a framework to 
assess emergency management capability. The purpose of this chapter is to 
describe and justify the research methods used in this project. The chapter 
will describe in stages how this research was carried out, identifying the 
methods used and the reasons for choosing those methods. There are a 
number of texts on the subject of research methodology, and where 
appropriate these have been referenced as guidance. The diagram (Figure 
4-1) summarises the methodology used in this research. The stages indicated 
in the diagram are described in full in the following subsections. 
4.1 Background discussion and expert counsel 
One of the first stages of the research methodology was to seek the expert 
advice of the research sponsors, OCTO Ltd. The organisation has a track- 
record of providing specialist emergency and crisis management training to 
industry and government agencies throughout the UK. They drew on their 
current and detailed knowledge of the field to identify some of the important 
issues which should be addressed in the research, and provided guidance on 
how these might be investigated in the field. They sought advice and 
collaboration from their clients and contacts throughout MAHI and the 
regulators, and provided advice, briefing and guidance throughout the project. 
The research supervisor also drew from an extensive background in designing 
and building assessment models for industrial application, and provided 
detailed academic guidance on acceptable methods and research techniques. 
The supervisor also used his network of industrial and academic contacts to 
establish the requirements of emergency management capability, and it was 
from this combined expert advice, along with the issues identified in the 
literature, that the research methodology stemmed. 
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4.2 Purpose, focus of study and units of analysis 
Patton (1990: 197) gives a comprehensive list of factors which should be 
considered when designing research methodology. A number of those factors 
will be addressed in the following subsections. The factor concerns the 
purpose of the study. As presented in chapter 1, the core purpose of this 
research is to provide a method of assessing emergency management 
performance and capability. This research question has been established 
from industrial, academic and governmental experts involved in the field of 
Industrial emergency management. The assessment method should allow 
organisations to assess and ultimately improve their performance and 
capability in emergency management. The ultimate goal of improved 
capability is to increase the number of lives saved, and decrease the damage 
to the environment and assets that can occur in an emergency incident. This 
classifies the research as `applied research', because it is seeking knowledge 
which can be used to improve the effectiveness of human actions. 
The focus of the study is Major Accident Hazardous Industry (MAHI) in the 
UK. The definition of hazardous industry is in line with the COMAH 1999 
regulations, which classify a site as a Major Accident Hazard if it stores or 
processes above a certain amount of certain substances. This focus is 
appropriate for several reasons. 
The nature of the hazards faced by MAHI means that they must have a 
tangible and significant emergency response capability to deal with potentially 
high consequence, rapid escalation incidents. The research focus was on the 
UK rather than European MAHI due to limited resources and the time at which 
the research commenced. The project resources were limited to one 
researcher and the period of three years to design, implement and write-up 
the research project. To carry out a meaningful European study under those 
constraints would not be feasible. The timing of the project was also 
significant. When the project began in 1999, a major change had occurred in 
the UK statute, bringing the MAHI in line with EU regulations. There were 
member states that were ahead of the UK in their implementation, and those 
who were lagging behind. It would have been a difficult and inappropriate time 
to carry out meaningful comparison across the member states. The change in 
the European research environment over the past three years is discussed 
further in the Discussion, Chapter 8. 
The focus of the research is the organisational response, as shown through 
the emergency plans and procedures, and demonstrated in exercise and 
feedback capability. Previous research in this area has focussed on EM 
leadership and the role of Emergency Controller (EC) (Flin 1996; Flin & 
Slaven 1996; Skriver 1998). This focus was especially appropriate to offshore 
emergencies, as the behaviour and leadership of the Offshore Installation 
Manager (OIM) is of principal importance in rapidly escalating, limited escape 
scenarios. EC leadership focus was not as crucial to the MAHI situation focus 
on the EC does not consider sustainable organisational emergency 
management. 
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This study is therefore defining the organisation as the main unit of analysis, 
as the research is looking at organisational performance and capability. The 
EMT plays a central role in that capability, and so the Emergency 
Management Team (EMT) is therefore the unit of analysis for the emergency 
exercise observations. The emergency plan is focussed on the entire 
organisational response, so the unit of analysis for that part of the data 
collection is the whole organisation. 
4.3 Literature review methodology 
The aims of the literature review were to discover the scope of previous work 
and identify how established knowledge could contribute to this research. It 
also aimed to build an appreciation of the concepts and theories involved and 
show how previous work supports this study. The literature review process 
began by defining the boundaries of the search. It was important to ensure 
that the review does not sprawl to cover issues which are unconnected to the 
subject, and also to provide rigorous assurance that all related material was 
drawn together. This was aided by drawing a concentric circles diagram, as 
shown in Figure 4-2. 
Figure 4-2 Literature review focus diagram 
"r 
Core 
issues 
Impacts 
on study 
Periphery 
The central area is the core subject, upon which the thesis is based. The 
review should thoroughly explore issues within this circle. The blue circle 
contains the issues which impact on the study, but are not central to the 
thesis. They should therefore be reviewed in some depth, and preferably 
linked to some of the core matters. The purple outer circle contains peripheral 
issues, which impact on the thesis but do not warrant discussion in their own 
right. It is important to demonstrate knowledge of the issues in all circles, but 
the depth of that knowledge should be relative to the proximity to the core 
subject. Some subjects span more than one circle, as they have some 
aspects which impact on both spheres. 
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Once the literature subjects had been prioritised, several methods were used 
to search for and review the appropriate work. Research on the subject of 
emergency management has only been recently established at Cranfield 
campus, and so there were limited library resources available. It was 
necessary to seek resources in other libraries, and research was carried out 
at Cranfield's Shrivenham campus library, which houses a- large disaster 
management collection. Coventry University library also has an established 
disaster management information and resource centre, as does the 
Emergency Planning College at Easingwold. Research was undertaken at 
both of these facilities, supplemented by visits to the British Library in London, 
and the Fire Service College Library at Moreton-in-the-Marsh. 
4.3.1 Search methods 
Searches for relevant books and journal papers were carried out physically 
and electronically. Electronic searches used databases of journal titles and 
articles which are stored on-line and could be accessed using services such 
as Science Direct and Pro-quest. Other databases contained abstracts and 
titles of papers which could be ordered in print form from the British Library. A 
new electronic service called 'Contents direct' was used, which involves the 
automatic emailing of selected journals' contents pages to the researcher 
when a new issue is published. Physical searching involved using library 
catalogues, personal recommendations and cross-references from other 
sources, in addition to browsing, to find books, journals and theses in the 
libraries mentioned above. 
A service called 'Index of Theses' contains a large proportion of postgraduate 
theses from UK Universities, with abstracts. This service was very useful in 
identifying relevant research. Searching the internet often results in an 
overwhelming amount of irrelevant information, but can also help to trace 
authors, university projects and overseas literature. It should be stressed at 
this point that while best efforts have been made to seek out relevant similar 
research overseas by investigating reputable international journals, this 
search was confined to English language journals, and so there may be 
connected work carried out in non-English speaking areas which has not been 
identified. 
The literature identified in the search was then reviewed. This process 
involved critique of the evidence, clarity, plausibility, use and value of the 
work, in the context of its relevance to this study. The review concluded with a 
summary of the research methods used in other studies. This summary has 
been used to inform the choice of research methods, described in the 
following sub-section. 
4.4 Qualitative research method 
Several factors were considered when identifying a suitable research method. 
The research studies reviewed in Chapter 2 provided a useful insight into 
established and proven research methods. An example is the quantitative 
approach to emergency management performance used successfully by 
Lyons (2002). The subject of her work was related to task performance timing, 
and so clearly demanded a quantitative approach. 
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The constraints of the field were also taken into account. Emergency 
management is often a secondary activity for many industries, and as such 
operates under tight budgetary controls. Exercises are usually only conducted 
for regulatory demonstrations or for training, and Carthey (1998) and Lyons 
(2002) both allude to their lack of input as researchers, on the design of the 
exercise scenarios that had been structured to demonstrate a predefined 
objective to the regulator. The technique of exercise observation was used by 
Lyons (2002) and Carthey (1998) in slightly different ways and produced 
valuable results in their work. It was thoroughly recommended as a worthwhile 
method by both authors. 
Several literature sources had reviewed emergency documentation as part of 
their work. This included an emergency plan review by NAO (2002), 
emergency exercise report review by Snelling (1997) and a review of public 
inquiry reports by Toft and Reynolds (1994) and Haji Brahim (2000). The 
authors listed above have used qualitative and quantitative analysis on their 
data sets, however the former appears to offer greater flexibility, and is more 
compatible with the aims of 'applied research' discussed in 4.2. With this 
flexibility the applied research can respond to trends and new concepts in the 
data, which increase the value of the study as a problem-solving device. 
Patton (1990) describes the three main qualitative research methods; 
" Direct observation of subjects, or observation via video 
" Written documents - work with words and visual data, not numbers 
" Detailed, open-ended interviews - not highly structured 
(Patton 1990: 10) 
The choice of methodology for this study was based on the previous 
research, review of literature and discussion of the limiting factors above. A 
qualitative research method, involving analysis of emergency planning 
documentation and direct observation of emergency exercises supported by 
interviews with emergency management personnel was chosen as a robust 
and suitable combination of techniques. 
This study aims to produce an assessment framework, the conclusions of 
which will be much stronger if it uses evidence from three sources rather than 
the current uni-directional assessment approach. The technique of using 
more than one information source to investigate the same issue is known as 
triangulation, and is used to improve the validity of the findings, by showing 
that a similar conclusion can be drawn from more than one source. 
Patton (1990: 187) gives several different methods of triangulation which can 
be used to increase the validity of research findings (Figure 4-3). This study 
uses all of these methods of triangulation, apart from comparing the data to 
published work, as currently no appropriate comparison work is available. 
82 
Figure 4-3 Methods of triangulation 
4.5 Model adaptation 
This subsection will now explain the process used to convert a model from the 
management field into an assessment framework for use in the emergency 
management field. 
The first step of the methodology is to decide which aspects of the original 
model should be preserved and which parts need to be replaced with the 
appropriate detail from the emergency management field. The core of the 
model was its process-based maturity approach, based on continuous, 
evolutionary improvement, through five defined levels of capability. That 
important core structure of the model remains the same. 
As discussed later in this study, the CMM is made up of 5 levels, each of 
which has a number of KPAs. The names and the meaning of the levels may 
need to be adapted to fit emergency management language. Some 
processes might still be relevant, some will need to be altered slightly and 
some are no longer relevant, and therefore have to be deleted. First, the data 
from emergency plans and exercises will be examined to see which of the 
original PCMM processes (if any) are present, and whether any of the existing 
processes, or the core intention of that process can be adapted for use in 
emergency management. The final process set is expected to comprise of 
new processes and ones which have been adapted from or influenced by the 
original model. 
The following subsections will describe in detail how the qualitative methods 
of emergency plan analysis, exercise observation and key personnel 
interviewing were used to obtain data to inform the modelling process. 
4.6 Pilot interviews 
Inter-agency cooperation in MAHI emergencies is very important. The 
capability of an organisation to collaborate and coordinate with outside 
agencies, including the local authorities and external emergency services, is 
key to successful resolution of any incident with potential off-site 
consequences. It is not possible to fully observe all parties and interactions 
during an emergency exercise, or fully appreciate the quality and practicality 
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Adapted from (Patton 1990: 187) 
of relationships stated in emergency plans. Three pilot interviews with 
representatives from one fire brigade, one police service police and a local 
authority were therefore required to highlight some of the issues which may be 
either problematic, or examples of good practice. The interviewees all worked 
in the same county, and so provided an overview of a typical coordination 
structure. The purpose of the interviews was to inform and prepare the 
researcher for some of the issues that might be encountered in the exercises 
and emergency plans, and the focus of the interviews was the inter-agency 
cooperation in MAHI emergencies. 
The interviews lasted between one and three hours, and were conducted 
within the space of two weeks, to ensure some consistency in the issues 
being discussed and the environment in which the representatives were 
working. These interviews were semi-structured, with discussion based 
around a number of important issues. As an information gathering exercise, 
later interviews built on and questioned issues raised by previous 
interviewees. The notes from these interviews are included in the appendix of 
the thesis (10.3), and the results are presented and analysed at the beginning 
of Chapter 5. The remainder of this chapter describes the process of 
collecting data to build the assessment framework. 
4.7 Sampling strategy and security 
The sampling strategy for this study was influenced by several factors. MAHI 
in the UK includes a range of different sectors from pharmaceutical to petro- 
chemical and from nuclear to chloro-chemcial plants. In order to ensure that 
the assessment framework was appropriate across the sectors, it was 
necessary to include a range of different sites in the sample. 
MAHI sites are classified according to the volume of hazardous chemicals on 
the site, rather than the site population or complexity of the surrounding area. 
It was therefore necessary to sample a range of sites, which included large 
and small site populations, sites which were in areas of dense industry and 
sites which stood alone in isolated areas. In areas of dense industrial activity 
or dense local population one might expect a demonstration of higher 
capability in emergency management than in an area with little outside the 
plant boundary. 
The sample was also limited to organisations within which the research had 
established a contact. Some of the organisations also approached the 
research sponsor with the intention of taking part in this study. The reason for 
this limitation was the difficulty and time taken to secure permission, visits and 
information from organisations without prior contact. The level of detail 
provided to this study by those organisations could potentially have 
highlighted problems in their systems or plans which could have put lives at 
stake, or threatened environmental or asset damage. This type of information 
is not treated lightly, and so the assurance of confidentiality and trust provided 
by the researcher and the research sponsor was invaluable in securing 
sample organisations. 
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To maintain confidentiality in the transcripts of exercises, all references to 
particular chemicals, plant, locations and members of staff were removed or 
changed. The site names have been replaced with a code which allows the 
researcher to identify them, but does not represent the actual name or 
location in any way. The times of year at which the exercises took place are 
not released, as this could also be used to identify the organisation. Until the 
introduction of the COMM regulations which began in 1999 (Health and 
Safety Executive 1999), many sites had their own particular terminology for 
Emergency Controller (EC) and Emergency Control Centre (ECC) and other 
emergency management components. These were replaced with standard 
terminology, as was any reference to specialist off-site detection vehicles 
which are used at a number of sites to identify gas, radioactive or 
environmental contamination. 
4.7.1 Ethical considerations in research 
There are ethical considerations in any research which involves human 
participants, or impacts on society in any way. The University has strict 
procedures to examine and authorise experimental practice, ensuring that it is 
carried out to the highest ethical standards. 
If the emergency exercises had been designed and coordinated by the 
researcher, then there would have been an obligation to have the 
experimental method approved by the ethics committee. In this case however, 
the researcher was an observer in emergency exercises which had been 
written, coordinated and executed by a private organisation, over which the 
researcher had no control. The researcher was happy to report in all cases 
that the organisations maintained high standards of ethical behaviour in 
emergency exercises. Examples of this include monitoring staff for signs of 
stress, providing refreshment, hygiene and rest facilities for the staff during 
the exercise, and ensuring that the staff was not exposed to undue levels of 
discomfort, distress or exertion during the exercise. In the majority of cases 
the staff was provided with a supportive environment in which they could offer 
comments in a debriefing situation. Debriefing in exercises is not only 
important for learning, as discussed in Chapter 2, but also as a means for staff 
to mentally justify the events, and express their feelings and concerns. 
There was an ethical responsibility on the researcher to ensure that his 
presence in the exercise did not add unnecessary additional pressure or 
stress on the participants. To achieve this aim, the researcher was introduced 
as 'a university student' to all the participants before the exercise began, and 
it was stated that the work was confidential, specific participant actions would 
not be shared with the management and any published results would be 
anonymous. The impartial image of academia reassured participants that the 
researcher's presence was not threatening, and there was no hostility 
experienced in any of the exercises. Further impacts of observation are 
discussed in the next subsection which examines the research method of 
emergency exercise observation 
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4.8 Emergency plan analysis 
The first type of data analysis involved a sample of emergency plans. An 
exercise can be described as a glimpse of the reality of an organisation's 
emergency response, whereas the emergency plan (EP) is their statement of 
intent, in terms of how they would respond to an incident. The purpose and 
structure of the EP has been fully discussed in Chapter 2. An organisation's 
EP indicates the depth of understanding of the hazards and risks that face 
them, and their actions to prepare for and mitigate these risks. It is therefore 
important that any assessment of an organisation's capability involves their 
EP. Issues of confidentiality discussed in relation to emergency exercises 
above, were also encountered in relation to EPs. The selection of EPs for this 
research is discussed in the following subsection. 
4.8.1 Sample selection 
There were several objectives and limitations to be considered when selecting 
suitable EPs. Firstly, the organisations who were keen to be involved in the 
emergency exercise observation aspect of the research, were almost all still 
preparing their COMM EP when this research was taking place. No site had 
its COMM plan complete and checked for compliance by the Competent 
Authority at the time when the research was ready to collect and analyse 
plans. This presented a challenge to the research; however a positive 
outcome was achieved. In the absence of site EPs an alternative sample of 
plans was required, to show that evidence of emergency management 
capability could be found in EPs and incorporate that evidence into the 
framework. 
Through contacts made in the pilot interviews, it became apparent that there 
was a wide selection of Local Authority off-site and County Emergency Plans 
available. These included plans which related to incidents on COMM sites 
and other hazards which could affect the population. One of the advantages of 
using these plans was that they would give the framework a broader base 
than just COMM sites. Local Authority Emergency planners are commonly 
employed full time to carry out EP related activities, and so the plans 
represent years of experience design and plan construction. With this in mind, 
the EPs should give a good indication of what indicators of capability should 
be present, and some examples of good or best practice. 
Plans were available by requesting them directly from the Local Authority 
officers, viewing a large collection at the Emergency Planning College library 
and requesting copies from contacts met through professional societies and 
pilot interviews. England and Scotland were represented, as were a number of 
different hazards. The sample included Authorities of different sizes, as well 
as a number of plans from the hazardous site/pipeline operators. The full 
sample is discussed in Chapter 5, Data Analysis. 
4.8.2 Analytical approach - content analysis 
There were limited examples in the literature of methods of analysis for 
emergency plans. NAO (2000) used a simple checklist which produced a 
score based on the plan's content. The Literature Review (Chapter 2) 
identified some common weaknesses in organisational EM capability, and the 
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aim of this research is to build a framework of assessment that can identify 
those weak points, and highlight the strengths in an organisation's emergency 
management. 
The analysis of emergency plans will distinguish the parts of the plan that 
indicate an organisation's strengths or weaknesses in certain key areas. The 
three areas identified in the literature as being important to the success of 
emergency management are a risk basis for the EM system, a continuous 
learning approach and an integrated attitude to EM. The content and style of 
the selected emergency plans will be analysed for evidence of these three 
areas of importance. This analysis will take the form of a short description of 
each plan, followed by a table comparing the contents of the plans to the 
checklist developed by the NAO (2002), and to the processes found in the 
PCMM. 
4.8.3 Validity and confidence 
Validity in qualitative research is dependent on the skill and rigour of the 
researcher, as they represent the 'tool' used in the fieldwork. Whereas 
quantitative research can sometimes boast much more consistent validity, due 
to the standardised, calibrated nature of the tool, it lacks the flexibility and 
responsive capabilities of qualitative research. The qualitative researcher 
learns with each experience, and can build on his or her knowledge and ability 
throughout the study. 
The validity of the findings in this particular part of the study is strengthened 
by the multiple data sources. Emergency plans and exercises from different 
sizes and types of organisation from a range of industrial sectors and local 
authorities in different parts of the UK are analysed. Data on emergency 
management capability were analysed from emergency exercises and from 
emergency plans, using different analysis methods. The aim is to construct a 
comprehensive and robust assessment framework, and its validity is 
dependent on the analysis of a range of emergency management practices 
throughout the UK. 
4.9 Exercise observation -gaining entry & training 
Armado: How hast thou purchased this experience? 
Moth: By my penny of observation. 
(Shakespeare, 1593) 
Previous research has used emergency exercise observation as a means of 
collecting data on emergency management performance. Carthey (1998) 
used nuclear emergency simulations to investigate emergency decision 
making, and Lyons (2002) used a range of emergency exercises to develop 
and support the use of a quantitative model of task performance. The 
research technique of observation has some minor experimental difficulties 
associated with it and these are further described in the Discussion, Chapter 
8. 
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To facilitate a good research observation, it is very important to gain the trust 
of the group being observed. There are several recognised means of 
achieving this, discussed by Patton (1990: 253). The first model Patton cites 
from Jorgensen (1989) is known as the `phased entree' tactic. This involves 
the researcher working with another group within the organisation until they 
become known and trusted, then switch over to observe the group of concern. 
The method is inappropriate for this study, as emergency management is 
usually a small, stand-alone team within the organisation, and phased entree 
would not be practical. 
Patton (1990) states that the best method to introduce a researcher to the 
participants is the `known sponsor approach'. The known sponsor approach 
enables a new observer to use the legitimacy and credibility of a person who 
is known to the participants, and held in high regard. The research sponsor 
had an established reputation with most of the organisations involved, so in all 
cases their senior consultant was the `known sponsor' and introduced the 
researcher to the participants. This worked well, and further discussion of the 
observations carried out can be found in Chapter 8, the Discussion. 
Exercise observation is a skill which must be obtained by training and 
guidance. Prior to this study, the researcher had been an external observer at 
several exercises, and a participant in a number of other exercises. This 
previous exposure proved useful. Further guidance was provided by the 
research sponsor's consultants, who have extensive practical expertise in this 
area. This practical guidance and advice was supported by studying a 
Masters level academic module in Research Methods, administered by the 
Human Factors Group at Cranfield University. 
The process of each exercise observation at a site took between one and two 
days. The stages of the observation are illustrated below, and summarised in 
the following paragraphs. 
Figure 4-4 Exercise observation stages 
Exercise observation 
Before each exercise, between half a day and a full day was spent at the site. 
This time was usually spent with the organisations Safety, Health and 
Environmental department, who usually hold the remit for emergency planning 
and management. On larger sites there was a dedicated emergency planning 
department. The purpose of the visit was to become familiar with the particular 
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processes, operations and terminology on that site. The visit usually began 
with a health and safety briefing undertaken by all visitors to the site, and the 
issuing of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). The depth of this safety 
briefing varied between sites, ranging from being asked to read the fire alarm 
notice and signing to say you had done so, to a short video on site safety and 
test questions. On sites where there can be three different alarms, each with 
different meanings, such a briefing is very important. 
The visit would also include a site tour to familiarise the researcher with the 
surroundings, buildings and physical layout of the exercise scenario. The 
details of the scenario would then be discussed. This process was of great 
importance as without the background detail, much of the emergency exercise 
would be meaningless to the observer. As the observer had no control over 
the content or coordination of the simulation, this was also an important 
opportunity to note down procedures and assumptions that were particular to 
the site, which would be useful in explaining behaviour during the exercise. 
The pre-exercise briefing was normally held an hour before the scheduled 
start of the exercise, and was for observers and the exercise administration 
team, which usually included telephone operators, message loggers and 
marshals. The briefing aimed to present the scenario as it would be delivered, 
and any extra detail which was being simulated or assumed. Some scenarios 
told the exercise players that the weather conditions were `as reality'. Another 
scenario asked players to imagine that it was a windy day with temperatures 
below freezing. Similarly, some scenarios were set at a different time of day 
that reality. One exercise began at 09: 00 and the players were told that the 
scenario time was 15: 30, and daylight was fading. The level of realism in 
exercises will be discussed in depth later in the thesis. This pre-exercise 
briefing ended with the observers being taken to the ECC, and made aware of 
which members of staff would be playing different roles in the exercise. Once 
the exercise management personnel were in place, the signal was given for 
the exercise to be started. 
Actual exercise observations lasted between 40 minutes and three hours. 
Observation of the EMT was carried out from a point in the ECC where the 
observer was not obstructing any equipment or team member. As far as 
possible, all the activities of the EMT were noted down with the time that they 
occurred, to the nearest second. Detailed descriptions of all the exercises 
observed are presented in the Data Analysis, Chapter 5. 
When the exercise has been declared over, there was usually opportunity for 
participants to take a short break and partake of refreshments before the 
debriefing. It was common practice that a full group debriefing would take 
place first, followed by individual debriefs for EM and DEM and specialist 
teams. This stage of the exercise was usually conducted in the ECC with staff 
bringing extra chairs around a central table, or in a separate conference room 
where refreshments had been provided. Commonly the exercise coordinator 
would act as facilitator, and a logger would take notes of what was said. The 
EM and DEM usually began the proceedings by giving their comments on the 
exercise, and the quality and depth of the debriefing varied between sites. It 
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lasted typically between 30 minutes and 90 minutes. In most cases the 
observers were asked their comments, and these were usually a diplomatic 
balance of congratulating good practice and giving suggestions for 
improvement. If serious flaws were seen in the exercise, this was more 
appropriately dealt with in discussion with the senior staff at a later 
opportunity, rather than criticising individuals in front of the group. 
During the debrief, the observer continued to take notes of all comments, but 
without timing, as this aspect was no longer important. In some cases 
regulatory debriefs were also conducted, and the observers were usually 
asked to leave at the request of the regulator. This was more common at 
nuclear sites than any other sector, but was not considered a hindrance to the 
research as the main debrief was usually conducted well on these sites. 
The information gathered on the site and in the exercise was then transcribed 
into a standard format. Information which was crucial to the understanding of 
the exercise was written as an introduction. This was followed by a 
chronological transcript of the exercise events. The document concluded with 
the participants' debriefing comments and any additional notes from the 
observer. The exercise transcripts are contained in the Appendix of this 
thesis, and the analysis of the exercises is contained in Chapter 5. 
The aim of the exercise data analysis was to determine the key processes 
that make up an emergency management system. The key processes that 
make up an organisational HR system are well known and used in the PCMM. 
As they are part of a model which is respected for its accuracy and 
comprehensive nature, it was considered astute to analyse the exercise data 
with these processes in mind, using them as a foundation set which can be 
added to, changed and deleted from according to the findings from the data. 
The analysis of this data began with a technique known as 'coding'. This 
involved analysing each exercise transcript, and highlighting evidence of any 
of the CMM processes. This was a useful technique, as it showed which 
processes were common in emergency management, and which were 
uncommon or present in a different format. This analysis provided a table 
showing the processes observed at each site, and the evidence that was 
provided. 
4.10 Audit of Local Authority Emergency planning department 
As described in Figure 4-1, the original intention of the research was to apply 
the completed assessment model to an organisation in a 'test audit'. The 
circumstances stated in the flow diagram and discussed in Chapter 8 caused 
difficulty in achieving this objective within the timescale of the research. The 
alternative was to test out the framework in another sector. Several local 
authorities were planning emergency exercises within the period of the 
research, and local authority 'A' (LAA) stood out because of the scale of the 
planned exercise, and the enthusiasm of the Authority to participate in the 
research. As enthusiasm to participate and improve is one of the factors 
stated as being important to the success of the assessment framework, 
(Curtis et al. 2001) the researcher decided to apply the framework to this 
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authority, using the major exercise and their newly completed emergency plan 
as the main focus of the assessment. 
LAA requested that their details, the date and specific details of the exercise 
be removed from the transcript. Several different agencies participated in the 
exercise, which took place over a number of days. 
4.10.1 Emergency exercise 
The researcher attended a briefing with LAA one week before the exercise 
took place, and received basic details of the scenario. Observation was to 
take place from the Local Authority Silver command centre. A security pass 
was arranged for the researcher, and permission was granted by the Chief 
Executive of LAA for the observation to take place. The researcher attended 
the exercise between 07: 00 and 19: 00 on the first day, and attended the 
review and remediation discussions day from 10: 00 till 16: 30 later in the week. 
A considerable number of data were gathered, and they were transcribed into 
a report for LAA. 
4.10.2 Emergency Plan review 
The full 'emergency procedures' document from this Authority was reviewed, 
and evidence of the practices and processes taking place was sought. 
Combined with the evidence from the emergency exercise, these data would 
give an indication of the maturity level at which the organisation was 
performing. 
4.10.3 Interview with key staff 
The evidence from the exercise and plan were compared to the assessment 
framework, and there were certain practices which had been weakly 
demonstrated. Without further evidence of these practices, the processes 
would not be confirmed, and so the Authority would be placed at a lower 
maturity level than its performance suggested. As this was the first audit using 
the assessment framework, it was also important to check that there was 
nothing missing from the framework, and the process could be explained and 
justified. For these reasons, the researcher decided to carry out an 
unstructured interview with the emergency planning staff responsible for the 
exercise and for writing the plan. 
The purpose of the interview was to clarify several processes and to ensure 
that aspects of the framework which originated from commercial hazardous 
industry translated into the public sector environment. The interview was 
carried out with the County Emergency Planning Officer, local emergency 
planning officer and the officer responsible for the exercise planning. It was 
carried out at the Authority's premises, and details of the subjects to be 
discussed were provided to the authority in advance of the meeting. The 
interview lasted one hour, and notes were written by the researcher 
throughout. The details of the audit, findings regarding the authority and 
conclusions for the model will be presented in the Results, Chapter 6. 
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4.11 Expert validation review 
As mentioned above, extensive testing of the framework in an organisational 
setting was not possible within the research time-span. In order to ensure that 
the research product fulfilled the objectives set, was appropriate as an 
industrial assessment tool and was a valid contribution to knowledge, an 
alternative test was organised. 
A group of experts from the field were invited to Cranfield for a day-long 
seminar. The research would be presented to this expert group in the 
morning, and in the afternoon there would be a discussion and opportunity for 
structured feedback. The group were chosen for their expertise and 
experience in the field of emergency management, emergency planning and 
qualitative research. The experts who were invited to the seminar were 
Figure 4-5 Expert validation panel's credentials. 
Professor Ian Davis Former Chair, Cranfield Disaster 
Management Centre 
Professor John Sharp Visiting professor, Offshore & safety, 
Cranfield University 
Dr Mark Lemon Lecturer, Ecotechnology research 
Centre, Cranfield. 
Jeremy Larken Director, OCTO emergency 
management consultants 
Helen Shannon Director, OCTO emergency 
management consultants 
Les Moseley Director, Coventry University Disaster 
Management Centre 
Ed Terry Senior Consultant, Risk and 
Reliability and Offshore & safety. 
The expert validation was a very successful experience. The full programme 
for the day and outcome from the discussion, with a breakdown of the critique 
and feedback are discussed in Chapter 7, Application of the framework. 
4.12 Conclusions of the research methodology 
The methodology has described how data was collected and used to 
construct a framework for the assessment of emergency management 
performance and capability. It then describes how that framework was tested 
within a local authority emergency planning department. The final presentation 
of the framework to an expert panel is then described. 
The following chapter will present the data analysis, carried out in accordance 
with the methods described in this chapter. The data analysis will be in three 
sections; firstly, the notes from the Pilot Interviews will be presented, followed 
by the content analysis of the sample of emergency plans, and finishing with 
analysis of the observation data from the emergency exercises. 
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s Data Analysis 
The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 identified a need for a people-centred 
approach to emergency management assessment, and Chapter 3 discussed 
the merits of the CMM continuous improvement methodology. Chapter 4 
outlined a method by which a new emergency management methodology 
could be built using the CMM framework as a basis and populating it with 
qualitative data from field investigations. 
5.1 Structure of this chapter 
A central concept of CMM is that an organisation's activities can be defined in 
a set of core processes. If the organisation is capable of carrying out its core 
processes to a high standard, then the desired 'product' or output will also be 
to a consistent high standard. Assessment therefore provides a targeted 
approach to improvement, by focussing on the processes in the system 
identified as being weak. The primary aim of the Data Analysis Chapter is to 
identify the set of processes that make up an emergency management 
system, and how the presence of these processes and the level to which they 
are performed can be assessed through in an organisational context. 
Knowledge of the CMM structure and experience from collecting the data for 
this study has contributed to three hypotheses being suggested at this stage. 
These hypotheses aim to focus the analysis on several important 
considerations for building the assessment framework in Chapter 6. The 
outcomes of the hypotheses will be discussed at the end of the chapter. 
Figure 5-1 Data analysis hypotheses 
Hypothesis Explanation 
Fewer key Emergency management activities form a small but vital part of an 
processes processes organisation's overall 
business. The PCMM has many key processes, 
PCMM than 
designed continuously to improve the capability and maturity of an 
' organisation s entire human resources. One would not expect there to be 
as many processes involved in managing an emergency situation, as the 
number of staff involved and range of activities are lower 
Plans and Whilst exercises and emergency plans give a good indication of the 
exercises will capability 
of an organisation, it is not expected that strategic, higher level 
be less processes will 
be identified visibly through exercises and plans. 
Therefore, one would expect that exercises and plans will give some 
indicative of indication of performance at levels 2 and 3, a lesser indication of level 4 
higher level performance and very little, if any indication of level 5 performance 
capabilities 
Set of core From the study up to this point, one could hypothesise that at a basic 
emergency 
level, emergency management is made up of the same processes as 
management 
organisational management. These core processes should be identified 
through the data analysis. In addition to the core processes there will be 
processes for additional processes that are unique to emergency management. These 
any response should also be identified in the data, and contribute to the construction of 
the new framework in Chapter 6. 
This chapter will begin with an analysis of the results from pilot interviews 
conducted with several response groups. It will be followed by the analysis of 
emergency plans, beginning with a brief description of each plan's structure 
and presentation. This will then be followed by a plan analysis using the 
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assessment checklist defined by the NAO in their report (NAO 2002). 
Described in the literature (2.6.2); this is a checklist-based plan assessment, 
divided into several sections. Twenty-two of the original indicators are relevant 
to non-health emergency planning, and each plan has been assessed against 
these. This method of plan assessment has been used successfully by the 
NAO, and could provide some useful comparisons or illustrate some 
relationships that can be taken forward in the CMM based plan assessment. 
When all the plans have been analysed in this way, a summary of the 
evidence of PCMM processes found in the plans will be presented. 
The second section of the analysis will be based on data from the 
investigation of eight MAHI sites conducting emergency exercises. Each case 
will begin with a summary of the exercise, giving the background information 
on the site and details of the particular scenario. The PCMM processes that 
have been identified in that exercise will then be described individually. Any 
additional processes observed will also be noted and an analysis of the 
feedback and learning mechanisms will be shown. 
In the concluding section, the outcome of the hypotheses will be discussed, 
the relevance of the original PCMM processes to emergency management, as 
indicated by the plans and exercises will be described. Comments on the 
scenarios, plan types and feedback may be noted and will be used in the 
construction of the new emergency management framework in Chapter 6. 
5.2 Pilot interviews 
The objective of the pilot interviews was to provide some background 
information and an indication of the contemporary issues in MAHI emergency 
management. Three interviews were conducted in the same geographical 
area to ensure that the research aims were in line with industrial 
requirements, and that the main issues had been included in the review of 
literature. The semi-structured format of the interviews gave the interviewees 
the flexibility to discuss issues which they considered important. Four main 
areas of discussion were opened with the interviewees, which were: their 
views of the multi-agency response in their area; if they had response targets 
and what they were; their views of the emergency plan; and any other 
problems they felt were important. The conduct of the interviews is discussed 
in the Methodology, subsection 4.6. 
The following paragraphs will discuss the key points of each interview in turn, 
followed by a summary of the issues which are highlighted by more than one 
of the interviews. As with all data in this study, any name, chemical, location 
or other factor that could be used to identify the cooperating organisation has 
been removed or changed to protect that organisation's confidentiality. The 
censored interview transcripts are available in the Appendices. 
5.2.1 Interview with Major Accident Hazard Pipeline operator 
The first interview was with the operational emergency planning advisor for a 
UK pipeline operator. The particular organisation has a number of sites and 
pipelines across the UK. The interview began with a description of the 
regulatory regime appropriate to Major Accident Hazard Pipelines (MAHPs). 
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The Pipeline Safety Regulations (PSR) 1996 did not stipulate a frequency with 
which pipeline emergency plans should be tested, in anticipation of the 
COMAH (1999) regulations, providing a combined approach to plan testing. 
[This combined approach had still not been adopted by 2003, when this thesis 
was completed]. 
The interviewee raised the issue that there is a political aspect to emergency 
response assessment, as the emergency services and Local Authority (LA) 
are regulated by the Cabinet Office, and hazardous industry is regulated by 
the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). This difference in regulators 
effectively means that while hazardous industry is expected to maintain a 
consistent approach to emergency response across the UK, they have to work 
with different LAs who have vastly dissimilar planning methods and structures. 
Regional differences in emergency services also cause some problems of the 
hazardous operators, when trying to approach their emergency 
responsibilities in an integrated manner across the country. 
The interviewee went on to mention the problem of a lack of consultation by 
LAs in the emergency planning process. Different LA emergency plans 
include various versions of this operator's response, which the operator 
assures us is exactly the same at any location. This error could be dangerous, 
as certain plans state that it is the responsibility of the emergency services to 
define the safety cordons and approach routes during an incident. Only the 
operating company has the necessary expertise and technical equipment to 
define the safe areas, and so the responsibility clearly lies with them. The 
operator also confirmed that they have standard response targets nationwide. 
The interviewee was keen to state that his organisation drew a distinction 
between emergency response and pipeline incident response. The latter was 
tested and practiced regularly when a leak was detected or reported, many 
times each day across the UK. The former was rarely used, and only when 
people, property or the environment were at serious risk from that leak. If a 
regulatory regime were to recommend a specific frequency of testing, then it 
should recognise the need to test the rarely-used emergency procedures 
rather than the regularly-used incident response actions. 
5.2.2 Interview with County Police Emergency Operations 
This interview was held with two police inspectors responsible for County 
Emergency operations for a specific area of the UK. The interview began by 
discussing MAH emergency planning and management and the nature of the 
police involvement. 
The interviewees clarified that the organisational structure of the police in an 
emergency response comprises three levels of bronze, silver and gold. 
Bronze level is located as close as safely possible to the incident, and it is 
from this point that the operational issues are tackled. The police rely on the 
Fire Brigade to define a safe location for Bronze control. Silver control is the 
tactical command centre and is located at the nearest police station to the 
incident. It usually acts as a communications hub for the emergency services 
and as a resource base. At gold level, strategic commanders meet with the 
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Chief Executive of the LA and Chief Fire Officers to discuss the overall picture 
of the incident. Gold control is rarely required and usually located in the 
county police headquarters, as the police have overall control of a situation of 
that magnitude. 
This system conflicts with some of the agencies involved, as LAs often have 
their own version of `silver control' known as the District Emergency 
Command Centre. The role of this centre in relation to police Silver control 
causes some confusion and the interviewees recommended that it should be 
addressed in any new plans and procedures. 
The police were keen to state that the primary goal of their response is to 
protect life, and many of the procedures involved in a MAHI emergency 
situation are the same as those performed by officers in the course of their 
regular duties. These include tasks such as diverting traffic and 
communication with the public and the media. There should be some 
distinction between the need to exercise the rarely used emergency 
procedures, and the acceptance that some tasks are practiced and proven to 
be effective and efficient. The police considered this especially important, as 
the COMAH regulations allow the emergency services and LAs to charge 
MAH operators for their time participating in exercises and plan tests. If the 
regulations were interpreted strictly, the number of major exercises and the 
cost of police involvement would be prohibitive to industry. 
The police regard the LA's County Emergency Plan as a summary of the joint 
incident procedures rather than a working operational document. In this case 
the plan is too large and verbose to be useful to the police in an incident, so 
the police have A5 booklets describing their operational procedures. 
In this county there is an emergency planning group consisting of 
representatives from the different stakeholders in emergency planning. It is 
seen as a useful communications and coordination forum to improve relations 
between the parties. In terms of performance targets, the police regard the 
`Dealing with Disaster documents from the Home Office as their target level, 
and are confident that they achieve those standards. 
5.2.3 Interview with a County Fire Service Divisional Officer 
In describing the fire service response to MAHI emergencies, the interviewee 
explained that while procedures have to be flexible to deal with minor and 
major incidents, the majority of the fire service response is based around the 
experience of the officers from previous incidents. They compare their 
experience with their assessment of the current situation and choose the most 
appropriate action. The first consideration in attending a chemical incident is 
planning a safe route of approach. This is coordinated by the control room 
with advice from the chemical data services. 
The interviewee expresses their concern that many MAHI sites are reducing 
on-site fire-fighting resources as a cost-cutting measure. This can be 
detrimental to the quality and speed of response, as the local fire service has 
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to respond from a remote location and are not as highly trained in dealing with 
particular incidents as site-specific fire-fighters are. 
The fire brigade carry decontamination showers which are for the use of their 
officers, who would be in protective clothing. They are not responsible for 
decontaminating casualties, a job which lies with the ambulance service. 
National quantitative performance standards exist in the fire service, and their 
primary target is response time. Residential areas are categorised 'A', 'B' or 
'C', according to the value of the property in that area. Industrial sites are dealt 
with on an individual basis. 
5.2.4 Interview with Local Authority Emergency Planner 
The interviewee raised several concerns about the role of other agencies in 
MAH emergency response. The Emergency Planners found it difficult to 
establish a working relationship with the police because officers in the role 
responsible for emergency management change frequently. The interviewee 
also voiced a reluctance to use the police as an information source during an 
incident, preferring instead to use other local contacts within the chemical 
industry. 
The interviewees were concerned about hazardous sites cutting their on-site 
fire-fighting capacity, because the local fire service are not as experienced on 
hazardous chemical fires, and are not sufficiently familiar with site procedures. 
Concern was also voiced about the unwillingness of hazardous operators to 
declare an off-site incident. Their aim is to safeguard their reputation but they 
risk delays to the response of the LA and local emergency services which can 
result in a less effective response. 
The final comment from the interviews was that they had difficulty on several 
occasions getting technical advice from industry relating to the chemical 
involved or contamination issues during exercises. Delay in receiving this 
information during an incident could result in a slower response from the Local 
Authority. 
5.2.5 Conclusions from pilot interviews 
The importance of plan and response coordination between the agencies was 
highlighted by all three interviews. The police and hazardous operator went 
further and mentioned specific problems in these areas. The fire brigade 
assert that in chemical incidents, they rely on information and data rather than 
their experience, and if that information is not available quickly, their response 
may be delayed. This view was echoed by the Local Authority. This suggests 
that MAH site or pipeline operators should determine what information is 
needed by the emergency services, and ensure that it can be provided in the 
plan or as early as possible in an incident. The pipeline operator mentioned 
the urgent need for greater consistency between the responders' plans and 
procedures. The roles and responsibilities of the responding organisations 
should be clearly identified in the plans and tested, to avoid confusion in an 
incident. The importance of performance standards and targets for emergency 
management was recognised by all the interviewees. 
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All three interviews brought up the issue of exercising only the sections of the 
plans and procedures which are not carried out in the regular work of the 
emergency services and hazardous operators. The interviewees believed that 
the COMAH regulations would require demonstration of the full emergency 
plans for each COMAH site, whereas there are many comparable elements of 
the response which need only be demonstrated once. If the regulations were 
taken literally, this attitude to testing would result in unnecessary commitment 
of time and resources from the emergency services and hazardous 
installations. 
The interviews have proved useful as an introduction to emergency 
management of major hazard incidents. The interviewees illustrated the 
importance of inter-agency cooperation, coordinated planning and 
communication. They also highlighted problems relating to the regulatory 
regime and the need for structured, coordinated testing and exercising of 
procedures. 
Several points from the interviews will be explored through the analysis of 
plans and exercises. The importance of coordinated, multi-agency response is 
highlighted by the interviewees, and this supports the use of LA off-site plans 
as the sample for emergency plan analysis. Secondly the interviewees raised 
the importance of clear roles, responsibilities and information sources. These 
are areas specifically explored by the NAO plan assessment checklist, and so 
this strengthens the use of the checklist as an analysis tool for this study. 
5.3 Analysis of Emergency Plans 
The pilot interviews indicated a need to look at the multi-agency response, 
and so the plans used for this part of the research are from different 
organisations than those that took part in the exercise observation. This 
provides a wider scope than using just one set of organisations for the whole 
study, and also gives an insight into how organisations work together in 
planning a combined response. 
What is observed in an exercise should be closely related to the procedures 
and practices written in the plans, so using the plan and exercise data from 
the same organisations would be useful for confirming an organisation's 
internal consistency, but would do little to provide a cross-section of the 
processes undertaken to produce an industrial emergency response. 
The methods of analysis will firstly examine the plan as a document, in terms 
of its construction, presentation, and ease of use. Secondly, using some 
(health specific indicators removed) of the indicators given by the NAO (2002: 
46) in their checklist of Health Authority emergency plans, the content of the 
plan will be analysed. The checklist is comprehensive in its coverage of the 
major planning requirements detailed in the literature, and forms a useful, 
indication of the content of a plan. Figure 5-2 shows the comparison of all 
analysed plans against the check-list. Finally, the content of the plan will be 
analysed for evidence of PCMM indicators, showing the processes found in 
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each plan in tabular form. The plans have been assigned codes to protect the 
identity of the organisations involved. 
5.3.1 Analysis of plan SA 
Plan SA was written to deal with major accidents in high pressure gas 
pipelines across a particular county in England. This plan can be applied to 
any incident on any pipeline in the county, and is a coordination document to 
bring together the response of the emergency services (ES), pipeline operator 
(P0) and local authority (LA). 
As a document, the plan is well presented and reads easily. It is concise and 
well organised, however it is not physically indexed to allow rapid reference to 
particular sections. It aims to be specific enough to provide guidance to 
responders, and flexible enough to be applied to any likely incident The format 
of the information however, does not facilitate use in an incident because it is 
not in a chronological order representing a potential sequence of events. It is 
clear that the plan has been carefully constructed, however its aim of 
coordinating a multi-agency response is difficult to judge, as there is a lack of 
information on joint training, exercising or overall incident coordination. 
SA scores fourteen out of a possible twenty-two points on the adjusted 
checklist, scoring particularly well in the section relating to the ease of 
application of the plan. There is evidence to suggest that the plan is subject to 
regular updating, especially in the thorough understanding of risk 
demonstrated; however there is weakness in commitment to training and 
exercising of the plan. The plan also illustrates a detailed knowledge of the 
response actions of the pipeline operator, but gives a contradictory outline of 
how the coordinated response takes place. While the plan only scores five out 
of a potential nine points for its detail of the elements of the response, it states 
that the relevant agencies' Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) should be 
used in conjunction with the plan. Taking this into account, one would expect 
the plan to have a cohesive and strong coordinating influence throughout, 
which it does not. 
One difficulty with the NAO framework is that the checklist focuses on the 
presence or absence of a plan attribute. The original version incorporates a 
simple scoring system, however there is no way of qualifying the adequacy of 
particular aspects of the plan or judging the depth of content. Although training 
and exercising are mentioned in the plan as being important, and coordination 
of efforts was required, the plan fails to lay down a mechanism, timescale or 
commitment. Therefore it scores the point for the reference to training and 
exercising in the document, but in reality there might be little substance 
behind the statements. 
5.3.2 Analysis of plan UA 
This plan is a LA off-site plan for areas which could be affected by a COMAH 
site emergency near this large city. The plan is a template which has been 
applied to each of the sites in the area, with the purpose of coordinating the 
100 
off-site response of the Site Operator (SO) emergency services and LA to any 
incident. 
The plan is a large document and is unwieldy to read or use. There does not 
appear to be any logic to the structure of the document. The document makes 
no use of graphics or diagrams other than simple tables. The level of detail 
given in the plan is high, but without structure it looses value. 
The plan reaches just nine of the twenty-two targets set on the planning 
check-list; some of those are barely present. There is only a short statement 
indicating that the plan forms part of a continuous process, and no means of 
updating and recording revisions to the document. Brief reference is made to 
the COMAH regulations, but no indication of how they have influenced the 
plan is given. The plan gives no details of back-up procedures should there be 
a transport network failure, or any indication of how the events of an incident 
will be recorded and logged. There is very little guidance in the plan on how to 
achieve the response tasks. More seriously, there is no indication that any 
form of debriefing or learning would take place following any incident. There 
are no procedures in place for such follow-up activity, or even the 
mechanisms for psychological support for victims, responders and connected 
parties. The plan provides details of the hazards at the site, but not of the risks 
posed by these hazards. The plan scores low for its lack of clarity, order and 
structure. Although the roles and relationships of the responding agencies are 
detailed, the plan fails to consider trans-boundary incidents and their 
coordination. 
5.3.3 Analysis of plan BA 
This plan is designed to coordinate the response to major hazard pipeline 
incidents within a county in the UK. The county is home to a range of 
pipelines, including natural gas, petroleum products and toxic gases. The plan 
is an overall county plan, and contains details of the response to all pipeline 
incidents. The plan is printed in colour coded sections for ease of use, and is 
indexed and structured well. The main sections of the plan are 'activation' 
followed by `immediate response'. Key messages are presented in highlighted 
boxes, and the presentation of the plan is effective. 
The plan scores sixteen points from the twenty-two available. It provides a 
good indication that the plan should be maintained and updated, but gives no 
detail. It refers to the legislation on which it is based, and gives indication of 
where further details can be found. The procedures in this plan for alerting 
and initiating are clearly laid out and very easy to follow. Such procedures 
would be useful to the relevant agencies during an incident. Roles and 
responsibilities are also clearly stated in a structured manner. There is no 
indication in the plan, of the importance of keeping a detailed log of the 
incident. Such a log would be the basis for learning from the incident, and 
support any decisions should there be legal repercussions of the incident 
response. 
The plan gives details of the communications systems to be put in place, and 
the procedures for immediate incident control. The procedures are written in 
101 
large text within shaded boxes, which make them ideal to be read and 
understood rapidly in an incident. There are no action cards for responders, 
and although facilities and reception centres for victims and families are 
mentioned and a detailed media response is outlined, there are no 
arrangements for debriefing of any sort. Debriefing is a key aspect of learning 
from an incident or exercise, and also provides the first steps towards 
psychological recovery for the individuals involved. It is a serious omission 
from the plan. 
The plan provides details of the various hazards, and brief information on the 
risks. Detailed risk assessment details are not present however. The plan is 
well indexed, and has additional information in the appendices. Although 
some key parts of the plan are brief and concise, other parts are too lengthy 
and as a result the document is rather large. Locations of the county's 
school's and care facilities are included in the plan, which requires regular 
attention to ensure that it is up-to-date. The details of each organisation's role 
are given, along with brief recognition that pipeline incidents could develop 
into trans-boundary incidents, and as such procedures should be in place. 
There are, however, no such procedures detailed. 
The flaw with the check-list method, stressed again in this analysis is that it 
provides only a core indication of whether a task or plan element has been 
included, rather than an indication of the extent or adequacy to which it could 
be fulfilled. 
5.3.4 Analysis of plan NA 
This plan relates to incidents which could occur on a section of a particular 
hazardous pipeline in a county. The pipeline is only used for natural gas, so 
there is only one hazard and one pipeline operator to deal with. This plan is 
presented in a very clear style; each page is sub-divided and clearly labelled. 
Sections are also clearly labelled and the plan follows a chronological 
structure, including clear maps of the pipeline and surrounding area and a 
glossary. A uniform style is used for all of this county's plans. 
This plan provided evidence that amendments were treated seriously, and a 
statement to the effect that incidents should influence the improvement of the 
plan suggests that continuous improvement had been considered. The 
Pipeline Safety regulations (PSR) were cited as the basis of the plan, and the 
duties placed on the PO, LA and HSE by the regulations are also quoted. The 
operational response is described clearly, in a manner which could be used in 
an incident. The plan also states that a multi-agency debrief is required as 
soon as possible following the incident to 'make meaningful contribution to the 
post-incident investigation'. It suggests that all agencies should produce and 
circulate a post-incident report, and the plan should be adjusted in the light of 
the reports. There is no support indicated for this learning ethos with a 
structure of logging and reporting during an incident however. Media 
arrangements are clear and functional, and there is a brief but operational 
description of the risk and hazard. The plan is self-contained and useful 
additional information is stored in the appendices. The possibility of trans- 
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boundary effects is recognised, but no procedure or protocol is given. It 
scores highly, with eighteen points out of the total twenty-two. 
5.3.5 Analysis of plan NB 
Plan NB is from the same Local Authority as plan NA. It is written as the off- 
site plan for a major accident hazard chemical site within the county. The plan 
was written in 1998 to satisfy the CIMAH Regulations, but with the knowledge 
that COMAH was to be introduced a year later. It was therefore constructed 
with the draft COMAH requirements in mind. The chemical site deals with four 
hazardous chemicals, although they are similar in their nature and 
mechanisms of hazard. It is useful to compare two plans written by the same 
authority to satisfy different regulations and deal with different hazards. It is 
expected that the three analyses here will highlight the similarities. 
The plan is very similar in style and presentation to plan NA. The LA has 
applied a distinctive style to all their planning documents, which creates a 
consistent familiarity. The plan begins with general details of the site, followed 
by initial response and further response. The annex contains detailed role 
descriptions for the responding organisations. 
This plan scores twenty points from a possible twenty-two. There is a section 
in the plan which gives the mechanism for continuous improvement, and the 
requirement for post-incident reporting is emphasised. The clarity of 
presentation makes it easy to read and understand the initiating and alerting 
structure, and the roles are clearly defined. Incident debriefing is 
recommended for operational staff in the interests of learning from the 
experience. A mechanism for psychological debriefing for the victims or 
respondents is also provided. Arrangements are in place for a back-up 
communications network; however there are no procedures to deal with 
transport network disruption. The plan details the four chemical hazards on 
site and the risks they pose to people and the environment on and off the site. 
As with plan NA, the style makes the plan much easier to use, and so one 
could imagine it being useful in an emergency situation. Although the 
possibility of a trans-boundary incident is recognised, there are no procedures 
or policy provided to deal with such an occurrence. 
5.3.6 Analysis of plan UB 
This plan is from the same LA that wrote plan UA, but rather than hazardous 
sites, it describes the response procedures for certain hazardous pipelines in 
the county. The plan specifically deals with natural gas pipelines. 
The plan is very similar in presentation to the UA plan. The plan is badly sub- 
divided, and it is not easy to find the appropriate information. The order of the 
sections is not logical, and so would make the document difficult to use during 
an incident. Straightforward pages of unbroken text make the plan difficult to 
read, and there has been no attempt to summarise information in tabular or 
chart form for quick reference. 
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The plan score is similar to the first plan from this LA, but scores four points 
more. It contains a requirement for a six-monthly updating of the plan, and 
gives the mechanism for providing amendments to the plan authors. The plan 
provides all the necessary initiating details, but as previously mentioned, the 
presentation does not make it conducive to rapid response. There is no 
evidence from the plan that logs or records of an incident should be kept by 
any of the respondents. The back-up communications protocol as well as the 
structure and technology of the primary communications systems are also 
present. There are no procedures for debriefing victims or respondents 
outlined in the plan. The single hazard and risks are presented in the plan in 
sufficient detail to aid the response. The plan is difficult to read and use, and 
as such fails to score any points in the 'clear and unambiguous' section. 
5.3.7 Analysis of plan XA 
This emergency plan is for a nuclear licensed site. It details the response to 
an incident on the site which could have effects beyond the boundary. Some 
of the response details are kept in separate documents for security reasons; 
however it is not anticipated that this will affect the analysis. As the regulation 
of the nuclear industry is quite stringent in the UK, it is expected that this plan 
will be more clearly defined and contain more concise detail than some of the 
other plans in this analysis. 
The plan is clearly laid out, well structured and very concise. As an overview 
of the expected emergency response, it provides a sufficient level of detail. It 
is not designed to be an operational document, and refers to the operational 
procedures documents where appropriate. The plan is written with knowledge 
and experience of how the procedures work in practice, through exercising 
and real incidents. This plan is written in an authoritative style not seen in the 
previous plans reviewed. 
The plan scores fourteen points from a total of twenty-two. This is partly due 
to the nature of the emergency plans for this specialised sector. Several of the 
check-list items are identified as being present in other documents, and so the 
inflexibility of the check-list method does not permit these points to be credited 
as part of the plan. 
Evidence of plan updating and amendment control can be seen. However, 
details of the continuous nature of the process are not included in this level of 
planning. The plan does not contain reference to the legislation, but provides 
a clear breakdown of roles, responsibilities and resources required for an 
emergency response. In common with all other plans analysed so far, there 
are no action-cards or checklists included as part of the plan. There is also no 
mechanism for operational or psychological debriefing in this plan, but these 
activities are part of a related document. The plan is easy to read, concise and 
well structured, and accounts for the possibility of a trans-boundary 
emergency. The difficulty in assessing this plan with the check-list method is 
that it is a part of a portfolio of response documents, which should be judged 
as one plan. Unfortunately the remainder of the portfolio is classified as 
`restricted' due to its sensitive content and was therefore unavailable to the 
researcher. 
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5.3.8 Analysis of plan OA 
The document was designed to detail the contingency arrangements for 
response to a MAH pipeline emergency within a Scottish county. There are 
several pipelines, and the plan details the overall response and the specific 
elements for different pipelines. 
The plan is presented in five sections, indexed with numbered dividers. 
Although it does not use diagrams or charts, the plan is presented to a good 
standard and the text is broken down into structured sections. Overall though, 
the plan spans over 200 sides and is not concise enough to be easily 
navigable. The plan maintains a lively and comprehensive style, and is written 
authoritatively. 
This document scores well in areas where other plans have failed, and badly 
in some usually high scoring indicators. Overall it scores twelve out of a 
possible twenty-two. There is evidence of an amendments sheet, version 
control and statements relating to continuous review of the plan. This 
indicates that the plan authors are forward thinking and aware of the dynamic 
nature of emergency planning. The plan also provides details of the hazards 
and risks, and the regulatory basis for the plan and response. Roles and 
responsibilities are detailed separately alongside each hazard in the plan. The 
plan states the importance for each agency to keep an accurate record of the 
incident for use during the response and in any later activities. The plan does 
not provide information on the communications system, or any back-up 
measures for communications in an incident. 
There are no arrangements for dealing with the media, relatives or VIPs in the 
plan, which is quite a serious omission. Neither is there indication of any 
allocation of resources for the response or communications arrangements. 
The plan is risk-based and easy to read, and is physically divided into 
structured sections. Despite its size, the plan refers to other documents for 
some operational details of the response. It does not contain reference to 
incidents which may have trans-boundary effects. 
5.3.9 Analysis of plan JA 
This plan is a recently released county emergency plan, designed as an all- 
hazards approach to the subject. It states that its aim is to focus on the 
common procedures of the responders, rather than the detail of responding to 
specific incidents. 
The plan is heavily indexed using physical dividers. The plan uses graphics, 
different fonts, colour and charts to present information in a user-friendly 
format. Master copies of checklists and forms for individual roles are included. 
The plan is structured in a logical, chronological order to facilitate use during 
an incident. 
This plan scores full marks on the NAO check-list, being the only plan that 
includes check-lists for each role, in addition to the other facets of the 
assessment. This plan is the youngest of the set, written in 2001 closely 
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followed by SA then NA and NB written in 1999-2000. The other plans were 
written between 1997 and 1999. 
5.3.10 Summary of plan analysis 
The table below gives the plan identifier across the top and the indicator down 
the side. The key below shows the definitions of the indicators. 
Figure 5-2 Plan summary of NAO checklist performance. 
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Key of Figure o-z - inaicators ana tneir meanings. 
8- 
Evidence of amendments sheet, stated when plan was last updated and by whom 
Evidence of version control and a style conducive to a continuous process 
Evidence of a statement saying the plan was under constant review 
Evidence of reference to relevant uidance/le islation 
Clear alerting and initiating procedures 
Clear statements of roles and responsibilities 
Clear arrangements for relevant incident response team, documents and logs 
Coordination of communications at the scene 
Clear procedures for immediate incident control 
Action cards for staff and functions 
Arrangements for relatives, media, VIPs 
Clear allocation of resources for response 
Clear arrangements for failure of communications or transport disruption 
Arrangements for debriefing and subsequent support for staff, victims and relatives 
Plan identifies risks and hazards 
Easy to read language and format 
Plan has comprehensive index and cross reference as appropriate 
Action cards / checklists are accessible and noritised 
Plan does not require use of other documents not included in appendix 
Brief and concise, containing key information only 
Statement of key organisations and roles 
Indication of trans-boundary procedures and interface 
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As the NAO scores have been described individually for each plan, it is 
sufficient to say at this stage that some of the indicators might be useful in 
determining the structure and content of the final CMM framework, and their 
role and application will be discussed when that framework is constructed in 
Chapter 6. 
5.3.11 Summary of CMM processes in plans 
The plans were also analysed for evidence of CMM processes, and this 
analysis is summarised in the table below. The plan analysis should indicate if 
plans contain information on the human element of the response and its 
maturity, and if so what levels of maturity do plans show. It should also be 
clear if there are any links between the processes shown and other aspects of 
the plan, such as its age, purpose and presentation. It is clear from the table 
that some processes are more common than others, and this will also be 
discussed further in Chapter 6. 
Figure 5-3 Summary of CMM processes found in emergency plan sample 
Training and development 
The plans address this process in different ways, but primarily they advocate 
joint exercises between the responding agencies. UA, SA, NA & NB state 
clearly that the responsibility for training lies firmly with the individual 
organisations. Only NA and NB go further than simply stating this, by including 
information on the LA's exercise diary, an attempt to keep a record of all 
emergency exercises planned in the county, to facilitate wider benefit and 
value. 
Work environment 
This refers to the process of ensuring that the response environment is safe 
and facilitates an efficient response. SA details the Personal Protective 
Equipment (PPE) that can be used, and the different personnel that will 
respond from different locations. BA, XA, NA and NB refer directly to the 
'bronze, silver and gold' commands, representing operational, tactical and 
strategic staging points for the response. Each level has different resources 
and capability. JA is the only plan which provides details of the equipment at 
each location, and details of procuring extra equipment for the response if 
necessary. NA and NB give information regarding the risk-based process for 
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The following subsection analyses how the CMM processes are represented 
in the emergency plans. Each process is described in terms of how it appears 
in the different emergency plans, identified by their codes. 
determining safe locations for the Forward Control Point (FCP). NB and XA 
also detail back-up ECCs, available if the main control room is compromised. 
Communications and coordination 
This process demands that the organisation proves that communications 
procedures and technology are in place to deal with any foreseen incident, 
and that the coordination structure is clear and understood. This sample of 
plans are all for multi-agency response, and so the communication and 
coordination require intricate planning. BA shows the format for the 
transmission of certain key messages for alert and activation, as well as the 
back-up measures available. The plan also features the coordination structure 
of the incident, although due the number of agencies involved, it is not easy to 
determine from the plan, which is in control of what part of the response. NA 
and NB also feature the back-up measures should the regular network fail, 
along with a clear definition of the coordination structure. UB, XA and OA do 
not contain detail of back-up communications options, although they identify 
the technology available for communications. OA and JA contain log sheets to 
record the transfer of information. JA also provides graphical interpretation of 
the message procedures and highlights the importance of logging and 
recording decisions. 
Staffing 
The process of staffing aims to provide adequate numbers of properly trained 
personnel to deal with the likely consequences of an incident. The plans 
analysed address this issue in varying degrees of depth. All plans at least 
provide a list of the organisations involved in the response. This was usually 
supported by contact details, including a mechanism for call-out during silent 
hours, where a 24-hour hazard exists, such as at NB. The range of 
organisations mentioned in the plan varies, with SA planning for catering, 
triage, environment, evacuation and rest centres, as well as the operational 
emergency services. BA leaves the judgement of who to call-out until the 
actual extent of the incident has been determined. NA also includes the facility 
to extend the call-out should the demands of the incident increase. The JA 
plan uses a chart to show the levels of staff responsibility in the response. 
This makes it exceptionally clear what is expected from each of the roles. 
Participatory culture 
This process requires that there are mechanisms in place for all staff and 
organisations to contribute to the improvement of the response. Staff should 
understand and have faith in the system through which they can voice their 
grievances and suggest enhancements. NA encourages all agencies involved 
to report on their incident experience and share that report. Joint contribution 
to exercising is also encouraged. 
Empowered workgroups 
Plan JA gives a high level of autonomy to the response groups. Each group 
can procure resources and recruit additional personnel if required. They can 
also make decisions related to the response, and are given the power and 
authority to carry out their tasks. 
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Performance management 
This process of performance management requires that targets and objectives 
are set, and the response is measured to record the achievement of these 
targets. These objectives should be based on the risks identified and the 
target achievement should influence future plan development and response. 
NB and JA exhibit attribute of performance management. JA contains targets 
in role-specific check-list form. 
The processes above will be discussed further at the end of this chapter, and 
compared to the processes observed in emergency exercises. 
5.4 Observation of emergency exercises in hazardous industry 
This section analyses the data gathered from eight emergency exercises, as 
introduced in 5.1. The data collection method for emergency exercise 
observations was discussed fully in 4.9 and summarised in Figure 4-4. The 
aim is to determine what combination of processes enables an organisation to 
continually improve its emergency management capability, and how those 
processes can be observed and assessed. The observations are expected to 
show a spectrum of processes, indicating different levels of performance and 
capability. Using this range of processes an assessment framework for 
emergency management can be developed. 
Each exercise has been assigned a code that is linked to the particular 
organisation involved. The code does not resemble the site location or 
organisation's name, thus maintaining the anonymity of the data. This section 
will conclude with a summary of all the emergency management processes 
that have been identified from the data. The tables of data and observations 
from the exercises is lengths and so is contained in the Appendices to this 
thesis, Chapter 10. 
5.4.1 Conclusions of exercise observation process analysis 
The table Figure 5-4 shows the CMM processes that were observed at each 
of the eight sites visited. There were also some additional `novel' processes 
which will be discussed later in this chapter. The table shows that there are 
four processes which are clear in every exercise observed, and there is also 
some similarity with the processes found in the emergency plan sample. The 
processes themselves are summarised in Figure 5-5 giving details of how 
they were apparent at the different sites. This table is followed by the overall 
conclusions of this chapter, and the information that will be taken forward into 
Chapter 6 to present the results. 
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Figure 5-4Table showing CMM processes evident in exercises 
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Figure 5-5 on the following page comments on each of the processes on the 
basis of the evidence from the MAH sites. The process notes are based on 
the compound knowledge from all the sites, and the numeral in brackets in the 
first column is the number of occasions out of the total eight that the process 
has been proven. This table will be followed by the overall conclusions from 
the Data Analysis. 
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5.5 Conclusions from data analysis 
There are four main sets of conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis 
of the plans and exercises. From observing the feedback sessions there are a 
number of examples of good and poor practice and recommendations for the 
planning and structure of emergency incident or exercise debriefing and 
feedback. There are also comments resulting from the analysis of the exercise 
scenarios used on the different sites. These will be used later in Chapter 6 to 
construct the detailed framework and assessment protocol. The main 
conclusions relate to the overall processes found to contribute to emergency 
planning and management and any similarities with the processes described 
in the original PCMM, including a discussion of the hypotheses stated in 
Figure 5-1. Finally there are some general conclusions drawn from the plans, 
exercises and feedback regarding the structure of the emerging emergency 
management framework. This will lead into Chapter 6, the results, where the 
final assessment framework will be constructed and tested. 
5.5.1 Summary of CMM processes evident through data analysis 
Section 5.3.10 detailed the processes that were evident in emergency plans, 
showing in tabular form that some are more commonly used than others. The 
number of processes visible in each plan is an indication of the plan's level of 
detail, and also of the level of commitment to and understanding of the 
emergency management process. It is difficult to judge the actual response 
capability of an organisation from reading its plan alone, and even more 
difficult to judge from the multi-agency coordination plan. It would be fair to 
say that often, emergency planning is much more than what is shown in the 
physical plan document. Whereas some organisations approach the plan as a 
means of communicating the procedures and directing an incident response, 
others see it as a document designed to fulfil a regulatory requirement. The 
different attitudes result in different plans. Observing exercises however 
brings a new dimension to the emergency planning. 
Figure 5-6 Table showing CMM processes found in data 
" 
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Figure 5-6, shows all of the processes found in the data, and indicates the 
number of individual cases (plans and exercises) they were identified in. 
There are several clear trends in the data, which support the hypotheses at 
the beginning of the chapter. 
The first hypothesis suggested that there would be fewer overall processes 
than identified in the original CMM. Numerically, fewer processes are 
identified, but perhaps more significantly, the process descriptions in 5.3.10 
and Fig. 58 show that there are some which have close or overlapping 
characteristics and therefore could be combined and renamed. This 
refinement of the processes will take place in Chapter 6. 
An interesting conclusion from the analysis was that there are some 
differences between how a process appears in a plan and how it is involved in 
the exercise. To an extent, some processes also have a third role in the 
feedback and learning from the emergency. It appears at this stage that rather 
than there being one set of processes for the preparation, response and 
learning aspects of an emergency, there are three versions of the same set of 
processes. This will be explored further in the Results, Chapter 6. 
The second hypothesis stated that the plans and exercises would be more 
indicative of the processes at lower maturity levels. The table (Fig. 5-6) clearly 
shows that while there are a number of level two and three processes, there 
are only three level four processes briefly indicated and no level five 
processes. The level two processes are widely observed in many of the plans 
and exercises studied, but this is to a lesser extent for the level three and four 
processes. Overall there are 61 examples of level 2 processes, 17 examples 
of level 3 and 6 examples of level 4. 
The final hypothesis proposed that there would be a set of core emergency 
management processes which would be central to most cases, and this also 
appears to be shown in the data. The processes of training and development, 
work environment, communications and coordination and staffing feature in 
the majority of plans and exercises, and form a base-line of core activities. 
There were also some issues in the plans and exercises which might warrant 
new processes in the final framework. These new processes will be detailed in 
Chapter 6 as the new levels and processes are constructed. 
The second part of Chapter 6 will describe how the new framework was 
applied and tested by auditing a sizable emergency management 
organisation, and validated by presenting the framework to a panel of experts 
for their feedback and guidance. Chapter 8, the Discussion, will criticise the 
methodology use in this study and discuss the problems encountered and the 
wider application of the results. 
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6 Results 
This chapter will show how the original PCMM along with information from the 
data analysis have been used to construct a new, Emergency Management 
assessment model, known as the Generic Emergency Management 
Assessment (GEMA). The chapter will begin by arguing why the PCMM could 
not be used without significant changes, before describing these changes and 
how they were made. The chapter will conclude with a presentation of the 
draft Emergency Management CMM, giving details of the assessment 
method. Chapter 7, Testing and validation will then show how the model was 
tested and refined. 
From the data collection experience in this research, some recommendations 
for exercise design and conduct and emergency plan design have been 
suggested. These will be described in section 10-4, Appendices. 
6.1 Designing the new model - variations from CMM 
This section will describe why the unchanged PCMM could not be applied as 
an emergency management assessment and what changes to the original 
PCMM were necessary to create an appropriate assessment framework. 
6.1.1 Why change PCMM? 
The data analysis chapter compared the processes found in emergency 
management systems to the processes claimed by PCMM as being indicators 
of sound organisational management. This highlighted that although the 
principal structure and philosophy of PCMM applied equally well to 
Emergency Management, the assessment method of the model and the 
processes needed to be significantly changed. 
Firstly the language and phraseology of the original PCMM was unsuitable, as 
a significant proportion of the terminology was specific to the organisational 
management field. Those responsible for emergency management on major 
hazard sites are generally from an engineering or scientific background, and 
so use largely technical vocabularies. The meanings of terms such as 
process, control and feedback are different to engineers and scientists than 
they are to managers. The language and layout of the framework must also 
be straightforward and require little or no interpretation if it is to be a fair and 
accurate assessment. 
There was also the issue of scale, as the original PCMM was designed to 
assess the Human Resources (HR) issues of a whole organisation. 
Emergency Management is usually only a small part of the organisation's 
activities, and so applying a large group of PCMM processes to the fraction of 
the organisation involved with emergency management can result in 
duplication, redundant processes and inappropriate definitions. Some issues 
such as the responsibility for safety still apply organisation-wide and will be 
discussed further in Chapter 8, Discussion. 
The resources required to conduct a PCMM-scale assessment of this scale 
should also be considered. To apply the full PCMM to an organisation takes 
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between three and five months using a team of four to ten assessors, 
depending on the size of the organisation (Curtis et at 2001). The time and 
financial commitment from the organisation is high. In the case of CMM and 
PCMM this cost can be justified against the direct savings of operating more 
efficiently. Emergency Management budgets are however dominated by the 
expense of training and exercising, leaving little support for assessment and 
improvement activities. If the framework is to be successful, it must be easily 
applied with minimum requirement for additional time or resource commitment 
from the organisation. 
The method of assessment used by PCMM is not suitable for the Emergency 
management field, because there are insufficient resources to provide 
additional opportunities to assess the facilities and systems. The GEMA 
framework should ideally use assessment opportunities that already exist 
within the organisation for predefined purposes. These opportunities include 
demonstration exercises for the regulatory bodies, plan reviews and feedback 
sessions. 
This issue was clearly demonstrated in the experience of this study. 
Organisations were happy to allow the researcher to spend time reviewing 
documents and answer any queries in a short meeting. Similarly, they were 
keen for the researcher to attend a site exercise and observe the proceedings, 
with the opportunity to discuss the outcomes in a short summary meeting. 
Many of the exercises allowed the researcher to also observe the `wash-up' 
and feedback sessions which provided a further level of data. Some sites 
were even keen to promote individual interviews with particular members of 
staff. Opportunities for lengthy meetings to discuss the emergency plans or to 
run a particular scenario for the sole purpose of assessment or research 
would have been unlikely in any of the organisations who participated in this 
study. This issue will also be discussed further in Chapter 8, Discussion. 
6.1.2 How the PCMM structure has been changed 
The PCMM structure has been changed in several ways to address the 
concerns from 6.1.1. The PCMM processes are grouped into five maturity 
levels. An organisation must complete all the processes at a particular level in 
order to be classified as performing at that level of maturity. Each level is 
labelled, and has a statement of purpose. 
6.1.2.1 Changing the Levels 
The levels in the original model reflected the organisational management 
focus, and the progression in performance of the whole organisation. These 
were not appropriate to EM, and so new levels have been defined and named, 
reflecting the staged improvement in performance and capability of an 
emergency management system. 
6.1.2.2 Changing the Processes 
The processes have also been changed to make them more appropriate. 
They have been streamlined into three stages, reflecting the sequential 
phases of emergency management. This has reduced the number of 
processes and also simplified the assessment. The descriptions used in the 
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model now reflect more clearly what each process should achieve (Fig. 6-5) 
By combining some processes under a different title, restructuring some into 
phases of a wider process and cutting out several processes that the data 
collection showed to be inappropriate, the number of processes has been 
condensed from twenty-two down to eight. 
6.1.2.3 Process qualifying statements 
The original assessment concentrated on four features of how the key 
processes were managed in the organisation. The new assessment 
framework also concentrates on four aspects of how the processes are 
performed, but these `process qualifiers' are more in line with the demands of 
emergency management (Fig. 6-3-3) 
6.1.2.4 Assessment protocol changes 
The PCMM prescribes an assessor-intensive programme of interviews and 
questionnaires spanning several months. Resource constraints and the 
smaller scale of emergency management systems indicated that the 
assessment needed to be scaled down. The research methodology confirmed 
that an assessment opportunity, which did not place additional time or 
financial burden on the target organisation, would be welcomed by industry, 
and so a new assessment protocol has been drafted. 
6.2 Redefining the levels 
A maturity level is a stage in an organisation's capability, which is achieved by 
carrying out their emergency management processes to a particular standard. 
Specific practices, tools or methods are not determined in a CMM framework, 
as the model aims to prescribe why but not how improvements should be 
made. By maintaining this rule the generic quality of the model is preserved, 
and each organisation or sector can provide the appropriate detail and 
description for their own circumstances. Figures 6-6 to 6-13 will detail each 
maturity level in turn, stating the key requirements and describing how each 
process should be carried out at that level. 
6.2.1 Level headings 
The headings for each maturity level are of prime importance. The heading 
must encapsulate what it means for an organisation to be at that level of 
maturity. The words used must be clear and unambiguous, and have the 
same meaning to an engineer as they do to a manager or to the regulator. 
The examples of the names from the CMM and PCMM maturity levels are 
shown below with the new names for the GEMA levels. These headings were 
chosen after long research deliberations, and some of the rejected options are 
explored later in the Discussion, Chapter 8. The numbering of the levels has 
also been changed to reflect the absence of any requirements or processes at 
level 1. This recommendation came from the expert validation panel, and is 
explained further in Chapter 7. Note that from this point onwards, the maturity 
levels will be referred to by their GEMA number, ranging from 0 to 4. 
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Figure 6-1 Maturity level names for CMM, PCMM and GEMA 
Level 
1 
CIVIM name 
Initial 
PCIVIIVI name 
Initial 
GEMA number & name 
0 Default 
2 Repeatable Managed I Functional and repeatable 
3 Defined Defined 2 Focussed and defined 
4 Managed Predictable 3 Measured and integrated 
5 Optimising Optimising 4 Adaptive and optimising 
The differences between CMM and PCMM are explained by the literature and 
are due to the CMM technical focus, for which repeatability is an important 
early stage. The PCMM focus is on human-based processes, and they must 
be actively managed before further improvement can be attempted. 
A key consideration when designing the GEMA level names was that they 
could be understood by all agencies and stakeholders in emergency 
management. PCMM assessment is carried out by Quality, HR and 
management professionals, in contrast to emergency management, which is 
the realm of experts and volunteers from a range of technical and non- 
technical backgrounds. To enhance the clarity and allow ease of 
interpretation, two-word phrases were chosen to replace the single word CMM 
and PCMM descriptors. Level 0 does not have any requisite processes, it is 
simply where immature organisations reside; `Default' was therefore 
considered to be a more appropriate term for this level. 
The following section presents overviews of the maturity levels for the GEMA. 
The description of each level will begin with an overview, then give reasons 
why a process should be carried out in a certain way at that level of maturity. 
Levels 1 to 4 are described, as level 0 is the default level and has no 
performance requirements. 
6.2.1.1 Level 1- Functional and Repeatable 
Emergency management systems which have been assessed as maturity 
level 1 are able to provide a functional response to an emergency within their 
portfolio of credible incidents. An emergency plan exists, and if it is 
implemented, a standard response can be expected to occur. At this level the 
organisation is accountable for providing a response to incidents which might 
occur as a result of the hazards under their jurisdiction. 
At level 1, the Human Resources Management process ensures that there are 
sufficient staff to ensure a response, and that they are reliably able to respond 
to a call-out. The staff responding to an emergency are accountable to the 
emergency managers for their duties and responsibilities. There is evidence of 
a good working relationship between the emergency managers and the 
response teams. The process of Training and Development at this level 
ensures that each responder is trained to carry out their assigned duties. The 
training focuses on the perceived requirements of the individuals, to enable 
them to respond appropriately. 
The process of Research and Innovation has not been observed in 
organisations at this level, as their aim is simply to be able to present a 
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credible, repeatable response. Innovative solutions might be observed; 
however the structure is not in place to control or benefit from them and they 
could go unseen or have undesirable consequences. At this level, the 
response teams review their performance directly following an incident, to the 
extent that they discuss the positive and negative aspects. It is unlikely that 
there will be further analysis of the response, or any learning from it at this 
maturity level. 
The process of response management at this level ensures that there are 
facilities for managing a response to the credible hazards. This could include 
fire-fighting and medical facilities. The buildings and facilities provide a stable 
environment from which the response can be managed. There are repeatable 
measures in place for initiating the plan and activating the response. 
Resources are provided through irregular means at this level, and there is 
usually no policy or financial commitment to resource emergency 
management. Risk identification and Assessment does not take place to a 
significant extent at this level, with emphasis instead on safety and hazard 
awareness. There may be small scale risk assessments carried out by the fire 
and medical personnel, to enhance their personal safety during the response, 
but risk is not assessed at the organisational level. 
The final aspects of a level 2 organisation are borne out through Definition of 
requirements and Response Assurance. At level 1, it is usually only the 
internal parts of the organisation that receives assurance of a response being 
effectively administered. There is an internal understanding however, that the 
managers are accountable for the performance of the organisation in dealing 
with an emergency. 
A level I organisation should demonstrate that it understands the 
requirements placed on it. The emergency plan should show a fundamental 
understanding of the regulations that it is seeking to address. There should 
also be repeatable means of defining the immediate requirements of an 
incident. These could either be physical assets; in the form of gas detectors, 
alarms and sensors that alert the control room to a certain type of incident, or 
in the form of written guidelines detailing the response requirements for 
specific types of incident. The appropriate regulatory requirements for UK 
MAH industry are discussed in the Literature review, Chapter 2, but in short 
they require that the site has an emergency plan, the capability to respond 
and regular testing of the response at defined intervals. 
6.2.1.2 Level 2- Focussed and Defined 
At level 2, the response capability of the organisation was performance based. 
The goal of the plan and individuals involved was to maintain a state of 
readiness to respond to an incident. The aim at level 2 is to build a focussed 
response infrastructure of workforce and facilities. A level 2 organisation 
should be able to respond the risk levels they have defined. For these defined 
risks, the organisation should be able to justify how it can respond to control 
and dominate an incident. This justification should be presented in terms of 
the knowledge, skills and abilities to manage the specific incident, and how 
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the competencies of the workforce can be applied to the demands of an 
emergency. 
The PCMM asserts that one of the primary goals of this level is to gain a 
competitive advantage, or `do better' than your competitors. In the EM context, 
the hazard is the competition they face, and the organisation must gain an 
advantage by being proactive in managing the risks that have been defined 
and focussing their efforts on regaining control, should the risks escalate into 
an emergency situation. 
Level 2 concentrates on building a more sustainable response, capable of 
dealing with any escalation in risk, rather than simply responding to 
emergencies. The CMM literature suggested that a more efficient and 
effective organisation can be achieved by distilling the organisation's 
committed work into a set of competencies, which could be used to tackle any 
task that arose. The data also indicated that the competency-based approach 
to emergency management has been attempted in some of the organisations 
studied, and that there is scope for further development of the technique. 
The HRM process at level 2 aims to provide the necessary workforce to 
manage and respond to the defined risks. The roles and responsibilities of the 
responders are defined and clearly recorded in the plan and associated 
documents. There is a clear structure for the recruitment, selection and 
progression of emergency management staff, which is focussed on 
establishing synergy between the full-time responsibilities of the individuals 
and teams, and the development of their response roles. Individual and team 
training requirements are assessed, and a record is kept of individuals' 
training and development. The Training and Development process provides a 
structured training process, with defined objectives. The training is focussed 
on developing the necessary competencies in the workforce, to ensure a 
reliable response. 
At level 2, Research & Innovation are used to fill gaps in response knowledge 
and resources. If a problem is perceived during the response, research can be 
commissioned to find a solution. Such research is usually carried out within 
the organisation, and solely focussed on solving one particular predicament. 
Whilst level 3 organisations are not structured well enough to take full learning 
advantage of any opportunity, the learning outcomes of any incident are likely 
to be discussed and analysed by those involved. Learning is focussed within 
team groups, and lessons or knowledge gained from the response are unlikely 
to be shared outside the team. Any learning would normally be focussed on 
solving a direct problem, rather than probing deeper to seek solutions to the 
root cause. 
The physical response requirements at level 3 are defined, and the facilities 
and equipment are focussed on dealing with the likely risk portfolio. Level 2 
response management aims to ensure that sufficient resources are available 
to respond to risks that the organisation has defined as being likely to escalate 
to a dangerous level. An organisation performing at level 2 maturity is likely to 
have carried out a risk assessment, and defined a portfolio of risks, detailing 
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the scenarios in which certain hazards could become unstable and 
dangerous. This process is key to level 2, as it provides the portfolio of risks 
which are revisited by processes at higher levels. 
The stakeholders who require response assurance are defined in level 2, and 
how this assurance will be achieved is recorded as part of the planning 
documents. The response assurance tasks are focussed on matching the 
expectations of the stakeholders at level 3, and some work will have been 
carried out to determine the requirements and concerns of the different 
stakeholder groups. Response assurance is still reactive however, and 
assurance activities would take place once an incident has occurred. 
At level 2 the emergency plan clearly defines the requirements that it aims to 
fulfil and focuses on achieving related goals through the response. Individuals 
and teams in the response show awareness of the overall requirements, and 
of the specific duties and responsibilities connected to their roles. The teams 
should be aware of the distinction between the requirements of the external 
environment in the form of legislation and public pressure, and the physical 
requirements and limitations of the site and the plant. Both of these sets of 
requirements should be addressed in the plan, and evident to the assessor 
through any observations of the EMT. 
6.2.1.3 Level 3- Measured and integrated 
When an organisation reaches level 3 it shows evidence of being 
measurement driven. Emergency management processes are designed to 
facilitate measurement and assessment. This measurement enables 
knowledge to be structured and shared more easily, and learning is 
enhanced. Measurement facilitates comparison on equal terms, which 
enables organisations to gauge improvement and share improvement 
strategies. Measurement is also important to formalise a system of monitoring. 
Criteria and a measurement framework make it much easier to monitor 
emergency management continually, whereas maintaining a regular schedule 
of monitoring without a structure is difficult, and usually proves unsustainable. 
Without a defined set of common characteristics, comparison of dissimilar 
sectors and plants throughout MAHI has proved difficult. Earlier in the chapter 
this set of characteristics, known as `key processes', has been established, a 
level 4 organisation would be expected to set quantitative targets for these 
processes, and monitor progress towards them. Targets should be designed 
to encourage the achievement of performance standards, and should be set 
by the teams who will be performing the tasks. 
The second aspect of level 3 is integration. This reduces duplication and 
enhances the ability of all teams to learn from each others' experience and 
knowledge. Through integration, the organisation widens the number of 
competencies they can access to complete tasks, known as their `competency 
base'. 
One of the core reasons given for integration in the CMM model was that it 
increases the agility and efficiency of interdependent work. By level 3, the 
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teams' internal structure should be, well defined and focussed, and the 
cohesion between the different teams is the key objective. Integration is 
especially important for organisations which work extensively with contractors, 
stakeholders and outside groups, as the increased pressure of an emergency 
situation can expose any instabilities or fissures in the emergency procedures. 
Looking at specific processes at level 3, they all show a closer relationship 
between emergency management and the everyday business objectives of 
the organisation. HRM incorporates measurement of staff turnover, 
recruitment efficiency, and the satisfaction and sustainability of the current 
personnel. Training is planned and structured to achieve set objectives, and it 
is then measured and appraised to ensure that it meets them. Numerical 
training targets are discussed and recorded, and the progress and 
advancement of individuals and teams is measured against these targets. 
Integrated training opportunities are exploited by all parties involved, and 
further integration is continually sought. 
The process of Research and Innovation should be integrated with other 
agencies and organisations. External research might be commissioned, using 
academic and industrial resources, and research effort is measured and 
assessed for its value and efficiency. The efficiency of the organisational 
learning process is also measured at this level. This can be achieved by 
investigating how far learning penetrates into the organisation, and the 
longevity of the resulting knowledge. The access to that learning can also be 
measured, in terms of integrating it across the organisation and across the 
other agencies involved in the response. Learning at level 3 is also taken 
forward by formulating action plans, setting measurable targets towards their 
achievement, monitoring progress and re-testing to check changes. Level 3 
organisations also integrate their learning mechanisms with other relevant 
organisations to exploit the learning available from incidents and experience 
at other plants or in other agencies. 
The efficiency of the actual response is also measured at level 3. Quantitative 
targets are set and individuals within the teams are responsible for monitoring 
and recording progress towards those targets. There is a budget allocated for 
response management facilities and equipment, and financial targets and 
expenditure is integrated into the normal business of the organisation. 
Emergency management facilities and resources are managed in the same 
way as any other organisational asset. 
Requirements for the response are expressed numerically, and targets for 
fully meeting all requirements have been set and are assessed. The 
requirements have been integrated into a core set of competency 
requirements for the response. This competency requirement is defined, 
recorded and progress towards its achievement is mapped out, monitored and 
measured. These competencies are distributed between the different teams, 
and the response is competency rather than task focussed. Competency 
cross-over between the emergency tasks and the everyday business 
therefore adds benefit to both objectives, and makes both more efficient. 
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At maturity level 3 the organisation will use quantitative risk assessment 
methods to assess and prioritise risk. The organisation will also exploit the risk 
knowledge and experience of its partner agencies in planning its own 
response. Quantitative methods might also be used to justify levels of 
expenditure and resources for particular risks, and to support the 
organisation's emergency strategy through response assurance. 
A level 3 organisation would measure the effectiveness of the response 
assurance using quantitative means. Stakeholder satisfaction and public 
opinion would be useful indicators for this. Assurance would be coordinated 
with other participating agencies, and a joint response overview could be 
developed. Feedback is used to improve and strengthen future response, and 
make any changes necessary to support more effective assurance. 
6.2.1.4 Level 4- Adaptive &Optimising 
The maturity level 4 signifies that an organisation is continuously improving its 
emergency management system. It has the capacity to detect changes in the 
demands placed on it, and make the necessary, measured changes to the 
system to enable the response to cope with the new circumstances and be 
prepared for any further changes. The organisation shows adaptability 
through all its emergency arrangements and documentation. It is continuously 
responding to the precursor conditions which can trigger an incident. These 
may be internal events, or changes in the external environment. 
Optimising means to 
`... make something as effective or advantageous as possible". 
(Allen 2002: 618) 
In emergency management terms, this can means that the organisation has 
facilities and protocols in place to learn from any incident or occurrence, and 
use that knowledge and lessons to its advantage. It should also create 
positive opportunities from any changes or flux in the external or internal 
environment, which in less capable organisations would have resulted in 
negative consequences and potential loss. 
At maturity level 4, the process areas are interdependent and integrated to a 
large extent. Risk assessment and analysis identifies areas of change in the 
system and environment, and provides the basis for changes and adaptation 
to the HRM. Personnel and their roles are adapted, and the activities of 
recruitment, selection and personnel transfer respond accordingly. 
The process of training and development is wholly competence-based at level 
4. Organisations aim to maintain a competency portfolio which has been 
measured as adequate, to deal with all reasonable demands identified by the 
risk assessment process. The competencies are integrated with the regular 
business requirements of the organisation, and training is planned and 
structured to meet requirements of emergency and regular duties in parallel. 
Training and development are also guided by information from the research 
and innovation process, which continually seeks innovation within and outside 
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the organisation, and conducts research in order to optimise and improve its 
processes and the efficiency of the organisation. Effectiveness and efficiency 
are also continually addressed through organisational learning. 
At level 4, organisational learning uses assessment of precursor events and 
incident response to generate performance information. This will improve the 
planning and risk assessment stages of the system. This is known as double- 
loop learning in the CMM literature. Single loop involves response feedback 
influencing future response, and double loop learning is the use of that same 
feedback to influence the planning and preparedness for response, and any 
earlier inadequacy that may have propagated response error. 
The response management process has predictive elements, and uses 
technology to gain advanced knowledge of potential incidents that could 
escalate beyond control. Facilities and equipment at level 4 are adaptable to 
respond to any situation, and continually reassessed and developed to adapt 
to any change. Any investment in response facilities should have a utility 
focus, to ensure that through regular or continual use of the facilities, use in 
an incident is familiar and well practiced. It would also ensure that the 
equipment is maintained frequently and facilities are always ready to respond. 
Response management is also tightly linked to the research and innovation 
process, which can be used to develop solutions to any specific technical or 
response problems which cannot be solved using conventional methods or 
technology. 
Level 4 also sees the complete shift from task-focussed response, to 
competence-based operation. Rather than teams focussed on achieving 
separate parts of the response, the organisation is now configured to deal with 
an emergency as a deviation from their normal operations, and to as greater 
extent as possible, the competencies which equip the workforce to carry out 
their regular work also enable them to deal with the different conditions of an 
emergency situation. The competency basis removes the problems 
associated with disjointed emergency management procedures. It lapses in 
training and practice, resulting in poor retention of skills and knowledge. 
Competencies are used daily through scheduled work, and so are continually 
improved and maintained. There is also no potentially difficult transition from 
normal to emergency conditions. The organisation simply applies its 
competency base in a different way to deal with the novel circumstances, and 
adapts seamlessly to quickly regain control. 
Risk identification and assessment at level 4 is a cultural feature of the 
organisation. Focused management of change ensures that operations are 
continually monitored for any variation from the intended processes, structure 
or functioning. The monitoring is automatic, integrated and also instilled within 
the workforce. Risk assessment is a formal and documented process, which 
precedes any change or major decision affecting the organisation. It is also 
integrated with safety at shop-floor level, where the responsibility for accident 
prevention and prediction lies with every member of the workforce. Such 
information and knowledge is used to bring the problem to the attention of the 
department or individual with the responsibility to rectify it, and measures are 
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planned and implemented to address the concerns. The results of the matter 
are then fed back to the individual who discovered the problem, and the wider 
workforce. This creates a culture of continual learning and improvement. 
Definition of requirements and response assurance process at level 4 is 
further integrated and continuous. All stakeholders are part of a consultative 
process of requirements definition, in which their expectations and demands 
are explored and the organisation provides a structure through which the 
concerns and requirements will be resolved. This process is in parallel with 
Response Assurance at level 5, because the organisation structures its 
assurance mechanisms to directly meet and exceed the requirements of all 
the stakeholders. It also retains the capacity to respond to any new 
stakeholders or assurance demands, continuously assessing the environment 
for both new demands on the organisation, and new demands for assurance. 
At level 4 the processes are more strongly integrated and interdependent than 
earlier in the model, where they were convoluted and working separately. The 
definition of requirements and risk identification & analysis processes provide 
the continuous remit for human resources management, training and 
development and risk management to adapt. research & innovation and 
organisational learning seek more efficient and effective response techniques 
and structures. 
6.3 Redefining the processes for GEMA 
Chapter 5 concluded that some processes from the original PCMM were 
identifiable components of an emergency management system. The analysis 
indicated that there was evidence of a select few PCMM processes in nearly 
all the data sets studied. The purpose of this section is to design and justify 
the processes that will form the basis of the maturity levels for the GEMA. 
Elements of the original PCMM processes will be adopted, in line with the 
conclusions from the data; however the analysis also indicated that significant 
changes in terminology and focus will be necessary. 
6.3.1 Process streamlining -the Trident sequence 
Primarily, the data analysis sought to prove whether the processes, assessed 
by PCMM as evidence of an organisation's maturity, would also indicate the 
maturity of its EM system. Data was collected from plans, exercises and 
feedback sessions or interviews. Although some identical processes were 
found across the different data sets, each process appeared to have a 
different focus when it was observed in the planning, exercising or feedback 
stage. 
Figure 6-2Trident assessment sequence 
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Figure 6-3 below compares three example processes at each of the three 
stages to illustrate this change in focus. 
Figure 6-3 Process comparisons between stages of EM system 
Focus4 
" Preparedness Response Learning 
Staffing Ensure sufficient Call-out Staff problems 
suitable staff procedures recorded and 
available to provide system 
respond adequate staff adjusted 
Work Risk-based Facilities and Resources 
Environment allocation of resources in replenished 
resources place to manage and problems 
identified in plan situation addressed 
Training & Training to Exercises used Training 
develoomant_ ensure all staff as training tool reviewed in 
have necessary to provide light of 
skills for roles realism and test practice. 
The focus of each process addresses three 
emergency management cycle in turn. This 
supports diagnosis of any problems, facilitating 
improvement. 
interlinked elements of the 
dissection of each process 
more accurate and directed 
This `Trident Sequence' breaks down the assessment into three manageable, 
linked sections, each measured by different means. The preparedness stage 
can be assessed by examination of documents, plans and interviews with the 
staff responsible. The Response phase can be assessed through the 
observation of an emergency exercise, and the learning phase can be 
evaluated through observation of the incident debriefing procedures and 
interviewing participants following an exercise. Although the three phases are 
sequential in an organisation, their assessment is attacked as a three-pronged 
approach, hence the Trident sequence label. This three-stage approach was 
particularly recommended by the Expert Validation Panel, and is discussed in 
Chapter 7. 
The original PCMM used a similar 
were themes that linked the key 
processes have been abbreviated ii 
be found in the Table of Acronyms. 
concept called 'areas of concern' which 
process, as shown in Figure 6-4 . 
The 
n this diaaram. and the full meaninas can 
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Figure 6-4 Process `areas of concern' from original PCMM 
Adapted from (Curtis et al. 2001: 43) 
In the original model, each process was specific to one level and a particular 
area of concern. For example, the diagram shows that the process of EW 
(Empowered Workforce) would only be expected to take place in an 
organisation at level 4 maturity, and is part of the 'Building workgroups and 
culture' area of concern. In the GEMA the same set of processes applies at 
each level of maturity. Each process is also divided into three focus areas of 
at each level. This three stage split has been labelled as the Trident 
sequence. Taking the process of staffing as an example, the EM system 
would be assessed in terms of how the staffing process is performed at each 
stage of the Trident sequence - in the plan, during the response and during 
the feedback and learning. Depending on the capability and maturity of the 
organisation in carrying out that process, it would be assessed as level 0,1,2,3 
or 4. 
The layout of the emergency management framework will be determined once 
the full set of processes has been defined in the next section. Definition of the 
processes for the new model was carried out by comparing aspects of the 
original model to the analysis of the data and incorporating concepts, ideas 
and requirements raised in the literature. 
6.3.2 Origins of the new process set 
As previously discussed in 6.1.1, the data indicated that some changes to the 
PCMM structure would be required to apply it to emergency management 
assessment. 
The names of the processes were changed after a significant amount of 
research brainstorming with input from several different colleagues. It was 
important to ensure that the language of the framework was appropriate to 
engineers, emergency managers, regulators and any other stakeholders in 
the emergency management system that might not be familiar with the 
organisational management terminology preferred by the American designers 
of the original CMM. 
There were also several changes to the design of the framework as a result of 
the data analysis. Two processes were changed into qualifying statements, 
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and two processes were removed from the framework, as there was no 
evidence that they contributed to emergency management capability. 
The process of compensation was removed from the framework because 
there was no evidence from the sites, plans or interviews that remuneration 
for emergency duties was considered appropriate. Professionals who were 
employed full-time in an emergency response or planning role clearly should 
be paid according to their qualifications and experience, but that is considered 
separate (this will be discussed in Chapter 8, discussion) from the majority of 
emergency management staff who voluntarily agree to the duties in addition to 
their paid full-time position. There was also no indication from the literature 
that remuneration of duty emergency managers affected the capability of the 
organisation in any way. 
The 'Workgroup Empowerment' process was also removed from the 
framework, as there were two exercise scenarios where operational teams 
were empowered to carry out tasks, and this transfer of control out of the ECC 
resulted in poor information flow and severe delay to the tasks. Empowerment 
is the transfer of official authority and the encouragement of initiative. It is 
important in emergency management that authority and responsibility remain 
with the coordinating body, but also necessary that initiative is encouraged 
throughout the system. For this reason, Workgroup Empowerment as a 
process was removed, and the encouragement of initiative is incorporated in 
the 'Research and Innovation' process, whilst authority to act is contained in 
the process qualifiers 'communication, coordination and integration'. 
The diagram (Figure 6-5) on the following page illustrates how the new GEMA 
framework was designed using the data analysis and original CMM elements. 
Working from the top down, the original PCMM processes are shown in the 
white boxes. Those with purple borders are processes which have been 
identified in the emergency management data. Blue bordered processes were 
not identified in the data, but have been highlighted by the literature as 
important novel concepts which could enhance EM performance. These 
processes may not be visible when observing exercises or plans, as they are 
more strategic than operational or tactical in their nature. 
These white process boxes are followed by a large red section which 
describes how the PCMM processes combine to create the new emergency 
management (EM) process in the solid red box below. Following this 
diagram, each of the eight new GEMA processes are described in detail. 
Figure 6-6 to Figure 6-13show an individual chart for each process, giving a 
statement of process and definitions of why the processes should be 
performed in a particular way at each level, and why each stage of the Trident 
sequence is necessary. 
Key relating to Figure 6-b 
KEY " process I Data-supported PCMM process PCMM process 
130 
O) OON-MM32 Vl 3 (D C) ;1 
ý O a o 
n, 
:, 
- O 
M (D ý cn n n ý. o m C r- O C n -00 (D 
.O (D N' CD ' "O 
(D N 
-s 
(0 O 
M CC' <b Z 1C2 l» 
ä* Ein NO 3 
(Q 
(0 ß o)) 
0 
- 
(D 
CD (A fD .. pO 
OO 
CD 
OO 
(D 
Oý OO z' ý% zr O<3 
y 
.O 
m 
OM * NO a0 O ý' N (D ON 
< 
(_') 
Z :Z Ei 
C) 
." ( 0 rn 
(n = 
CL '+ QQN (DM C7 0Na -="O 
<ý 
0 (D m ýö (D mZ =_c ö :r 
(D 
3 
Cp 0 C) OnO Cp ýp (ý N "d N fD Ö (D Cl- < fD C) 37 
3 'C (n 
- 
Z. aoN 
cQ ON0 
3 @j fD 3 91 r- O 
25 
O tD 3NN 
(p -ý 7 Cp ,NOO .+ OyOm3O cn CD = 
2: =r ;Z 25 (0 0 cl. ,4 
.+N 
0 CL o 
CD m0 
m3 CD 
CD 
C°n0i 
CD 
ö 2. ö, CD 
- 
0 
cm 
'a 
3'a 
:3 
3° " 3°m c 
L 
Q 12 ° :3 0 cc 
Qo 
m 
0 
CD 
(7 ^' a-(D-0 -- - -wC 
Op 
(/1 . fD < ,Gnn 
Ö-re 
Ö? 
C) M f/j C) 3N (Q (( 3ND U) (DD nn 
. +O N ? 
gi n" pý 0N 
O U' 3- Oyp 
fD pý O 
p 
CD 
-4 :p-? 
r 
CD (D Mp 
,. a zr .. O zr , _. O `< ((A 
dip 
-" CD p 
ýý CD 
d =+. CD C0. f^'D ý0 -{ OM 2) CD ! /1 Cl CD U) =. 070 0) D. -a m cQ CD CD M C) ý< 
CD 9) CD Cl 0 (j) (n U) - :1 rp* W CD 
m 
va, 
0 -ý =r F3. äý Kßä äN 
pý Uj 
p F. V 
fD d 
GJ 
0 (1) (D CD 3<pdNO CD aöýýcri 
; CD m*ai aimp'0o-CD 0 fA o o-0 m. %< zI (n c 0 CD CD 
m am co cn ymM. 9; cr 
o 
co 
. 
'- QoC" 
3mß 
O- CA 
0 CD 0 CD (D© 
L 
n 
o 
o 
Q3 
ý"ö 
n CD , 
a3 0 Way CD C) 
l< 
MnCN CD pc 
co 30Nß 00 
ca 
tu «2 fD Off) 
Z 
N_ 
"Q Q_ a ÖÖ (D Z 
:3Z (D 
Uf Ci "º23 ,G CD (D fD 
=r Cn Dýo0 :E CD %< -C3 :3 (D 
CD NNa 
(D 
pý 0 G) Z- 
NaOG. z 
m 30 ° 
ni m< nýDi 
ä 
-0 l< n -03 0 
cc c3 Q3 3a> v°i" <0 
(D °m<° 9ß 
0 (D QZQ po °Q U) ° co MMm M-. 
3C: -, ýa 
ID 3(D'" 3 Inas 
cn N- 
CD ýý, ýmý, m Dý= rn3 
'o ý° 0 Q-' a-a CD 
3 aß 3 01 3. ßa U) CD 
(D 
CD 
(D < C7 fD 
CD 
CD fÄ (DD n 
ID-0 Cl) oo -m v, mc55 ým O 0-a 00 ýCB 
a) CD 0Q C) 
ö v, a0< -?. 
01 m c_ Q) M Cp o c_ jaC0 CD f7 ?KC? cc 
n i° v-°aoö0 (ßp 
° 
02 
3 =r CD r- (D CD W 
: 7,0- 
s M N< m > 
=r 
äff,, Q. m ain NmN CD 
o n) ? 
0 
oo 
o --" 
rn - vö5 
-- ' co 
0 
ýo CO 
N 
11 
6 
Cl, 
c 
3 
3 
0 
YJ 
m 
V 
0 Cl) m N 
N 
0 
N 
W 
N 
N w 
Functional & Defined & Measured & Adaptive & 
Repeatable Focussed Integrated Optimising 
E, s c30 m om (ao 
13 0 c2. 
ný(0 My (0 -4"0 
om ; pr CD (b 73 " 
«2 ä Zm ý0 ömcý 
OOO 
_ 
CL CD 
(D 0 ?O ZL CD (P (D N 
:3 12. CL 0 NO 
M ' 
CL 0 (D a fD N- CD 
c. 0 O yF 0) CD f/) « fp fD O. 
y (D 
C 
"+ 
'Oc "Ö0 
(D -1 CD 
O'NO 
p) Cam) (D C 
CD CD (0 
m U' öä ° :3. N ö M 
! /f 35- 
' 
vi 
N-a° Xp ä (n 
-0 m :3 -1 OlOO 
Q (DO 
m mý°ý ONO, 
mMy 
m 
O ý(D 
(D 
c OC 
-a pyOO 
0 M=- ° fD g» to Cl) (D a =T (D 
c 
C 
n co 
o 
jOo a) " cn @ CD Oo 3 o° 
ýo°° 
o o 
aO (i) 
(Da 
.mý 
3 ý a b° °MO 
m 
0 a=3=c°. ! l). výn; Ei* (0 0o ýn 
m 
ý BCD 0 (Dc3 :30 )y'O 3N cn 
Ö 
(D 
N 
` 
O ms -N. 
CD 
zr O3 to Q CD = 
N2 '= 0 :h 7r ß m < OO a 
fD d _ 
O 
- '", ` O- Q 
0 U' Cl. m 3 O 
. r C L- O pß 
XCD UM; 3 
; 
M cn 
30 Z7 
(n (D Cn (D ' 
aý me .0 
(D mm (D M 0. a (D 0 0 m, Z ä. y 
y 
m- cn 
0: 3 
a :o 
ma3° 
0 5z C03 
3äý 
0 
(D: 
om- 
(D 
2 O D 
°' m " M -M 
- mQ ý rn Z !' 
a 
to 3 y v 
-, ý ° 
m cm o=nr- C, mv, ö to N0 
c ý ä ýD -1 Omm än °' 
:2 (D cn LA. O 
NO O 92 gy 
=N -' a m 
fD 
. 
(D ä (d 3vm 
( p 
c) Q) CD (n m3 CO «: ) N (ß 
cnöý° : 3. c 
0 0-m O O °' öý 
O 
Z° DL 
a ý --0 ) N 
(2. c: ö 
O . 
c 
Q 
m 
O O 
cn 
CL aý 
, c n c0 
U «D ( 
(0 
5 
M° 
cn 
Ný 
O 
° 
ý" ä 
S) < 
ýý 
(D 92 o 
( a ) 
Q CD 
o- 33äy 
= 
c. ä 
CD CD 
D 
cc 
Nm 
=r MO 7 
(C D 
CD 
0 
fD 0) ') 
a 
CL !n fD 
' 
O 
5 OO ö 
+ O O y ß C 'ý 
ý-º 
- 
CD 
D 1 (D (0 
3 
r o QZr ö0 ö= ö3n 0ý m a 
a N 
o '° mo =, -0 - 0 c-, <m3 m 0 N -1 - O a9a nj ((D co (A - 
0 
<G 
N= 
. 0 C3 N O (p 
ä fß O 
CD (D 0 3(A N 
z 
(CD (D ýp z 
fD 
"" 
3 pý 
to I. 
- ° Z 
V1 
y a 5 za OM M 
(D 
r 
ý co 0(D0 N Zinc -, (D o-m3O N :U (D 0 
'ß c -0 0 0cä 
O3 
CD m3 
°- 
mN Z ?ä 
_^` (p may 
5', <cö 
cý°" k ö- 
(D 0-0 a3 
-Zm'' 
z OC 
pN O 
O 
zr° 2?. o -1 ZM0 
ama 
OQO. -1 aý 
£?. (D Q (n 
p 0. 
pi 3 
fSD ; Z cyU 
O 
CD 
Vl Ö 
3 fD ýD =t O° 
3 
(D fl 
(D py 
O 
_ y0am N= 0020 
O "º 
, (D 
O 
3 CD -. 
- 
'O ° 
3 
0 
, g 
co 
os 
10 
O 
C, 
M 
N 
CL m U) 
n 
" 
O 
-w 0 
v 
CD 
0 
0 
.n S. 
B 
CD 
r. U 
W 
W 
Functional Defined 8 Measured & Adaptive 8 
Repeatable Focussed Integrated Optimising 
ä O (n a ° 
< 
0 äßöß Z CL 
ýý 
O " 
° c . °'m° -O r_ 
m -ý 
z2. 
= = (D 
0ö ý 3 
0yN 
-0 ý. Xy 
O 
m c0 O 
OäOO 
y 
mOo 
C ,.., .. 
oO C) -" OO 
° 
ý ov 
CO) C) 0 
ä 
0- ö 
a -5 N 
0: (D n ä 
5O 
c u 
O- -"(D 
ö3 
-. n cn äm `< a -, OO (D ý, ýý. "5U' ý(D(DM(D 3yoým -0 O 
a ßn3 - 
CL CL CD m C) ° `<o ý3( a 
vý 
m 
> O vZ N . - ö' 0 
C) 
a _ 
0' 0N D 
%< ate ö 
(D o 2 (D CD ö . 
o n r ° ýma y 0(0 ýº 
ý> > m Z ý(P 
Ö 
- (D 3 3O -p 
(D 
C «C0 aaNa (D°= o CO y (D :E (D 3O p aO (n Z g» 
tD y- Om 7ý 
=1 O 
(n C (D 
r' O 
0 (DU 2m n y M"0o °' 3 
° ýý a aNN ny 
im 
OO 3 ý ° 
U' 5O3 CD 
.532 
ý. fn ü r- 
fD 0- - v ai CD rr a) CD ä 
5 rnýy 
j2 JD o c ý; 
:Z c 0 
ON 
o 
y äN o 
y m 5 Q ý. 
' 
O 
aZ oo j3 CL M vCD 0 CD C) C) CD - 0 (0 S; m X (D 35 av, --4 0 1D m -11 
o ý' 
C , 3 aö O ö v0 p fl 
" ýä 
cm 
mä 
(0 (D 
rn 
Nvii' 
3 ý°ý p äO 
0) x (D ä 
ynO 
o 
CD O D CL ýý ° 
ý U) (n < 
i :: r cam°oC) 
-, o =ý2, ° 
Q op o:, Q. c Cl) _N 
--s Zý 
33 
n, ÖßNy 
:3 
O y i? 
_ (D :3y Z) fR O 
ýº fp (Q 
(D 0 
(D fD "0 
nO 
. ° (D 
O 
Q 
j 
(D 
O N 
:3 c :3M 
(D O fp 
c3. 
N 
iD 
< <O 
O 
(D 
Oö0a3 (0 y( 
y ZOaO 
<n - 
0m 
°O 
m m 
°' y a (Q faD 
ö O ý Qi 
1 
° ý' ° ý 
Z öýaö 
° 
y r' mZö -mm m O 3 . Cý 
7r 
, C) (D 
t/rtQ Cp yZ (D aO U 
M 
O dC O ä- oi 
3 ý' 
p 
a 
" (n (D C) -CS 
v 
CL E; 0. 
c 
3 CL CL 
(p a O = (D 
a cn mý 
Q 
(D p° 
(p 
°ý. a 
:3 
(D 
; 
a 
j 
(D :3 
a .OC. - 
cn 
O ? 0 (0 0) ( O (D 
(D - 
öO y_ö -1 (~`D C0N3 
° ° 
o? 0 to fD -1 osxý (D ' 
O 
m5 
m 
m 
s. 
Q° c ýý 
m ää3 o m- 0 
3M a 
S' y <mD 
cD N 
m c 
C 
c mm° = 
- v 
ý°' O3=(O0 .ý om ý . ° 
mM " 
°' CL «D Z cr a) - oaso. ý 51 
ý 
ö-., oý 3 
(D 3 
C 
< rn 
ö m° 
ný ý' m 
C (A rn 
°=m 
m 
a92 
. °m 
CD D U) 
v 
( 
o 
0) L ' c dz o 
-. 
<m°a ' 
8m cD 
F 
cn o 
OyO 
- 
2 
(D 
O 
(n zr - 
0 ,ýy 
0 cD ä 
(D :3 
_ 1ý-. 
r 0 cD 
0 (n 
to y> m rD > D (D c_-O 
°m c, Co 
2 (OD 3ý ° co 
< Z 
-O< o CD cnö ýn ß ai o Z fD Z O 
Q 
°O Er ° < -g U 4 
yoý3 0 o CD a 
30 0 y O f0 pm D Om (0 
; lr - (D-: 3 c 
a 0) 5a (nCD 
Vj 
o. ý8a>CDo. 
y (D Oc pN=m CD ä (D = Cl- (p Z) (D << Z ° 
c -n -- 
am m 
(0 . 
O"m c ý' ää 3 '(D CL 
ämö 
m°<'o: Z 
<° äc (C2 
o0 Nc ý' 
m ýc y1m m 
ny a 
Q a< 
t1 
O 
N 
N 
v 
N 
ß 
O 
ID 
41 
v 
cD ö 
m 
W 
A 
-& IV C) 
Functional & Defined & Measured & Adaptive & 
Repeatable Focussed Integrated Optimising " 
^" Vl 0) Vl fA 
mm < 
ONi; O ääm (D 
;5OOz-- 
oo =r 
" 
. O N i a mOO 
-0ömNä 
c. °m CD 
pý 
ý. C D 
ma QN. - 
O 
7cN amßo 
° 
(p O UOi f(D 
ý ö N CD , J, 
M< m 
p 
/ý 
V: 
( .O 
v iQ 
V% 
ýº CD O vi 
S 
)v MCP= 1V 
y 
tiý /ýý ° Ion M ° Ö< O -r (D 
y/lý d 
o ,V, 
3 C) =rzr c ni :3rO 
ä 
äc n 
°' 
--h OOO C) 
`CD 
N (DD -, 0 ° m ý mm r. ý ' º. m 
C"< 2 
fA N(D 5cNy 
> :Z 
(CD (D :j 
CY 
3 p 
;w 
ZY «D 0 (D C) m 56 M ( (D 
ý 
(D 5- 
oar = 'rn3 C 
(D 0 
ý r. 1 Z 0 
_m 
C° 
Z 
mc CD 
-% cffn a-, 
. D ý' ß, -01 Z aci ý 
m= (n 'moo m- 
O cn 
C 
:D Lý. m92 ý 
2mo5 
ä= CCD 
v°m° 
N( 
-. 3 ) 
S o-' Z3 
Cl) c(D O ý< O CD 
O . 3 OM . NC D CD dd0 
CD c 
CD 
. Cp 
< N= O 
O -a 
5OC ý 
O 
-ti, 
O lD O 
CD CL 
C u; M Uf 
N 
f0 O 0 
D D QC O (7 O OOC "' 
y 
/f ( 
M30 O CD O 
(Q 
iD 
N 
yd O 
3 
CD 
3ß - F s* co C, (0ý 3 (0 m CD (D °° u 0 to O Q 
CD 
@ s 
O (D 
N 
< 'ý O Cý CD O CD 
a) O (D < (n N 
nc 
CD , 
O. 
O 
Qc0. 
_! 'a NO 
n .. O 
r+ CD O 
y_ C 
CD 
n. 
Wz ( n, 
mm (D a ° mQ3 mD 
(D a-u, c?. M --Cl-"O m y ° 2n2 3m (' 3 c0Ma 
m°ä° 
fD iý. Op 
CL aý 
p 
!n 
(D 
OÖ 
(fl ) 
(D 
p 
°3°ßö :3 ý( Iaj C CD . aNý 
ý Q 
c3 C) aß ° Z. rný 
Z'0 ö 
° 'p ggZ iO CD Ö=v `< °j2 
ß 
(O 
(K2 V ,ý .NO OM O (D m0° 
Oa 
°Z 
Nm 
O 
(D 0 (D O °2rn 
O 
°-M - 
C _! C0 (D (p 30 
3 
Q (A O Z 
: 
ý 
ma 
:Omm c ö cö` ° 
m 
M 
ý. (ý cý 
- C BCD 0. 
-n C° . (D nä Ö7C ýO 
_ 
'0 -0 3- 
FF M033 f A ä<p a ý. y _ 3 yy .N CÖ Z 
5- 
9 NN -. Q ý Q) cD O 
_. 
n QO 
C 
nN °r 0300 : (D °' Vi 
-" v 
52y 
, 
D0m CD ö m-a2 m 
3 3 gl (b aM (p cnc° 
<CCý?. Q 
CD ýömný 
Nj d 
3. U) 
«2 :E 
aöma 
cy o 
0mcoate' äm 
o E5"8 @°, o"0°Z ß'0mrz < (DD S 
CD ni 'a ä 
cy ä0 O> Mö v_,: 
ö cö aý 
° Z° _ Co c a°-a 
N°° x 3 
91 °ý Como Cn cD 
,r ° 
O 
cn ;pM G to n fD 0 -. a CD M :: r cD mýQ vaýmcý ýo s0 Z pN fD Ö p. yyQ. $IO = - 
Z 
G) 
(A 
- @ 
(D pý (D (D N U1 N (n M (0 - 
O 30 . 
O. - -. ' MOO. CD 
fD 
M 
cpZ 
(D 
ý 
:W (D O 2i 3 cD (D N 
m Cl) NN ýn 
Mi m( M a äZ 
° 
m 
D 
o CIL co 3 
Q 0 äi ä 
° 
is' 
ö0 
ic 
d 
eý 3 
CD 3 
W 
c-n 
-& w 
Functional & Defined & Measured & Adaptive & 
Repeatable Focussed Integrated Optimising 
Q-ý 
c 
c vº 
_0 2 
' 
M M. 33 =-. Cn o 
CD 
a 
a 
CD m Uf 
X OL CD 
pý Uf 
Cn = CD CD =cc 
c äCD CD ' (n Ca) 
Cn 
< 
;w0 m- 
3 rn CD 
=r CJ) --s CD 3a ° ý: - @0 °öm (aU _ CD r m? V m 
° m° ä 
m 
0D°-ä 
v 
ä 
-0 
> 
n -' 
0 
ß) 
of 
m@ m 
3a-. 
`< ° °' 
3v a) N M 
O 
-a N'v 
° °m m CD Z - N 
m 
;, r = 
ca rn CL CD 
ý 
0) (n V 
m C4 C =r -0 CD m 
ö n 
< CDm° 'm 
'a 
°ö 
;& 
Cl) N° 
C c 
o C 
=ä 
-v -º -- 
3au,, 
CD 'n -, (< 
('.: C D < 
CD ý °N= 
: 11jOä CD 03 
O 
0 ' 
0'0ý m ý3 a _0 N ? M m0 
co a 
äoö° 
m ° 
ä v= 
=3 
i (A c N 
a 
Cl) 
CD .ý rn a° a 
O- (D 
5T CD 
- CD U) CD ý rt 
C1 
0 ED Cy 
:3 r- ;3 5L =r CD (° 
m ° CD CD 
U'" 
Cr 
x CD w 
- 
CO 
a C va, 
m Q. rn Q ö = CD C 
c 
- C n -0 . :30 0) _ 
C1 Cn 
13 (D CA ý 
1 C) 0 CD -0 : I 13) (0 0 
Cl) 
ý :3 
(D y " 
CD W Do a° 
=3 
a)a 
ü, ý mý°. ýo mD a 33 'OX 3ý 
0 
° o : 
CD 
'D 
v, CQ 
Ch M 
r- =r 
=3 
2)o m 
a) CA Q--0 cn 
S' 
< 
0)0 
CD 
CD cL CD ° ( 
°- 
mö 0 
QOý 
c ° 3 CD °- a, 
o 
°0< 
rn 
T ä_ Z nN CA < CD :3 , ýýö 
- 
co m ö 
p 0c3 Ö 3 y 
3 CD 0= c 
CD 3 
ä CD CD oýi w °-' 
° 
1 
° 
CA ff' CL a ý 
fD 
Q o 3 
a (D 
(n N CD 
a a (D CD 
0 Q) 
MO C@ 3 n .0 
jai CD 0 p. N. 
0) . cQ p3y 
=r 
ý CA CD 3 
* 0 Cn c 
;r CD W 
CD 0, fo 
0 :3 
-01 17 -ý 
(D z- 
CA 
Q " N äaß as 
- CD 5 n rt 
ö 0 M 
c- a CD < cc CD äa ' 
y° 
°m O CD a 0 cn 3m CD CD 
CD 
m a_ < 
. 
° Oo' p 0. 
CD C a0 
CD 0 
0 
0 
CD 
0=r y 
(5 
Q% 
=3 -0 
m 3 3 > 0 CD CD CL -0 O 
rt 
a (D 
*, 
CD 
Vº 
CD 
CL 
CD (n : 3. N 3 CA (/l r- =0 
(D 
Q- "ý cn N0 
OR 
_ 
a =r (n O 
CD 
0 (D - O Uf 01 -. 
ö Qý 
-' D 
öö 
= 
-N 
ä 
Z 
0 nN 
° (n 
ä 
CD r N 
m ýn = 
-ý ac a 
0. m 
mm 
xý; o >v 
° ß 
C 
, CD (Q < CD y °. 00 
(n ö =r°c 
äv 
aM w 
ß) 
CD 
-», 
(D (n 
-m __ °0 (Q= a 
N Ci 
(n C). CD o f3 °ý cn 
ä 
° 
C) a) 
° CD a 
T 
is' 
C 
a 
Ir 
40 0 
0 
c, M 
H 
N 
CD N 
n 
O 
0 
U) 
X, 
FL 
CD 
c, U) 
0 
2 
w 
3 
CL 
2) 
LA. 
W 
a) 
-ý N w 
Functional & Defined Measured & Adaptive 
Repeatable Focussed Integrated Optimising 
ßä(D 
A (p y =r 
im 0 -1 3 m o« 33 mD Oa (D 33 o3 O 
CD 
° 
. 
CD U) Uf 
aývý CL (D 
NM N =r >>N° 
ch (D 
E 
ö Uf ay 
2 CDCn 
3ip1 cZM u3 LA cöcö cöý CD CD <OD CD 
cn m y .+a r_ 
coo0m 
_ G) fD 
. 
O E2 fn O 
(D 3 
(D 
33 
(D O0 fD ä (D n äßm 0 
C> > 
°' 
(D (D (D ai _ 0 °° 
cD a) -I am - 1 
Z Cao M a@ m3 N3 (n ö 3-0 D O3 C> . v, r(D o cn mä Ný ip o c y(D0 m ON= cD 0 
° 
(D B(D 
(° ° 
Z 
m a CD l< . z cp 
0ää 
3 
cnmm 
ä 
2Ný3 
_ Zm51cö D 0 
(p 
O "-p O i 
m0_. ° 
prM :3 (0 
mO 
-0MMM ocoFUn« 
fD 20 
0- 
m 2 
53 n ' i3 - :3 . "y 
äý 
° ' ;Z v cn cD °. ý 
- 
°- am 
m äZ N 
-1 
0 c° 0 
s= mnýö 
(D 
=r 3 
1 am° 
0 
0 
' m ° :>Z. ° ;0 oaooo «D 3 °m <= 3 Ü) O cD (D ý( 
m 2 °o v, o m 0 
M (D ö ým °'ä 0 i ý uDitö 3 ON 
O NO 
NQ to 
rn ýv 
nýi rn 
ö7 
74 
d 123 o cn 
m N-0 
0 -0 5N3 cD 
:: k CD 
^. m 
, (D 
-- in 
zr O in CD 
-, cn(0 
Oüß 
Coo° 
-1 (0 
ÖO 
, 0 Zr (D :3 3 "S o3 
. 
:3 D CD ° <(D0 °a m rm0(D cl. 
S a cp m CD 
O 
3 
CD 
m 
- y 
Z' 
n 
(n 
=) ( 
0 r- CL (D O -ß 
w O m- , Cu -CN " 
D 3Z 
7,. Z O 
m Vf =' O 
Z LO 
_ 
Ul 
n. 
(Q CD 
C 
CL 0 
Ei 
2) 
-1 :3 
(D O< 
CD O 
. C). = 
Üj 
0 ;wm 
MM «a C 
z3 
(D O 
Ö 
Z 3 
M 
CO 
0) 
_C) (D Ö_ N O_ 
ö 
ß cD fD II1 f 
0 aO 
a> > 
m 
ý1 3 
>v Q 
n3 
OOy 'OM 
CL 
OyV_ 
;wC, NO Z :: r U) iD 
(0 m 9 m 
(D =r 0 
 ° 0. 0a . 
. ° m &_.. 
- ,Q 
'< 
zr 
m fD mö 
Qcm < 
0 :3 
=© 
m m (p 
m . ° -; ; or co 
o OoO 
o _ 'O 
öa cn m 
V a_5 
Cö 
ß ' cN C : 
N C) 
(D 
(D 
° °- 
ommý, 
C n aom 
o C D yf 
to O N 
p D CAC ((D 
m 
(D 0 
?. O -0 
Ö 
r- CD Z (D CO (D ZZ - j; 
ö 
cb aaýaý° 2. oýäo. 3. 
<0- O O. 
3c-oo o chio Co me uv(D 
C°. ý, om -^((mm ' 
V3CD o OO a 0 r- o= Q 0ý 3 ay °-C .= .a CD 5n 
0 
-0 cu 
(0 "ý .. ?zO zr zr 
= cc o 
?°ä 
`C - 
0sQ 
CD 000 
0 a 12. 
(D * m N 
C/) - oý 
Q C Ui 
CD Co n y 
m 
VO= (0 
ri° cý 
3 «0 c217 ) 
to 
IT, 
ý 
e 2ir ö c oT° m (4 =-, -o 
m 
:3 
D 
;0 
- N ýQ 
CD 
ýv n f" "« 
om 
ö <'m mg 
? M a( ? -. N 
N 
N 
10 °mm 
ma 
aov -ib 
ý 
_ °3 Z ON 
O 
a 
a (D Cl- - i öa o i 
(D 0°n 
a - 
3O 
3. c° C 
CNo. 
1 9 ý ° (D 
° 
o c - to 
O 0 ;Z pIr (M> (D c_ 
2 
0 
0 (3Dä C 
:. < CD 0 (' 3 Cl- :: 4 N 
(D 
D(D C Boa(DZ a 
Z2 N 
, 
m3 (o ° o y 7r ° a (D 
T 
fa, 
a) 
0 
0 
CD N 
N 
CL 
N 
n 
1 
ü 
0 
I 
U) 
X 
cD H 
O 
C 
CD 
0 
w 
3 
CD 
W 
v 
N W as 
Functional & Defined & Measured & Adaptive & 
Repeatable Focussed Integrated Optimising -" 
ö ný -ý (l) 
a co 
any o -1 N «D O- O m -" 
ccN- $NOo 
om 
aý , nn 
öONo 
m 
" 
" o 
Q (D 
= 
r_ , rý °- 
m ä Üi (D 
p ; or (D 3 
9- ! 
Lß. :3 r_ äQO 
ill 
- 
Z 
O (D 
O0O 
N fý/ < O O cQ O ZO ß no O 
_ C ° 
Q 
°° 
=r 
Qm rn_ cm CD o- 
öa < aý `ý 
3 co 
" 3 
v 
O -ý D) 0 0 cn ý ýý - (D 0 (D m 
o- 
rzC mö 
D 
m 
37 
03 n m0 D. m a 3C--M Z m 3m :3 73 fD 
-C° 
- 
mm 
ý" 
C p 
m --' 
3 (p 
2 lu (D 
Z 
m -' 
(n 
(D CD 0 (n 
0 CD OdQa 
° ý CL ` ý' 
OZ0a; 
äm 
_O 
CD C'< ( 
V) 
O ö < i n- = o v 
ä 
-C3 - ö3 :E 
u) O 
(D 
Ui o 
O . 0 
a 
N Üj CD 
zr 
. cn a 
OO 
ä-0 
«p 
Z 
c 
cýD 
cD >0 
D 
o 0. cÄ 
3N NO cD 
O 
CO 
(D (D 
cn 
C 
- CAD m. mo 
- 
°3 Ö G1 0 
y 
O_ -' O xO 
fD N Vl. :.. (D 
Q 
D 
ö ° 
ýö ýý 
° CD °ý 
n any v 0 ý mm 3mö ° äm 
c n 
a) r_ ý 
c 9ý3 c . 
0 CD amaýco " m 
- `< ý ° - 
ß-1 00 Co - 
°' CDD a 0 ýý o. cy -- 
c 
_ 
na 
° (P = (M ö° 
a_ 
o 
OO .« 0. m 
v 
ý. r 
Cý ,O Z Zr Oc 
3 
(D N 
_ O 
< 
O 
ÖO 
Z 
(0 < 
(D (D M 
(n Ch (Da (n 10 
. Z- 
0 0 N m C 
(D oa 
a 
G1 ý. CÖO 
CD mZM v 
O 
Z 
( 
O 
' 87 O 
ö z m 
O 
°cýD z 
zr 
o o 3 -5 
- 
(P 
Z 
3 m 
ID 
'0 o 
2r «D ao m 
CD ý"rn n 3 N (CD p. 
DZ j), 0 zr 
oc3m 
(D CD C') 
zr 
=°0: E 
M>o 
(0 ° (n co 
3(n 
(D O 
N 
07 m 
2. O 
y0 ZT 
pý O 
CON 
NÖ 
= 
"-' 
- 
O V0 «D 
N M ý 
(0- a (D 
O CD 
C) (n CO 
CD _ 
f D 
ÖON (D Ö m-, 
- (D 
.O (D 
() 
!Z 
:3 
° 
a En* 
1 O0 CL 
° 0-- öD ý° 
D 
= ?ý (Dö< 
CD 
0 =ä 
ßc 
m 
. N Q (D 
<ý M Co C 
c> 
O 
5. 
- 
'd 
c 
> 
O 
0d 
Ný ä _ 
CD (D 
o«o m ZrM cö ZI ö CD 
ö ý. r 
(D Z * (D 0= 
Cl- (D ; `r 
Co 
0 
-- 
CL qO (D 
(n 
Ui m? 
ID ö 
0C a :3 
N 
CL 
C p_ 
O 
(ý 
O0a (p 
3OU 
Er 7N 
; Im 
Q 
rr ° 
CD a= 
°ö 
Q 
0 
< (D c _ 3@ m- E£ DarZZ c m 
Ö 
-v°i ° ömö 
- 
c ö° 
!0D. (D m 
» 
°ýö-(n 
=' <° ä 
D 
z 
(p rn 9.0 
aua 
v ýcý ö o (D 
Z , -` °c (D Z "º n 
_ 3výýc ý (D-0 
ý. ý 3 0öo mM 
v° r. D 
° 
zr 3 (Dcc ° 
43 0 
B 
gi 
... c 
a 
m°° in < öTý cu m = x4ý CD cD 
--h 
-, - O r+ ° . CD ý° a o ný ö3 ý c 3'< 
a CL O3a 
QN 
-ONO 
. y. (p 
MOONm 
O 
ö7 - a 
(D °°a 
0 (D a l 
=r 
(p O ON fD 0. 
cD 
0 O 
to 
cQ ? 
fý 
0 
ö° 
t1 
c 
w 
- 
- 
0 
1 
O 
Ci 
CD 
N 
N 
a CD N 
C) 
. 5_ 
ß 
O 
7 
Ö 
fD 
H 
0 
O 
7 
N 
CD 
D 
N 
N 
C 
pl 
3 
n m 
W 
OD 
m w 
Functional & Defined & Measured & Adaptive & " 
Repeatable Focussed Integrated Optimising 
rn z- U 
CD 
5a -0 -D 
g» (D S 50 3 ýQ o U; 3 ai -1 j «D 
EL CL :3 
e. 
CL (CD 
00 a 
GM) ß5 . 
O+ CD fD 
NO C zi aO 
zr < 
ý" O CD O "" -p 
3 
Imo 
(D O 
(D h 
:O 
ýmý 
_ CD 
m -ýOV 
CD 'ý 
y 
y 
n fD 
y Oy 
CD «0 - 
CD NN 
`D D j Om rn rn ,ý m 
Z- 
cumzr 
a2 
m 
CD - CD üm9 
(030. 
2 -o m 
n 3 
a Z- 
(O . = Ui 
:3 
<° Z 
(D C 
CO 
CD 0 
= 
y 
vöc 
fD Ný (D 
<_ 
I G m 
n 
3-0 f /l 
C) M d O. 0. Z3 
N 
aßNC (n 73 C_% O 
m N .+N p) 7 
fD Oyy 
X .ry ID '0 
iD (1) fA 
< CD 
vi o o 
m ýcö ao 2 a c * O 
O 
O O (I 23ý 
p 
D ý 
O 
- H 
Ö 
(% N (D N OÖ (D 
(D C 
0.2. @ 00 
:3 CL 
m ä° 
3N c° (D «D -C3 (D ca 
O 
3- 
O (D '0 X 
0 ID y : i) m p> > 
O 
IQ 
Ö «D oO o Q. O- ö ?m 
O ! /f ßO m'r=E < 
0% 
-O O Q-, O 
ýy 13 OO CD (C2 Oy CD Oo 
is ti , y> CD a) (n 
(A 
O n! 
C1 7 m: y M-CM 
(n a 
f/1 O fD O 
< 
O 
N ID 
d OO fp 
ON _ y" pý d 
(D 
O3 
O CD im N Im == Er 
d .M© (D M. _ 
O (D 
O _ fD OOn p> Cý 
O y 
^' O d 3O (a 
ý= 0 
äi ä ä0 ý m m o° o°ýo C m N 
Norº Z 
ör8, 
CD 
ý' cQý @ 
rnäýý ý 
O ý0 
" 
-S ý O yý0CD y oý V-0 r- 
Z 
2) 
3O 
Ui Z Zý 3 
(D 
CD QQ 0y 
: 
aý . .. Ng " CD cn N 
cö 
0 
cn n= an ý öö 
cý Com 
21r 3r 
^º 
r, ýc ý 30 ä :3 CD0 O e(D 
N. O. N N 
(D 
7 G7 ^' (D N ýG p Q) f 
LV y 
d 
jQ 
Cl 
Q (DD O 
O 
( 
CD CD y 
--9 0- 
Oß 
O 
Cr 
-O CD 
o Z 
1 
Er 0 O (0 . Q -(D O fD 0 3 
O 
VOi 
(D ý_ 
3 d 
lD NmQ 
8ÖN9O 
oO 07, 
(D 
3 
'a d 
O= 
(p y = C 
Vi `G O 
p y O 
7 
=yO 
0) 
_O 
o 
N 
ZF 
ý . (D :3 CL :3 (D _ (U CL 
O 
N 
d -a 
rn_ 
A) 
MO 
m0 
(D <MOO 
aO (0 7r 
l< 0ý 
y0 (D 
+ 
(D 
0 0) Oy 
0 
- Zr 
M< n(D 7 
C f 
M 
m Q, H ö. aaaQ. ý- Z) Z) 
Q ?0 -Z (D cc 
yö c° rn 
CD 
0 e 
0 CD 4 
Z CD 
-» 
zý (D 0 
ll CD 
Q 
iy 
N 0 tu ", Im 0* 
m ii 0 
y 0. aC 
3 (n 
a0 
r 
3 
O O 
CL 
N? (DD my m 
33 CO ä, m (0 :3 a4 7 N 
Eo ýa (Dý; mC3 va0 
. 
(D Co -1 
0 CL 
' NN ON 
(D 
N3 
!%y 
< 
O O ý 
n 'ý Vf pý O 
7C D (0 yO 0 
CL CD =r =. 3 25. (A Er 3 
tr =r =r 0 
CD - ý; a 
c 
ö 
C, m N 
N 
a 
N 
C1 
M 
0 
0 
!Q 
N 
0 
r cD w 
W 
cD 
N w 4> 
Functional & Defined & Measured & Adaptive & 
Repeatable Focussed Integrated Optimising 
:r 
C 
! 
N/ý 
. 
O". m c- 2Q O (D CD 
7m :3OO 
--0 m O , 
ßl A fD CD fD OO5 
M 
ZäOO 
ä CD 
% cö 
D(D 3 _O 
CD m ý ýý (' m ö° ö. < 0CD .. 0 (D n oä 0 c 
«D Z 
=) (n 
vom, 0+ ; -1 z5 
(D (n Ui* D (D 
Sy 0D 
Q- OZ 
(D 
C) =r GO) 
CD ß (D a M. mn m1 
XC 
0 
0* ,+C 
OO 
(n 
CN 
M CD n 
_ COOO 
' ä 
v 
-3? 
73 
ýd 
ýy 
Ol äý O 0 -' C(NO 
ý3 am r, 
0 CD (n 3 
Z ä 
(ß V <* w ? yý n c°, °- 
O -0 
svý3 - ( 
-D Co 0) 
(D 
Z) vo _ < ýN 
' 
om m 
(A 
ä= v , 
y 
11' N ca° 
ä0 
C mD 
y y 
am 
m 
-1 
O_Z. O 
(n Q° 
:C 
(D 0) 
O 
00 
zr (/f z 
O 
O ( 
mOC0 Nº 
to 
y zr 
G (D 
` 
an 
C2 
o< 
`. (D CD 
3 u) to ý Z 0 
o yC 
(D Q 
Q) 
0 (Q 
-1 -i 
y33O-ý 3 °° K 3 Ö. 
gÄ CD «D 
ßB 
5' m (yD -1 Ö n 
-1a _a oO°ýýC°c 
-'=ö 
-p (D o 0.0) äw 0. 
ý m ý° 2. ý ö 
o ý' oä a Pr ZN= 
o öy 
--0 . -.. A ; 0a :3>o 
, 
0< "m Q 
2" g 
O Op OO< (D :3 ß _ a 
V! 
3Z 
to 
(D N 
i - -ma -. 
2 
"G O 
m 
11 
m0 
l* 
°*rZ ± ý aoö° 
y 
ýyý 
, "-º 
cn _O 
O 
Z(4 
Z. e 
c rn= 
-N °º 
o onýv, 
Co3(DE 
a; Ný 
(D O D 
Q 
(0 (D 
:r :r ' 03 fD Q (4 cu Q" U) 
0 
CO 
(D 5 
(Q NO Ti 
2Dm 
(D ýD M O 
CD =; fD O N e 
O< (D 
VJ O 
n 0 
uJ O 
n 
cp ((D (D 
p, < 
G) (0 
n. 
mm 
(D 
Ö 
3N 
fOR 
N 75ON N (p 
Oy 
' 
Oy 025,0 C(D 0-8 ' y N °3 a 
- 
im (D 
d 
(D 
n ý0°ý 
(DCDzND Z, NZ-1CD 
(D m 
0 :3 
0 =r 
O 
Z 
(D fD 0)"D d n C) °O (D O (Q 
gyp' 
. 
pý cn 
0 :3 CD 
'ID rß. v> > 
O 
0 (D 
mam 
N 
o 
C. =m CU O. (p ° 
n «j m c) 
03 05 . -c (D r 
CD -. °D 
OON 
Gm O Öý O 
O O° Q O. 
n 
C>0 < (D =Ö n° (n n 
QN (D 3- - 00 °-°C°- 
M v 0 ( su cý 
C Co 
cc 
--1 (D Qy 
. -' o CD Z ( ' n 
ö ý 
O NO > 
D ( 
Q ý 
ý ý = 
fÄ ( D 
0ý °° 
ü 
ci O °(0 .( . N 
w 
ä 
o _ 
( 
[ 
Zvi 
N 
m än 
z 
(Dä . 
CD O° 
0 ( O 
z 
7 O" 
<ee'ý i mä3 
ä ýC ( 
© n 0 ý -1 
ym r- ° ° 
_ g» m O -" 
Z 
D°O O 
CD Ö 
=t R - (n m 
Q 
-" ono 
f 0 (P°= O 
CD 
U) ° 0. 0 =. O Cä° (n 
m 
y O O 
d 
:30 ý. 
O O OO 
cD 
m 
w 
0 
0 CD 
N 
N 
v 
N 
f, 
12 . 
0 
C 
N 
C7 
90 
0 
0 
3 
6.3.3 Appropriate process assessment indicators 
To assess the extent to which each process is implemented the original 
PCMM used a set of four qualities called `institutionalization practices'. They 
are show in Figure 6-14below. 
Figure 6-14 PCMM Institutionalization practices 
Based on (Curtis et al. 2001: 55) 
These process qualities are necessarily vague in order to account for the 
variations that occur in different processes across a whole organisation, as 
mentioned in 6.1.1. Generally, an emergency management system is smaller 
and has less variation so the assessment qualities can afford to be more 
specific. The process qualities for the new GEMA have been defined from the 
information gathered in data analysis, and will now be described. 
Figure 6-15 Emergency management process qualities 
Each process will be assessed using the four qualities shown in the table, 
across the five levels and three stages of the Trident sequence. 
The literature highlighted the ideological divide between the traditional 
`command and control' approach to emergency management and the more 
contemporary attitudes of `continuity and cooperation' championed by Dynes 
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(1990) and the Incident Command System, described by Alexander (2002b). 
Both schools of thought require that there is some form of leadership of the 
response, from operational leadership and decision making through to 
strategic and organisational leadership. This hypothesis has been supported 
by evidence from the data analysis. Leadership was considered to be more 
than a process, rather a wider quality which is essential to the stability and 
success of every process. For this reason, leadership and commitment are 
combined as an indicator against which each process can be assessed. 
Leadership was strongly supported as a process qualifier by the validation 
panel. 
Successful emergency management also depends strongly on the 
commitment of the senior levels of the organisation. They should demonstrate 
commitment to staffing, training, advancement, providing resources, funding 
and research for emergency management. If the CMM process is to be 
valuable, the organisation must also be committed to assessment, analysis 
and continual improvement. This point was strongly supported by the expert 
validation panel 
The physical ability to carry out a process is imperative in emergency 
management, as some processes depend on specific tools, equipment and 
facilities. Lives and assets can depend on equipment being serviceable and in 
the correct location when required, and so the organisation should be 
assessed not only on the fact that they have recognised the need for a 
process and planned for it, but also that they have the correct equipment 
ready to implement the tasks. 
Equipment failure or deficiency did not cause any major problems in the 
exercises analysed, however the lack of tools and mechanisms to assess and 
evaluate exercises was a weakness of nearly all the organisations studied. It 
was thought appropriate therefore to define a more specific measure of an 
organisations 'ability to perform a process'. 
The data analysis of emergency plans identified communication and 
coordination as a very important part of emergency management. It was 
recognised in fifteen out of the seventeen cases studied. Across the different 
cases however, the process had many different facets. Some plans referred to 
communication as the hardware such as radios, telephones and written 
messages. Other exercises demonstrated a communications officer, who 
dealt with all incoming and outgoing messages, and some sites showed 
evidence of an integrated communications strategy, where a particular piece 
of information could be tracked from when it is recorded by the ECC, through 
the different forms of record keeping and transmission, up to the point where 
the task has been actioned and concluded. The validation panel stated that 
communication was a vital part of each process, so should be included as a 
process qualifier. 
In order to encourage organisations to take a holistic approach to this crucial 
aspect of emergency management, communications and coordination has 
been designated as one of the qualities by which all the processes are 
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assessed. The coordinated sharing and recording of information is central to 
all processes, and as such, they should be assessed on that quality. This 
process qualifier also incorporates the aims of improving efficiency and agility 
of interdependent work, which is dependent on good communications and 
coordination. Curtis et al. (2001: 37) paraphrase the aspiration of this process 
qualifier as a "seamless process-based interaction among individuals... ". 
The final process assessment indicator acknowledges the importance of 
addressing change. Several of the organisations in the study had undergone a 
recent major change, and there were some differences in how the emergency 
management system had responded to that change. Change can also happen 
during a response, if the weather conditions change, EMT members fail to 
respond to the call-out or there is a utilities loss. Changes in shift pattern, site 
lay-out, corporate structure, plant operations or the external environment can 
also have linked effects on the emergency plan and response capability, so 
managing change is an important concept to apply to all processes. 
Verification is an important aspect of all processes, as it can prove that the 
organisation has sought to confirm that it is adequately address its risks. 
Verification of a process can be found by examining the aspects of the 
process in two or more of the Trident stages, or from an external verification 
source such as compliance with a regulation, inspection by a third party or 
verification by an external body. 
6.3.4 Changes to the assessment protocol 
The original assessment method used by the PCMM assessors demanded a 
large commitment of resources. Such resources are not available in EM 
assessment, and so a different technique would be required. The data 
analysis showed that significant information about an emergency 
management system can be gleaned by examining their emergency plan, 
visiting the site and observing an exercise and the aftermath. The data also 
indicated however, that these methods gave good coverage of the lower 
maturity aspects, but poorer indication of any level four or five standard 
performance. To address this shortcoming, it was suggested that a final 
interview should be carried out, to consolidate and expand on information 
from the practical observation and plan review. The interview can then 
specifically address any processes which are missing from the data, and any 
higher level processes which may be difficult to identify by indirect means. 
The whole assessment protocol is therefore an extension of the data 
collection method outlined earlier in Figure 4.4, and shown below. 
Figure 6-16 Assessment protocol for emergency management framework 
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Techniques and guidelines for assessment will be discussed later in this 
chapter and tested in Chapter 7, Application of the model. 
6.4 The Assessment Protocol 
This chapter has described how an Emergency Management assessment and 
improvement framework has been constructed from data analysis and use of 
established techniques from other fields. The final section will describe how 
the framework should be used to carry out an actual assessment of an 
organisation's emergency management capability and maturity. 
There are some background considerations however, which should be 
understood by the assessor and the organisation before making an 
assessment. The primary goal of a CMM type assessment is to facilitate 
continuous improvement in an organisation. CMM is not simply a point-scoring 
and grading tool to give a measure of the site's achievement. An effective 
CMM assessment requires that the organisation involved is committed to 
learning, development and improvement. In a similar fashion, the maturity 
levels do not have an adequacy point, where the level of maturity is 
considered 'good enough' and the organisation can stagnate and be content. 
As the framework is strongly related to the individual risks on the site, the 
organisation should be aware that the only level which indicates that they are 
dealing with that risk in the most efficient, effective and sustainable manner, is 
level 4. 
The CMM processes and improvement guidance given by the model, 
however, is not prescriptive. Processes and process-qualifying statements 
detail why the organisation should carry out a particular activity or process to 
be considered as that level of maturity, but not how they should do it. The 
main reason for this focus on principles rather than practice is the variation 
between organisations and how they function and operate. It is far better to 
give the reason for carrying out a certain process, and allow the organisation 
to deal with the resources and decide the method of carrying it out, than 
prescribe precise sequences of events that should take place. The former 
results in a generic and appropriate framework, whereas the latter would 
create an organisation or even site-specific assessment tool, which would 
have to be adapted and changed for every different application. 
In a similar manner, the GEMA does not use quantitative scoring to measure 
the processes. Especially in the higher maturity levels, definitions become 
less tangible and leave more scope for the opinions and judgement of the 
assessors. The four process qualifier statements demonstrate this. They 
describe what the qualities of the process should be, but avoid prescribing 
exactly how that process should be carried out. 
Assessing the difference between a level 3 and level 4 organisations is very 
difficult, as the differences are often in the strategic thinking and reasoning 
behind the processes rather than in physically discernable differences in the 
way it is carried out. Level 4 process maturity contains some aspects of 
judgement on behalf of the assessors, but each process has guidelines in 
place to aid a fair and consistent evaluation of maturity. 
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6.4.1 Practical assessment guidance 
Some skill and experience is required actually to observe an emergency 
exercise, review a document set and conduct interviews to obtain evidence of 
an organisation's maturity. Some practical guidance notes for exercise 
observation and plan review and interviewing have also been prepared and 
are contained in the Appendices (10-4). 
The literature suggested a strive to improve the professional accountability of 
the emergency management field in the UK. In addition to this, the specialist 
nature of the subject suggests however that the assessment must be carried 
out by someone with a professional qualification or high level of experience in 
emergency management. The guidance notes are intended to supplement 
professional knowledge rather than instruct a novice to conduct an 
assessment. Guidance through the literature is available on techniques for 
observation of systems and people at work, the professional and accountable 
conduct of interviews and notes from the CMM literature are available to give 
guidance towards assessing maturity and capability related processes in 
organisations. The following section will describe how each stage of the EM 
system can be assessed using the GEMA. 
6.4.2 Conducting an assessment - the Trident Sequence 
The simplification of the emergency management system into a three stage 
'Trident sequence' was undertaken in this research for several reasons. 
Primarily it gives organisations a simplified overview of a very complex area of 
their work. It is easier to ask that they visualise the actions taken before, 
during and after an incident rather than attempting to tackle the whole EM 
system at once. 
It also divides each process into three parts, which focuses more succinctly on 
what that process means at each stage of the sequence. Finally, the Trident 
Sequence provides three different methods of assessing the organisation's 
maturity and capability. Preparation capability is assessed through examining 
documents, plans and the site itself. Response capability is assessed by 
observing the emergency management team carrying out an emergency 
simulation or exercise, and learning capability is judged by observing the 
exercise, feedback sessions and conducting additional interviews if 
necessary. Assessment for each stage of the Trident sequence will now be 
described. 
6.4.2.1 Assessing Preparedness 
Emergency preparedness is assessed by examining the emergency plans and 
associated documents. The plans are examined for proof that the organisation 
carries out the eight key processes (Fig. 6-5), and evidence of performance to 
indicate their maturity level. To assess the preparedness aspects of T&D, 
HRM and RM processes, it is necessary to tour the emergency management 
facilities, and seek information from members of the staff that are regularly 
involved in emergency management. In order to confirm that Risk Assessment 
has been considered and planned for, it may also be necessary to interview 
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different stakeholders, providing that representatives are available and willing 
to participate. 
The original CMM assessment found it useful to prepare an organisation for 
their forthcoming assessment. This involved meeting the members of staff 
who played key roles in the areas of interest, in this case the Emergency 
Planners and Emergency Managers, and discussing the assessment with 
them in some detail. The site would then be presented with the list of process 
requirements, and the documents which may contain evidence. They would 
be invited to examine their own document set and highlight any evidence of 
the processes. This information would be used as a guide by the assessors, 
who would also examine the document set. This task was also useful because 
it ensured, at least for the duration of the assessment, that the organisation's 
representatives were familiar with their own documents and procedures. This 
is a useful technique if the organisation is fully committed to the assessment 
process. 
6.4.2.2 Assessing Response 
The response stage of the Trident sequence is assessed by the observation 
and analysis of an emergency simulation. The response is assessed to 
establish to what extent the organisation is carrying out the eight key 
processes. It is of great importance that observation of emergency exercises 
is carried out in a professional manner, using recognised protocols and 
techniques. The outcome of the observation will be affected if the observer 
does not adhere to certain guidelines and carry out vital preparation and 
research before the exercise takes place. Details of these techniques are 
discussed briefly in 4-9, the Methodology. 
It is recommended (Wickens & Hollands, 2000) that observers should undergo 
some basic training in the psychological methodology of this type of research 
before carrying out observations in real scenarios. Whilst applauding 
recommendations for a professional, accountable and thorough assessment, 
it is the opinion of this researcher that as long as the observer is professional, 
meticulous and has carried out all the research and preparatory measures 
recommended, the observation will provide valid data and have no adverse 
effect on the participants. 
A response assessment issue worthy of further explanation concerns 
exposure to the site and research into the organisation and their response. In 
order fully to appreciate and understand any emergency scenario or exercise, 
it is essential that the observer have prior exposure to the site and its 
emergency management system. Although there has been some recent 
homogeneity in the emergency procedures of UK MAH sites to comply with 
COMAH 1999, there are still vast differences between the sites. Such 
disparities include terminology, process chemicals and procedures, EMT 
structure and functioning, exercise style and design, ECC layout and use and 
interrelation with other agencies. Only with prior knowledge of, and exposure 
to the site will these unique facets of the exercise be fully appreciated by the 
assessor. 
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It has been a criticism by previous researchers in this field (Carthey 1998; 
Lyons 2002), that observation of emergency exercises is potentially a very 
useful tool, if the researcher could have control over the content, scenario and 
management of the exercise. The scenario could then be designed and 
conducted using consistent research methods, as opposed to the unique 
methods of scenario design used by different organisations. It could also be 
engineered to test elements of uncertainty discovered in the preparedness 
assessment, and custom-built to embrace aspects of each key process to 
provide an inclusive overview of the emergency management system. 
Resource limitations, mentioned in 6.1.1 and the complexities of scenario 
design are two strong reasons why there was limited involvement of a 
researcher, or assessor, in scenario design and management. A full 
discussion of this issue is presented in Chapter 8, Discussion. However, it is 
important to state at this point that if there is a level of flexibility in the 
scenario, the assessors should make their best effort to contribute in such a 
way as to test the responders and provide them with opportunities to clarify or 
confirm any uncertainties or issues that arose in the Preparedness 
assessment. 
Any contribution to scenario design by assessors should always be in full 
consultation with the exercise manager. It should make best use of their 
knowledge and experience. Scenario design is a specialist subject and there 
is limited guidance from the literature. This point that will be further discussed 
in Chapter 8, Discussion. 
6.4.2.3 Assessing Learning 
The capability of an organisation to learn from problems and mistakes in the 
emergency management system can be assessed using the eight key 
processes. Learning is assessed by observing an emergency exercise and 
the feedback sessions that follow it. Assessors might also find it necessary to 
supplement this data by interviewing members of the emergency 
management team. Important aspects of the interview technique and method 
are described briefly in the Appendices, 10-4. 
CMM focuses particularly on learning and improvement as part of every 
maturity level and every process. It is therefore important to consider learning 
as an integral part of the system, rather than being only contained within the 
OL process. Learning was made the third stage of the Trident sequence 
because the literature and data showed that there was a distinct lack of 
techniques and methods of learning within the UK emergency management 
sector. It conveys the message that learning is equally as important as 
preparation and response when managing emergencies and risk. This also 
realistically reflects the emphasis placed on learning and continuous 
improvement by modern management theory, including CMM. It is important 
to establish learning as an element of each process. Measures can then be 
included in the planning and response which will ensure that focussed and 
consistent data recording measures are in place to facilitate subsequent 
feedback and learning. 
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6.5 Presenting the GEMA 
This chapter has shown how a framework has been designed to assess the 
capability and maturity of emergency management systems. The final section 
will summarise how the parts of the assessment and improvement framework 
fit together, and how the assessment should be carried out in an organisation. 
6.5.1 Relating the processes to the EM System 
Up to this point, the emergency management system has been summarised 
as eight key processes, performed differently at three consecutive stages of 
Preparedness, Response and Learning sequence. This section shows how 
the processes relate to each other. As mentioned earlier, the processes 
become more closely interlinked as the organisation becomes more mature, 
and so an understanding of the process relationships is vital for the 
appreciation of higher level maturity assessment. 
It is important to note at this stage that the emergency management 
processes are divided into two groups. There are those which are part of an 
organisation's central functions, and there are those which enable the 
organisation to begin to control risk. The central and control processes and 
their interaction are illustrated in Figure 6-17 below. 
Figure 6-17 Central and Control process diagram 
0000 (Central) 
Hazards 
0 
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Human resources management 
Training and development 
Research and innovation 
Response management 
Organisational learning 
Risk Identification and analysis 
Response assurance 
Definition of requirements 
KP 1-4 are the central processes, and 5-8 are risk control processes. 
The diagram (Figure 6-18) begins with identification and assessment, which 
establishes what the organisation might have to deal with, and assesses how 
dangerous it could be. This is followed by an evaluation of how the 
organisation could cope with an incident, in its current state of preparedness. 
This evaluation is followed by improvement, which considers what 
improvement or learning is necessary if the evaluation exposes deficiencies. 
Improvement and learning is never completed, as once it has taken place, the 
organisation must reassess and identify any further hazards or risks resulting 
from the changes to the system, and evaluate their capability once again. 
Even if an evaluation shows a capable system, target setting is still an 
important discipline as it outlines a schedule for future improvement and 
divides the work into manageable portions. Following the evaluation and 
target setting, there must be a stage of assurance. This involves informing, or 
demonstrating to stakeholders that the organisation has the capability to deal 
with the hazards and risks identified at the start of the procedure. 
Figure 6-18 illustrates how the processes function together to control risk 
within an organisation. Addressing the processes as a cycle reinforces the 
importance of each process in securing the success of the system. It also 
enables individuals with little understanding of risk or emergency systems to 
appreciate how the processes fit together, and how some processes are 
dependant on preceding ones for information, and also depended on by 
proceeding ones to provide information. 
The GEMA framework separates out the four central processes of HRM, T&D, 
R&I and RM from the four control processes of OL, RI&A, RA and DR. The 
key advantage of linking the processes in this way is that it reinforces the 
continuous increase in risk control through cyclic learning and improvement, 
and the concept that processes have a provider-client type relationship with 
respect to information provision. 
As described previously, the Trident sequence reflects the three prongs of 
attack that make up an emergency management system. The cycle of 
preparation, response and learning helps focus the process efforts, and 
provides a clear target for the assessment framework. The assessment 
should gather evidence on how each process is performed at each of these 
stages in the system. 
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Earlier paragraphs in this chapter also emphasised the need to create an 
assessment technique which was easily understood by engineers, managers, 
inspectors and the plethora of stakeholders in UK MAHI. A single side 
diagram that can explain the processes on which the EM system will be 
assessed and how the assessment will take place is a major asset in 
simplifying a potentially complex model. The following page shows a diagram 
of the full model and how the parts interact in an assessment. Following the 
diagram is an explanation of the full model. 
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The left-hand side of Figure 6-18 shows the eight key processes, on which an 
organisation's capability and maturity are assessed. For each process, the 
assessor must use the qualifying factors to determine how well that process is 
being carried out, so for each of the 8 processes the assessor will consider 
the leadership and commitment demonstrated, how well the process is 
resourced and the organisation's ability to carry it out, how well that process is 
integrated with other processes and other agencies efforts, and whether 
evidence of the process achievements is available. They will also use the 
guidance from the process descriptions (Figure 6-6 to Figure 6-13) to 
establish if a process is being considered and carried out by the client 
organisation. 
This assessment is carried out at each of the three stages of the Trident 
sequence - preparedness, response and learning. At the preparedness stage, 
evidence of the processes is sought in the organisation's documents and 
emergency plans, and the assessor seeks physical evidence around the site 
and facilities. At the response stage the assessor observes an emergency 
exercise on the site, and uses the evidence to assess whether the processes 
are carried out when the organisation is placed under the duress of an 
incident. Finally, the assessor observes the feedback sequence from an 
exercise and interviews any key personnel, to establish how each of the 
processes is developed and carried forward by the new knowledge and 
experience. 
The diagram on the right-hand side of Figure 6-18 summarises how the 
processes fit together, representing the full emergency management system. 
On the following page there are three diagrams, which show how the focus of 
the processes changes over the three stages of the Trident sequence. 
Preparedness, response and learning represent the past, present and future 
aspects of the EM system. The data showed that while most organisations 
studied had adequate response systems, the relation to their existing risk 
portfolio and aspirations to improve efficiency and safety in the future, was 
found to be lacking. Thus, the three stage Trident sequence was formed to 
show the interdependency and reliance of each stage on the others, and the 
reliance of the system of all three stages functioning correctly. 
The diagram Figure 6.19 shows each level of the Trident sequence, and how 
the risk control processes are represented at that level. This is a very valuable 
diagram as it shows the importance of a risk-control approach at every level of 
emergency management. The use of a risk control framework in this way is 
considered to be a novel application of risk theory. This concept is a useful 
tool as it shows the value of using the same process at each stage of the 
Trident sequence, bringing standardisation and also increases the 
significance of the learning stage of the sequence. 
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6.6 Results conclusions 
This chapter has shown how, from data and from existing elements of the 
PCMM framework, a new model of Generic Emergency Management 
Assessment has been created. The following chapter will test this model in an 
organisation, and describe how the model was presented to a group of sector 
experts for their comments and validation of the concepts used. Some of the 
expert feedback has been incorporated into the model in this chapter, to avoid 
repetition of whole sections and diagrams later in the thesis. The model 
shown in Figures 18 and 19 contains all the valuable feedback and refinement 
from the application test, and from the validation panel, and can be 
considered as the final draft versions of the GEMA framework. The GEMA 
framework functioned as expected and as designed in the test and this 
successful outcome will be discussed further in Chapters 8 and 9. 
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7 Application of the model 
Chapter 6 presented the Generic Emergency Management Assessment 
framework and described how it could be used to assess capability and 
maturity in emergency management systems. To appreciate the functioning of 
the model in a live organisational environment and highlight any problems or 
errors it is necessary to test the whole assessment framework in a full-scale 
evaluation. This chapter will show how the GEMA framework was used to test 
the emergency management capability of a Local Authority, as mentioned in 
the Methodology, 4.9. The chapter will then go on to describe how the outline 
of the assessment framework presented to a group of industrial and academic 
experts for their feedback and advice. 
7.1 Testing the assessment framework in Local Authority `A' 
As none of the original organisations that participated in this research was 
available to carry out a full application of the framework, it was tested in a 
separate organisation. There were however two benefits to this strategy. 
Firstly, the test would show how practical it is to apply the model in an 
organisational setting, and give some idea of the time taken. Secondly, 
because the example organisation is a Local Authority rather than a private 
company, the test will inform the study on the efficacy of using the model to 
assess a wider range of emergency management systems, and examine the 
validity of the framework's generic nature. 
This section will describe how evidence was gathered for each of the key 
processes, to indicate LAA's capability and maturity at each of the Trident 
assessment stages. After dealing with all three stages of the eight processes, 
the overall maturity of the organisation will be argued from the evidence and 
data gathered. Following this, a short summary of the assessor's experience 
of using the model will be presented, along with any comments from the 
organisation being assessed. Full discussion of the test will be presented in 
Chapter 8, Discussion. 
7.1.1 Background to the assessment of Local Authority `A' 
The assessment of Local Authority 'A' (LAA) was opportune for several 
reasons. LAA had recently introduced a new County Emergency Plan (CEP) 
which detailed the response of the authority to all applicable hazards. The 
Authority's staff had been briefed on the use and structure of the plan; 
however neither the staff nor the plan had been tested in a full exercise. The 
second benefit of the timing of this assessment was that a major multi-agency 
exercise was about to be held, and permission was granted for the researcher 
to attend and observe. 
The plan was available to the researcher for review, and the details of that will 
be presented later in the section. The exercise was held over two days, and 
the researcher attended both occasions to observe and take notes. Pre- 
exercise briefing sessions, and a wash-up session following the exercise were 
also attended, in order to supplement the data for this study. 
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Due to the request for confidentiality by the organisations concerned, a 
transcript of the exercise can not be presented, as it would require an 
impractical level of sanitisation. In order to appreciate the detail of the 
assessment, it is only necessary to know that LAA jurisdiction covers both 
urban and rural areas, large and small conurbations and a number of water- 
courses and major roads. The incident scenario is a road collision involving a 
vehicle carrying hazardous chemicals, and the resulting leakage from the 
vehicle requires the evacuation and emergency accommodation of some of 
the population. Some decontamination was also required. LAA responded 
alongside the emergency services, and with the organisations responsible for 
the vehicles and various volunteer groups. 
7.1.2 Assessing the processes and the Trident sequence 
The capability of LAA in the preparedness stage was assessed by reviewing 
the County Emergency Plan (CEP), the response stage was assessed by 
observing the major exercise and the learning assessment was informed by 
post-exercise feedback and a follow-up interview. 
This subsection will explain how evidence from these sources indicates that 
processes from the EM-CMM framework were taking place, and to what level 
those processes are being carried out. A brief description of each of the 
methods of assessment will be followed by a process-by-process account of 
how plan meets the EM-CMM requirements, and to what standard. When all 
eight processes have been discussed, a summary will be presented and an 
indication of the maturity level of the organisation, and for each stage of the 
Trident sequence will be shown. 
7.1.2.1 Brief description of the CEP 
The LAA plan was finished in late 2002, and so it addresses the COMAH 
regulations and other contemporary concerns. It was based on a novel plan 
model from another Local Authority, and so is markedly different in style to the 
majority of the 'traditional' plans studied in the Data Analysis chapter. The 
plan is called the Emergency Procedures Manual and is made up of role- 
focussed sections. It contains flow-diagrams, checklists and templates of 
documents, to support the initiation of the plan, and then assist each role- 
holder in their tasks. It is physically indexed using coloured sections and 
dividers, and is intended to be used during an incident as a reference guide. 
Comparing this plan to the majority of other plans studied for this thesis, one 
would initially comment that it is by far the most superior in terms of ease-of- 
use and potential value during an incident. It is also the most comprehensive 
emergency management resource seen by this study. The plan demonstrates 
that the organisation has considered many additional issues which are outside 
the scope of the regulations, but are considered to be desirable practice in the 
field. From an initial examination of the plan, it appears to facilitate the type of 
assessment required by GEMA. 
The following section will describe the emergency exercise carried out by 
LAA, and observed for this study. 
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7.1.2.2 Brief description of the emergency exercise 
The exercise was a large-scale live exercise, testing county-level response 
and incorporating some trans-boundary impacts and interaction. The exercise 
duration was two days with one day feedback and learning, and was observed 
from the LA control room. The exercise included use of several 
communications methods, and there were approximately 30 LA staff involved 
on the first day, slightly less on the second day as the incident was scaled 
down, and all the staff from most agencies present on the third day for 
feedback and follow-up actions. The facilities provided for the exercise were of 
an adequate and sustainable standard, and there had been a considerable 
amount of planning for the event. 
As mentioned previously, several different agencies were involved in the 
exercise, and this was reflected in the complexity of the scenario. The cost of 
the exercise was large, but was shared between the major organisations 
participating. The level of realism and the scale of the information barrage in 
the exercise were high, and each organisation had its own pre-defined 
objectives, alongside the combined response objectives. Although effective 
testing of roles, communications and of the plan structure can be carried out 
on a smaller scale, this scale of exercise can be an excellent, although 
expensive means of testing all elements of the combined response to a major 
incident. 
7.1.2.3 Brief description of the 'learning' assessment 
In this case, the learning mechanisms were put in place as the scenario was 
being constructed. The objectives and means of recording performance for 
each of the participating agencies were discussed and incorporated into the 
exercise. Records and logs were kept during the exercise, and a considerable 
amount of time on the third day was devoted to debriefing and feedback. 
The debriefing took several forms, ranging from small group discussions to a 
full plenary of all the participating agencies. 
As the researcher did not participate in the debriefing, and only observed the 
proceedings, there remained some questions unanswered from the plan and 
exercise. It was for these reasons that a further separate meeting was held 
between the researcher, the exercise coordinator and the Chief Emergency 
Planner for LAA. This was most useful to consolidate the assessment, and 
draw the procedure to a close. It also enabled the organisation to seek 
clarification on any part of the assessment, and offer any additional evidence 
which they feel may provide a more detailed view. 
7.1.2.4 Process assessments- Trident assessment 
The following section is made up of diagrams showing the detailed process 
assessment. 
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7.1.3 Process assessment summaries 
The following section will summarise the assessment of each process and 
conclude by assessing the maturity level for that process. Assignment of a 
process maturity level is based on the maturity of each stage of the process, 
and the overall impression of how that process is conducted within the 
organisation. It is not necessary for each process Trident stage to be at 
maturity level X in order for the process to be assessed at level X, although 
the majority of the process should be performed at that level in order for it to 
be a consistent assessment. Each process will be summarised in a 
paragraph, and the section will finish with a concluding argument on the 
organisation's overall maturity level indicated by the assessment. 
7.1.3.1 Process maturity for Human Resources Management 
This process has been evaluated as an overall level 3, because of the 
predominance of the positive achievements of competency-crossover, 
measurement and assessment of role adequacy and ongoing HR adequacy 
monitoring in the response outweigh the minor nature of the downfalls in this 
process. There were a number of staff, who were uncomfortable in their roles, 
but on further examination they were staff who had missed out on pre- 
exposure to the new plan, and they were unprepared for the whole exercise 
experience. The lack of feedback from the EMT to the communications 
operators was a serious oversight, but was the result of a member of staff 
being unfamiliar with their role, and so was not an inherent error in the 
preparedness. A key requirement of HRM at higher levels is that there is a 
level of integration between the roles of the staff in their regular jobs and their 
emergency positions, to ensure a sustainable human response. As LAA 
demonstrates an understanding of closely linking organisational and 
emergency HR, level 3 is appropriate. 
7.1.3.2 Process maturity for Response Assurance 
This process is assessed at level 3 overall, as it demonstrates a strong, 
sustainable culture of public and staff assurance. There are structures in place 
to monitor and adjust assurance continually, to address any change in the 
requirements of the situation. There is a high level of internal integration within 
the LAA, however they could integrate their assurance efforts, including PR 
strategies, with other responders to a higher degree. Lack of this integration in 
the response resulted in delays and withholding of information, rather than 
quick, rash and uncoordinated releases. However, there is room for greater 
coordination. Outside the scenario, LAA organised media coverage of the 
exercise as part of their'real-time' response assurance strategy. 
7.1.3.3 Process maturity for Organisational Learning 
This process has been assessed as an overall level 3, as internal commitment 
to learning is very high. Integrated learning was demonstrated to level 2 
standard in the response studied, however a mitigating factor was that LAA 
was not the lead-organisation in the response, and so did not have overall 
control over the level of integration and knowledge sharing that occurred in 
the learning phase. They demonstrated however that had the framework been 
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in place, they had the ability to integrate their learning with others for mutual 
benefit. The plan was designed to facilitate measurement and recording, and 
the response demonstrated the ability to record and measure performance 
during an emergency. Minor problems in the response can be attributed to the 
fact that this was the first exercise using the new plan, and quite an atypical 
exercise for LAA, so it is with confidence that their capability is assessed at 
level 3. 
7.1.3.4 Process maturity for Research and Innovation 
This process has been assessed at maturity level 2. The main reason for this 
is that there is no evidence of measurement in the research and innovation 
that is carried out. Other aspects of the process are conducted at level 3 
standard, including the control of innovation during response, the use of 
innovation in planning and preparedness strategies and the coordination with 
other agencies in some research and novel approaches. The lack of a 
budgeted and measured approach to research could be due to the internal 
structure and politics of the Emergency Planning department of LAA, as a 
local government organ; however such speculation would be outside the remit 
of the assessment. Overall, the organisation has shown commitment to 
continual advancement and innovation, and as such, would easily move to 
level 2 when measurement criteria were introduced. 
7.1.3.5 Process maturity of Definition of Requirements 
This process was assessed at level 3, because the process was found to be 
conducted in a professional and thorough manner demonstrating an insightful 
understanding of contemporary and changing nature of the requirements for 
emergency management response. The preparedness was integrated and 
measured to an extent, but strengthening of this could easily be achieved. It 
demonstrated that the organisation actively sought to determine the 
requirements of different stakeholders by several different mechanisms. The 
plan also indicated a wide understanding of the physical and psychosocial 
requirements of the response staff, and mechanisms to protect their well- 
being. The response demonstrated continuous appraisal of the demands 
being placed on the EMT by the media and other organisations, and was well 
structured and recorded details for future analysis. The feedback and learning 
were integrated with those of other agencies, and the structure provided by 
the plan facilitated the learning stage very well. Verification was also 
conducted for LAA by an external consultant. 
7.1.3.6 Process maturity of Training and Development 
This process was assessed at maturity level 2, but shows clear potential for 
movement up to level 3. The organisation is currently using a task-based 
approach to training and development, where each individual is trained to 
carry out the tasks they would face in their emergency role. They are moving 
towards a competency-based approach, where the individual's competency is 
developed in several areas, to enable them to complete a range of tasks. 
There are a number of level 2 attributes which lay the foundations for level 3, 
and with formalisation and measurement, the process would be performing at 
maturity level 3. Basic level mentoring, self-assessment and selection are 
present and essential requirements to be advanced for level 3. Further 
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development of individual training records and structured development to 
formalise the competency-crossover would raise the process to level 3 
standards. 
7.1.3.7 Process maturity of Response Management 
This process was assessed at level 2, because although deficiencies in 
internal resource management arose during the response, no effort was made 
to address them. The plan indicated a high level of resource integration and 
preparedness, and some of the problems from the response can be attributed 
to the fact that the plan had not been fully tested until that point. There was a 
level of inefficiency in the response, where perfectly good resources were 
available to the EMT, but were unused. Examples include display-boards 
which printed their contents, computer terminals and the GIS system, which 
suffered configuration problems for most of the first day of the exercise. The 
resources available and committed to the learning stage were very good, as 
the organisation had built the plan and response to facilitate learning, but 
measurement techniques and systems were not included. Useful 
measurements would have been of resource adequacy and use, satisfaction 
with resources and some cost and value analysis. This would facilitate 
continual improvement, and higher level sustainable performance. 
7.1.3.8 Process maturity of Risk Identification and Analysis 
This process was assessed at maturity level 2. The main reason was the lack 
of coordination in the risk-based decision making during the emergency 
response. The plan and preparedness are of level 3 standard, and the staff 
are in place to provide a professional input to any risk related issues. The GIS 
is an excellent tool, and provides real-time risk-based decision support, 
however the Emergency Planning Department used a different version of the 
software to the other departments of LAA, and so there was limited 
interfacing, and therefore reduced utility and conflicts during the response. 
Although some risk-based decisions were taken by the response teams, the 
EMT did not coordinate the decision-making well with other agencies in the 
response. The learning stage is also assessed at maturity level 2 because of 
the absence of communicated risk-related learning and experience. Once 
again, LAA was slightly limited as it was not the lead agency in this exercise, 
however, a more structured and measured approach to learning would be 
required to meet level 3 standards. 
7.1.4 Overall maturity level for emergency management in LAA 
The assessment has shown that half the processes are performed at level 2, 
and half at level 3. At the Trident sequence level, the assessment is the same, 
with half of the stages performed at level 2 and half at level 3. Although it is 
tempting to assign weightings to the processes to make such a decision as 
this easier, that would be introducing more bias and subjectivity into the 
assessment, which is precisely what this study set out to avoid. The original 
PCMM works clearly by the rule that unless all the processes required for 
level 3 are performed to an adequate standard, then the organisation can not 
be assessed at that level, because the processes are of equal importance and 
must all be in place to ensure a foundation for level 4 practices. If this 
assessment were to assess LAA at level 3, as some of the processes 
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indicate, this would communicate to the organisation that they were ready to 
work towards level 4. The requirements of integration, coordination and 
interdependency needed as a basis for beginning maturity level 4 processes 
are clearly missing from some processes highlighted in this assessment, and 
so the organisation is placed at level 2 until those problems are addressed 
and evidence is presented to indicate level 3 performance. The ethos of CMM 
is continual, staged improvement and for that important message to be 
translated into the emergency management field, it should be recognised that 
until every process is performing to level 3 standards, the organisation would 
not be able to consider introducing more advanced development strategies, 
as commensurate with level 4. 
7.1.5 Issues raised by the framework test 
This test of the framework was a very valuable experience, because it 
highlighted some of the practical problems of using the assessment in an 
organisational setting, and also any issues arising from using the framework 
designed for use in private sector Major Hazard Industry in a public sector 
local government department. These issues are discussed further in 7-1-5-1 
to 7-1-5-6. 
7.1.5.1 Language and terminology 
During the first two stages of the assessment, the role of the organisation was 
passive, as they were simply being observed and there was no interaction 
with the researcher. In the third stage, a semi-structured interview was used to 
answer queries from the earlier stages, and attempt to clarify some 
performance issues. When some of the processes were discussed with the 
CEPO and his staff, it was not immediately recognised that such an activity 
was undertaken by the authority. After further discussion and description, it 
became clear that the organisation actually did carry out the process; however 
it was referred to as something different, and undertaken by other means. The 
reason for the initial failure to recognise an activity was the language being 
used to describe it, and a difference in terminology. 
This was due to two factors. Firstly the use of management terminology, and 
especially USA management expressions incorporated in CMM, did not make 
it clear what was being described. Secondly was the difference in terminology 
between the industrial hazard roots of the new framework, and the local 
government structure and systems used by LAA. 
One would conclude that if the framework was to be used for Local Authority 
and other public sector emergency management assessments, the assessor 
must be aware that the terminology will be different, and probe deeper during 
the clarification interview. Thorough explanation of the processes is usually 
enough to enable the interviewee to relate it to relevant practices carried out 
within their organisation, and it is important to establish such an 
understanding with the interviewee, in order to conduct a fair assessment. 
7.1.5.2 Hierarchy of agencies in the response 
Certain attributes and decisions assessed in the response stage were related 
to issues controlled by the lead agency. LAA was not the lead agency on the 
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occasion observed, and it was not the agency responsible for planning or 
funding the exercise. This resulted in LAA being assessed on decisions and 
actions which were beyond their control. Where this has occurred, it has been 
mentioned in the assessment, and credit may have been given for the 
willingness or aptitude to carry out that process, if given the responsibility. 
This problem would not arise when the framework is used for Major Accident 
Hazard Industry assessment, because they remain in control of matters 
concerning their plant and personnel during an emergency, although they 
interact closely with off-site emergency services when appropriate. 
If the framework is to be used for assessment of Local Authority emergency 
management systems in the future, it will require some adjustment to take 
account for occasions when certain aspects of the plan or response are under 
the control of a third party. On this occasion, the distinction between the 
remits of LAA and the lead agency was clear, and the assessment was not 
disrupted in a serious fashion. 
7.1.5.3 Test of preparedness phase 
For the LAA assessment, the researcher only had access to the County 
Emergency Procedures Manual. In a full assessment, the assessor should 
use any document relating to emergency management, human resources and 
organisational policy to inform his or her assessment of the preparedness 
stage. 
In a private sector Major Accident Hazard organisation, research experience 
has shown that this documentation is relatively easy to access and is usually 
contained within a wider 'Health, Safety and Environment policy' with aspects 
also appearing in the 'Corporate Social Responsibility' and 'Regulatory 
compliance and legal duty' documentation. The LAA documentation was in 
the process of being reviewed, and responsibility for emergency planning 
being transferred to a different section, so the recently revised Procedures 
Manual was the only available document. 
7.1.5.4 Test of learning phase 
The assessment of the learning phase was the most difficult to complete in 
this trial. This is because a proportion of the learning debriefing (for 
operational and administrative staff) were carried out more than a week after 
the exercise, during normal working hours, and also because the one-day 
debriefing event was quite fragmented. The event split up the personnel into 
multi-agency discussion groups, who discussed the response and made 
informal notes on key aspects of their experience and how they would take 
the learning further. It was not possible for the researcher to observe each 
group for the whole discussion, so a general overview of all the groups was 
obtained. 
The groups were brought together for a final plenary session to bring any 
salient points to the attention of the chair, and ensure that they were recorded 
formally in the minutes. This provided the opportunity to raise most areas of 
concern, however some personnel may have felt unable to contribute in a very 
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large, chaired formal setting alongside very senior colleagues and third 
parties, so some issues may have gone unheard. Possible improvements to 
the learning phase assessment will be developed further in the Discussion, 
Chapter 8. 
7.1.5.5 Assessing Management of Change in processes 
The final process qualifier statement assesses the 'evidence of verification 
and the management of change' which required further clarification in the 
assessment. Verification is relatively easy to determine, however the ability to 
manage change in a process should be more carefully defined to avoid 
confusion. The statement should seek evidence of the organisation's ability to 
carry out that process if the circumstances change. For example, in assessing 
Response Management, a change in circumstances might render the ECC 
unusable or without electricity, so the ability of the organisation to cope should 
be reviewed. 
7.1.5.6 Justifying the maturity level 
In circumstances where the overall maturity level is unclear from the balance 
of different levels of process performances, the overriding CMM ethos should 
be applied. Previous systems of emergency management assessment have 
been criticised throughout the literature for being subjective and based on the 
opinions of consultants or individuals. In order for this framework to be fair and 
just and maintain the value of the CMM approach, an organisation can not be 
assessed at a particular level of capability and maturity unless they meet all 
the process requirements of that level. Without those processes requirements, 
the foundations of development for higher levels of operation will not be 
complete, and any improvement efforts would not be efficient or effective. 
This approach has worked in both the CMM and PCMM applications, which 
have now been in use for over 13 years in hundreds of organisations 
worldwide. The value of the approach has been proven, and quantitative 
benefits of improvement have been shown in the organisations involved. This 
study has shown that the same approach can be applied to the assessment 
and improvement of emergency management. 
7.1.6 Conclusions of the GEMA test in LAA 
The application of GEMA was useful in confirming the utility of the model, and 
also valuable in revealing that with minor changes, the model could be applied 
beyond Major Accident Hazard Industry, in the wider field of emergency 
management assessment. 
The Trident sequence of assessment phases was useful as an assessment 
structure, and was successful in drawing attention to the importance of 
learning in an emergency management system. The eight processes 
appeared to embrace all aspects of the emergency management system, and 
raised some novel issues and considerations with the test organisation. Some 
issues concerned the difference between application of the model to a private 
company, and application to a local government system; however a surprising 
level of similarity was present. 
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The results of the test have been discussed with the CEPO of LAA, and the 
conclusions and recommendations of the model were welcomed. The CEPO 
also welcomed the continuous improvement focus of the model as a much 
needed change to the current incongruity and disparity in methods across the 
UK emergency planning community. LAA believed that value of a continuous 
framework of assessment and improvement, where targets are clearly defined 
and the objectives are clear, was needed in the field of Local Authority 
emergency planning. The full implications of using the model in an 
organisational assessment will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 8, 
Discussion. 
The following short section explains the process of expert validation, which 
was introduced in the Research Methodology, Chapter 4. In the absence of 
extensive testing of the model in the field, the opinions of respected industrial 
and academic experts was sought on the potential use and value of this 
approach, and their feedback on any means of improvement. 
7.1.7 Expert validation review 
As shown in the flow diagram Figure 4-1 and described in 4.10, the final draft 
of the GEMA framework was presented to a panel of academic and industry 
experts for their critique and feedback. The experts, whose names and 
affiliations are shown in Figure 4-5, were chosen for their experience and 
knowledge of UK Major Hazard Industry and assessment methodology. Dr 
Jerry Busby, a senior lecturer in Human and Engineering systems from the 
University of Bath was also due to attend but was called away to other urgent 
commitments. 
The panel were sent a briefing document in advance of the meeting, which 
summarised the research and the objectives and proceedings of the day. The 
briefing document contained a short introduction to CMM and the purpose of 
the research, along with descriptions of the processes and assessment 
system. The programme for the day's discussions is contained in the 
Appendices. Following the presentations, the group of experts was split into 
two teams for the feedback session. This was to enable the researcher to 
compare the output and comments of the two teams, and would provide 
greater validity to the feedback if both groups arrived at the same conclusion. 
This final section of chapter 7 will first discuss the broader scale contributions 
of the experts, looking at the structure of the framework and the theory behind 
it. This will be followed by a summary of the more specific comments and 
suggestions, relating to parts of processes, terminology and salient points of 
experience. 
7.1.7.1 Structural and higher level feedback 
It is important to recognise that the model shown in the Results, Chapter 6 
was drawn up after the validation day, and incorporating the comments and 
critique of the experts. In the interests of clarity and brevity, it was not thought 
appropriate to include the draft model and the critique followed by the revised 
model, especially as there were some changes in the way the framework was 
structured as a result of the expert feedback. 
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The main structural change recommended by both groups of experts was a 
link between the GEMA processes and the disaster cycle's stages, which are 
mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. The groups drew two 
diagrams, to show how they believed this might take shape. Both diagrams 
were essentially variations of the disaster cycle, and how this related to the 
various processes, and this triggered two changes in the framework. 
The first change was prompted by the relationship between the disaster cycle 
and the opportunities for assessment in industry. The basic cycle of 
preparedness, response and learning reflected the stages at which this 
research had been assessing the organisation's capability, through the plan, 
the exercise and the feedback or debrief. The experts had suggested that 
different processes were more relevant at each of these stages. Once the 
process set had been changed to meet the experts other recommendations, it 
became clear that the same set of processes are carried out in preparedness, 
response and learning, achieving slightly different aims. From this, the Trident 
sequence was established, and the processes were further refined to prevent 
any overlap in the assessment. The further value to the trident sequence was 
that it gave a clear, three-stage focus to the assessment and also brought the 
`learning' stage forward as a recognised and important aspect of the EM 
system. 
The second change triggered by the diagrams was the notion that some of the 
processes were linked in a 'server-client' relationship, or the output from one 
process was the input to another. Following the expert feedback, this concept 
was explored further and the flow-diagram which shows the processes in a 
'control' sequence was the result. This diagram is valuable because it 
illustrates to the organisation the potentially cumulative effect of allowing poor 
performance in one process area. While reviewing this section of the 
framework and the processes, it became apparent that the processes were 
more strongly linked at the higher levels 3 and 4. This concept will be 
discussed further in Chapter 8, Discussion. 
The OCTO directors made three observations from their experience in Major 
Accident Hazard Industry which relate to the model. The first concerned the 
presence of Risk Analysis at the lower maturity levels. They stated that in 
some of the lower-performing companies they had worked with, Risk Analysis 
was extremely basic, if existent at all. Therefore they suggested that lower 
levels I and 2 would be better described in relation to the `site incident 
potential' and hazardous context. These phrases were thought to be more 
representative of the organisations' levels of understanding, which was based 
on the actual hazard rather than the slightly more advanced appreciation of 
the risks that were posed. This suggestion was taken up, and the `Risk 
Identification and Analysis' process was re-written to reflect this at lower 
levels. 
The remaining observations from OCTO were that the model should try to 
take into account cases where an organisation may provide an excellent 
exercise performance, but that exercise does not truly reflect the potential 
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magnitude of the incident. Such cases had occurred in their experience, as 
there are areas of Major Hazard Industry which have never experienced the 
potentially serious consequences of a major emergency. This point was taken 
into account in terms of the Definition of requirements process, which should 
determine how competent an organisation must be to meet all of the 
requirements placed on it. Exercising is also dealt with through the training 
and development process, and the risk identification and analysis process. 
Finally OCTO drew the attention of the panel to the value of competency- 
based training in emergency management. In their experience, by defining the 
competencies required to manage a site's risk portfolio and training the staff in 
those competencies, the organisation also benefited from having more 
competent and capable staff in its regular operations, ultimately resulting in 
higher productivity and a greater competitive advantage. This point has been 
used throughout the processes and has been labelled 'competency-crossover' 
in the model. It also serves another more significant purpose, which will be 
discussed further in Chapter 8. 
Professor Sharp recalled a project to establish an assessment framework for 
offshore safety. The clients found that the most useful part of the report was a 
table describing succinctly how to move from one level of performance to a 
higher level. He considered that such a table would be useful in this project, to 
give the core requirements of moving from one maturity level to the next. The 
other members of the panel considered this to be a very useful addition, and 
after further consideration and reference to the original CMM literature, the 
layout of the process descriptions in Chapter 6 was changed to clearly show 
how improvement to the next level was possible. 
7.1.7.2 Minor points and issues of definition 
The first issue raised concerned the name of the framework. It was agreed by 
the panel that 'Emergency Management Capability Maturity Model' or EM- 
CMM could be considered confusing, and a more attractive name should be 
sought. The panel suggested the Generic Emergency Management 
Assessment, or GEMA, which was considered appropriate and was taken 
forward as the new name for the framework. 
Several members of the team also suggested that as maturity level 1 did not 
have any performance requirements, and was simply a default level for 
organisations who did not achieve the formal requirements of level 2, it would 
make sense to re-number the levels 0-4, rather than 1-5. This would also 
serve the purpose of removing level 3 as a 'middle marker, which can be 
considered a satisfactory level of performance for an organisation that simply 
seeks to be adequate, rather than optimal. With levels 1-4 there is no middle 
marker, and organisations would be more inclined to strive for level 3 than 
settle for level 2. Daniel (2000) recognises this tendency within organisations 
and has called it 'satisfactory underperformance', which means that a person 
or organisation is content with a level of performance that is barely compliant 
and far from best practice. The panel and the researcher agreed that this re- 
numbering was unlikely to have any detrimental effects to the framework, and 
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so accepted the suggestion as being in the interests of promoting a culture of 
continuous improvement. 
There was concern amongst the panel that the model did not make sufficient 
reference to redundancy and back-up plans, which are considered important 
factors in emergency management. After consulting the CMM literature, the 
study chose to incorporate the concept of 'management of change' in the 
qualifier statements used to assess the processes. It takes into account the 
ability of the organisation to deal with and respond to any change in the 
environment or the conditions of the response. This could include a loss of 
power, change of ECC venue or staff problems. 
Considering the financial aspect of emergency management, the panel 
suggested that there be some measure of the organisations' financial 
commitment to the system. Rather than give this a separate process, the 
researcher has decided to include it as a measure of the 'Leadership and 
Commitment' qualifier used to measure each process. By doing this it ensures 
that financial commitment is assessed across each process. 
On a similar theme, the panel noticed that the original PCMM had used 
compensation as an indicator of the organisation's commitment to its staff. 
This is normal to expect compensation for a member of staffs regular 
position; however there are no Major Hazard Industry organisations in the UK, 
known to the panel, which financially compensate their staff for EM duties. 
Some are paid over-time for attending exercises, or given the equivalent time 
off, but most are expected to participate in the response as a part of their role 
and status in the organisation. In some organisations there is often stiff 
competition for a place on the EMT, as it brings prestige and challenge. On 
this point, the panel agreed that it was correct for the GEMA framework to 
omit the process of compensation. 
The panel concluded that a key benefit of the model was that it could also be 
used to assess emergency management systems outside hazardous industry, 
as the processes did not prescribe how they should be carried out, but 
explained why and left the appropriate detail and methods to the individual 
organisation. 
7.1.7.3 Conclusions of validation review 
It is rare for a research study to have the benefit of the advice from an 
esteemed panel of academics and practitioners. The validation review has 
brought a number of valuable enhancements to the framework, and it 
emphasises the importance of contributions from both academia and industry 
to multi-disciplinary areas such as emergency management. 
The validation panel were convinced that with some minor adjustments, the 
Generic Emergency Management Assessment framework would be a useful 
tool, and bring a level of standardisation and accountability to the field of 
Major Hazard emergency management. It could also be used to assess local 
authority emergency planning and management systems, and has potentially 
wider applications regionally and nationally, considering the current changes 
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in the legislation and passing of the British Government's Civil Contingencies 
Bill, 2003. The author expresses his gratitude to the members of the validation 
panel for their time, encouragement and valuable contributions. 
The development GEMA framework and wider concerns in this exciting and 
challenging field will now be discussed further in Chapter 8, Discussion. 
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s Discussion of the research process 
This chapter will describe how the thesis has achieved its aim and objectives, 
and will discuss the research process used. An argument for the choice of 
methods will be presented, and the advantages of those methods over the 
available alternatives will be highlighted. 
The chapter will go on to discuss the problems that arose throughout the 
research, and how they were overcome. The chapter will conclude with a 
discussion of the implications of this thesis with respect to the field of 
emergency management, and in terms of the personal development of the 
researcher. This will lead into chapter 9, which begins with a summary of the 
contribution to knowledge made by this work, and the conclusions that can be 
drawn from it. The thesis concludes with suggestions for further research in 
this subject and the wider field. 
8.1 Discussing the aims of the thesis 
This section 8-1 will provide an overview of the aim and objectives of this 
thesis and how they have been addressed. The following section will then 
describe in detail how each objective was achieved, and justify the choice of 
method. 
8.1.1 Integrated learning 
The literature showed that the MAHI EM field in the UK had a very limited 
focus on learning. Many organisations sought only to comply with their legal 
duties under COMAH, PSR and HASAW regulations. While regulatory 
standards might be enough to ensure a minimal level of response capability, 
they neither actively promote the development of best practice, nor encourage 
the organisation to develop a dynamic emergency management capability. 
The development and sharing of best practice throughout the field should be a 
key focus of organisations, considering the lives and assets that can be at 
stake if an emergency is not handled effectively. A key aspect of sharing and 
developing best practice is the use of a common framework or vision of the 
field. Throughout the majority of MAHI in the UK however, differences in 
methods, behaviours and attitudes across the hazardous industries, sectors 
and individual organisations prevent any comparison or sharing of knowledge. 
If meaningful comparison is not possible, then the sector as a whole cannot 
learn from each other's mistakes, and development is retarded. Comparison 
between natural and technological emergencies and also across countries 
and regions would be very beneficial to the advancement of the field of 
disaster management, and ultimately save human life and assets, but it 
requires greater consistency in assessment and recording of knowledge and 
experience. 
This research also aimed to establish the basis for recording and sharing 
examples of emergency management best-practice in UK MAHI, through a 
common method of assessment. The European Union's `Framework Six' 
research programme is now seeking to begin research into the management 
of emergencies which have a trans-boundary dimension. There are several 
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countries tabled to join the EU in the near future, which would benefit from the 
experience and knowledge of UK and other longer-standing member states, to 
help them to meet the requirements of Seveso 2, the EU standard for MAHI 
emergency management. A framework that facilitates continuous 
improvement would be a useful tool to provide assistance to member states 
and industry within those countries that have to improve or change their EM 
standards to meet the Union requirements. 
8.1.2 Risk-based, people-centred approach 
The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 describes why a dynamic attitude to risk 
and emergency management is necessary to effectively respond in a 
changing risk environment. A risk basis for emergency management is also 
the only way and organisation can be confident that their preparedness is 
adequate. If emergency management is based on an estimation of the hazard, 
the most frequent incident or an approximation of the worst credible event 
then there can be little certainty that it will facilitate an adequate response to 
any incident. 
Clarke (1999) draws our attention to 'fantasy planning', which is the 
production of and reliance on emergency plans by organisations and 
countries, despite an incomplete understanding of the hazard and the 
potential risk. He cites nuclear evacuation and marine oil-spills as examples of 
this. Daniell (2000) mentions the concept of satisfactory underperformance, 
which is the acceptance of a level of performance, despite the awareness that 
it is not sufficient to fulfil the requirements. It was apparent that there are 
cases of organisations that write emergency plans which meet the regulatory 
standard, but are not based on a complete understanding of the risk they are 
supposed to address. Organisations in some cases are ignorant of this risk, 
and in some cases use `creative' risk assessment to minimise or discount the 
risk. In both cases, the plan does not relate to the actual danger it is should 
address. By assessing an organisation's EM capability and maturity with 
respect to their risks and the requirements of their stakeholders, a more 
realistic basis for the EM system is established. 
The regulator is often the only body which makes regular demands on an 
organisation to justify its emergency management system, apart from 
environmentally contentious industry, where pressure groups maintain a 
constant interest. The review of emergency plans revealed that it was 
common for organisations to become focussed on satisfying only the 
regulator, rather than seeking to understand and address the requirements of 
the wider stakeholder group. Stakeholders in MAHI commonly include the 
public (directly and through the media), neighbouring industry, the 
organisation's staff, customers, suppliers and shareholders. The emergency 
management system should aim to ensure that the organisation's relationship 
with its stakeholders is not compromised by an emergency situation. 
To cite an extreme example, corporate killing legislation in the UK is fast 
becoming a reality. Two organisations are currently being charged for 
allegedly causing death, one through failing to prevent an explosion and the 
second through negligence which lead to a train collision. The legal cases are 
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being brought against the organisations by the victims and representative 
groups, and in both cases the organisation will be asked to account for its 
health and safety management, and fully to justify its emergency management 
system. Rather than simply proving regulatory compliance, industry is also 
now required to prove that they are capable of managing emergency 
situations, and for this, a more accountable framework for emergency 
planning and management is required. 
8.2 How those aims were addressed and the choices justified 
It was important to ensure that the product of this research encouraged the 
development and sharing of emergency management best practice, as well as 
facilitated inter- and intra-industry comparison of performance and methods. 
To address this objective, guidance was sought from the management field, 
where tools have been developed to promote these aims in organisational 
management. In addition to this guidance from an established field, it was 
important to ensure that the product of this research was entirely appropriate 
to the UK MAHI field, and so a range of companies from the MAHI sectors 
were chosen as targets for the data collection. 
Several methods were used to select suitable organisations and secure their 
collaboration. Firstly, organisations connected with the research sponsors 
were approached, and following that, further contact was made with 
organisations that were linked in some way to Cranfield University or known 
through contacts in the professional bodies connected with this field. Existing 
contact within the organisation was an important prerequisite because it is far 
more desirable for an observational researcher to be introduced to the group 
or team by an established, known and trusted contact. This concept has been 
described in the Methodology, Chapter 4. 
MAHI is very varied, incorporating petrochemical, pharmaceutical, defence 
and utilities sectors. In order to ensure that the framework was appropriate to 
the different sites, a generic quality was required. The management model 
chosen as a basis for the framework is focussed on a set of processes that 
are deemed necessary for the organisation or system to function and improve. 
The organisation is assessed on the extent to which they carry out these 
processes, which are descriptive enough to give assessment guidelines, but 
not prescriptive in a particular course of action or method that might not suit all 
organisations or sectors. 
The resulting framework could be used on any emergency management 
system and the output would be directly comparable in terms of those 
organisations' capability and maturity in the eight processes. 
The framework also reflects the need for a dynamic and risk-based approach 
to emergency management, even at the lowest level of capability an 
organisation must be aware of the hazards in the context of its own site. The 
model states that the EMS should be based on risk, because that provides an 
indication of the profile of events which the organisation might have to 
respond to. Risk-based emergency procedures are information-rich, in terms 
of the extent of the consequences of particular events, resources required to 
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manage the incidents and likelihood of that incident occurring. The model 
requires that the level of demonstrated performance is commensurate with 
that organisation's understanding of risk. 
The final objectives highlighted the need for the organisation to consider its 
stakeholders' requirements and to adopt a fully accountable approach to 
emergency management. The management model that was chosen as a 
guide, focussed on adopting an open approach to decision-making, which 
included stakeholder consultation. The model also relied heavily on 
performance recording and measurement at all stages, to facilitate learning 
and continual improvement. Such records would enable an organisation to 
produce an audit trail of their response, beginning with their assessment of the 
risk, through mitigation, planning, incident response and learning. This record 
could then be produced should their actions be called into question later. 
The following subsections will discuss in detail how the framework was 
designed, and how that design was influenced and driven by the research 
aims. This will be followed by a section detailing the limitations of the chosen 
methods and research process. 
8.2.1 Adapting an organisational management model 
The main reason for basing the GEMA framework on an established 
assessment model was an attempt to transfer some of the knowledge and 
experience from the organisational management field into the EM domain. It 
was important to ensure that the framework was appropriate to the 
organisations and industries concerned with this research however, and this 
was achieved by using primary data and research to inform the fabric of the 
framework, drawing the range of experience and knowledge in industry. In the 
disaster management field it is important to ensure that that academic 
research has a clear application, and is tied closely to the needs and interests 
of the practitioners. The GEMA framework was required as a solution to an 
industrial problem, and so the content and focus of the model had to originate 
from industrial sources. 
In selecting a model to form the basis for the GEMA framework, two widely 
used and established assessment models were examined - the Capability 
Maturity Model (CMM) and the Balanced Scorecard approach. The criteria for 
selecting models during the initial search were that the model should be 
proven to be effective in its own field and should also be contemporary, 
comprehensive and focussed on improvement and assessing processes 
rather than products. 
From the literature, it became apparent that there was a conceptual problem 
with the criteria. It appeared that most existing assessment models were 
designed to measure a tangible output, for example number of products, 
profit, rate of production or a financially linked indicator of success. With EM, 
there is no direct tangible output. The output of an adequate emergency 
management system is ultimately an effective and efficient response; however 
such a response may never be required. The Balanced Scorecard approach 
(Kaplan and Norton 1996) had also been previously converted to look at 
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emergency management performance measurement in the EMPIRE project, 
(Strutt et al. 2001) but was more focussed on quantitative assessment and 
had not paid detailed attention to emergency planning assessment or 
continuous improvement. 
The Software CMM (SWCMM) had previously been adapted to measure the 
capability and maturity of an organisation's reliability strategy, and in an 
offshore safety strategy assessment. It proved a robust and adaptable tool, 
however it was technology based, and was structured around more 
quantitative and tangible concepts than were present in organisational 
emergency management. 
The solution was to use a Human Resources improvement model, called 
PCMM, which was based on the original CMM concept. This assessment 
model, as described in 3.3, is used to assess and improve the HR capability 
and maturity of an organisation. The benefits brought about by implementing 
PCMM are human-centred, process related improvements, which are closer to 
the requirements of EM than a profit and production based improvement 
model. PCMM was therefore chosen as the theoretical basis behind the 
GEMA framework and as a guide to determining a set of key processes to 
represent the EM system. 
This study has indicated that there can be indirect profit and production 
benefits from developing staff competency in EM, as those competencies also 
improve their performance in their usual job. This concept of competency 
cross-over is discussed in 7.1.7.1 and later in this section, 8.5. 
The assessment protocol of the original PCMM was however not totally 
compatible with the EM field. The resources and commitment required to carry 
out a PCMM assessment simply would not be available to assess MAHI 
emergency management. In nearly all cases the EM role is secondary to a 
member of staffs usual role on the plant, and so requesting that members of 
staff were available for structured interviews, focus groups and surveys would 
not be acceptable, as it would entail replacing those staff on the plant, and 
incurring extra costs. At an early stage it became apparent that any 
assessment framework must not place excessive resource demands on the 
target organisation, and must, as far as practicable, use existing structures 
and events to collect data. 
The framework was therefore designed to use data from the emergency 
planning documents, which would be available for examination without 
additional resource commitment from the organisation. Secondly data would 
be collected by observing exercise simulation and observation and interaction 
within feedback sessions, both of which take place regularly as a legal 
obligation and also for training purposes. This resource neutral approach to 
assessment has been welcomed by representatives of MAHI who have been 
informed of the concept. 
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8.2.2 Collection of data within organisations 
The three data collection methods were employed to give as wider 
understanding of the processes involved in emergency management systems 
as possible. It was only by visiting a site, examining emergency planning 
documents and observing an exercise and the learning that follows it, could 
an overview of a typical emergency management system be developed. 
In this research a separate set of emergency plans was used in the data 
collection. This was because the plans and documents examined before the 
exercises, with a few exceptions, were not of sufficient descriptive standard to 
provide the necessary information to build the framework of processes. It was 
very important to base the process set on as wider range of planning and 
exercising examples as possible. While the observed exercises provided a 
good range from poor to comfortably adequate, the site-plans were mostly 
site-specific interpretations of the regulatory requirements, and as such were 
very similar. It was therefore necessary to look at a set of off-site emergency 
plans, which gave a greater scope for detail on the integration and 
collaborative aspirations of the organisations. Accordingly the off-site plans 
exhibited a much better range of standards, from excellent to operationally 
useless. 
As a result of this experience, the protocol for conducting a GEMA 
recommends that all appropriate documents, which includes the site and off- 
site plan, are examined for evidence of key processes. 
There was also a conceptual reason for assessing at all of the three stages of 
preparedness, response and learning. A criticism of previous EM assessment 
methods was that they had usually focussed on the emergency exercise as 
the main assessment indicator, often taking a cursory look at the emergency 
plan for confirmation of its existence and evidence of regulatory compliance. 
This type of assessment, as described in the Introduction (Chapter 1), gives a 
view of the organisation's performance at that particular time, and with that 
particular scenario. Evidence of performance in one specific emergency 
exercise cannot however be taken as evidence of its capability to perform in 
any future incident. 
The more robust approach is offered by the CMM genre. It involves assessing 
the organisation's implementation of a set of processes, which together 
indicate how the organisation has achieved its current level of capability, 
whether it has done so in a sustainable manner, and how it should proceed to 
ensure continuous improvement. Capability assessment shows where the 
organisation is at one point in time, and maturity assessment strengthens this 
by investigating the organisation's current maturity level, how it achieved that 
capability, and what it should do to improve. 
This concept was translated to the EM field by ensuring that the processes 
looked at the risk-basis of the EM system. A strong basis was interpreted as 
being based on risk analysis and an understanding of stakeholder- 
requirements. The sustainability of the EM system was related to maintaining 
the HR issues and the resources to facilitate a response. The prospect for 
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future capacity was defined by the extent to which the organisation 
incorporated learning and innovation at every level of its system. 
Using three separate means of collecting data can also reduce the chance of 
an organisation being able to 'fake' a good performance. It is possible, and 
has been experienced in this research, for an organisation to ensure that it's 
most highly trained and experienced EM personnel are exhibited in an 
exercise of which they have been given advanced notice, and the standard of 
which is not as challenging as their site risk could demand. This type of 
exercise can be obvious to the assessor however, if they are familiar with the 
site hazards, EM documentation and have been briefed on the staffing of the 
EMT. The authors of the original CMM commented that written evidence 
presented for assessment must be accepted as truthful, as an organisation 
that is committed to the assessment process and to continuous improvement 
must be considered to be generally honest and open with the assessors. Toft 
and Reynolds (1994: 16) cite Brown and Sime who discuss qualitative 
research interview response, and suggest that 
"... in the absence of any evidence to contradict what the respondents profess to be 
the case, it should be assumed that they are not deliberately lying or distorting the 
'facts' as these appear to themselves" 
(Toff and Reynolds 1994: 16) 
It is also important at this stage to reiterate the distinction between different 
types of exercise, and their suitability for assessment purposes. An exercise 
can be used to test the emergency plan, train staff or demonstrate capability. 
It is important that an assessment takes the exercise purpose into account. An 
exercise to test the emergency plan and procedures will illustrate failures in 
this area, and may lead to the ultimate failure of the response. It can provide 
useful observation data, as it should demonstrate the organisation's learning 
capacity. 
Likewise, an exercise to train the EMT will highlight deficiencies in their 
knowledge and abilities. Improving that knowledge and enhancing their 
abilities is the purpose of the exercise, so it can demonstrate that the 
organisation has an advanced appreciation of the need to learn. Training 
exercises indicate commitment from senior and operational staff, and an 
organisational recognition of the importance of emergency management, the 
need to train and the need to exercise to improve and verify that training. 
Finally a demonstration exercise indicates that the organisation has a plan 
and trained team in place, and is willing to exhibit their capability. The 
exercise should directly indicate the effectiveness of the EMT training, the 
adequacy of the emergency plan and the adequacy of available resources. It 
could also indirectly indicate the organisation's level of risk appreciation by the 
scenario that they use and the commitment of the organisation to 
improvement, by the way in which the exercise is approached and carried out. 
It was important to undertake basic level research methods and training 
before carrying out the observation part of the data collection, and the 
knowledge and techniques learned in those sessions served the researcher's 
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objectives well. Advanced knowledge of psychology and research methods 
would be required to design implement and analyse surveys, focus groups 
and structured interviews, and so the Trident sequence of plan, exercise and 
feedback assessment was chosen as being the core data gathering means to 
inform the framework. 
When the data were analysed, the sets of plan and exercise data showed a 
reassuring level of homogeneity. It was also a convincing indication that a 
suitable range of practice had been used to inform the fabric of the framework, 
and that wider sampling or a further method of analysis and clarification would 
not be required. It is recognised however that the prescriptive nature of the 
COMM regulations (HSE 1999) meant that the lower level of the data was 
quite uniform in its compliance, but there was also a significant number of 
examples which performed to varying degrees in excess of compliance. While 
the lower limit of the data appeared to be set at compliance, there was 
considerable variation in the organisations that exceeded the regulatory 
requirements. 
8.2.3 Application and review of the GEMA framework 
The final area of the research methodology which requires justification is the 
exposure of the framework to testing and validation. At the beginning of the 
project at least one full-scale test of the framework within MAHI was seen as 
being a valuable indication of GEMA's use and value as an assessment 
method. 
By the time the research had reached an appropriate stage to plan this test, 
the climate of collaboration and hospitality previously experienced in MAHI 
had been changed by world and local events. The security repercussions of 
September 11th 2001 had caused many of the MAHI organisations to restrict 
access to their sites to all but essential visitors, and upgrade emergency 
planning documents to a higher level of privacy. The UK Fire Service was also 
engaged in a period of industrial action during 2002-3 which resulted in only 
essential fire cover being provided by the military, and many of the MAHI sites 
being prevented from holding their major exercises due to lack of back-up 
cover. 
The alternative solution was to test the model in a different type of 
organisation. A contact within one of the professional societies for this field 
invited the researcher to attend a large multi-agency exercise, in which Local 
Authority 'A' (LAA) was playing a major role. This seemed a good opportunity 
to test the model, as the exercise, plan and feedback stages would all be 
accessible. Permission to carry out the test was granted by LAA and the 
assessment went ahead as described in Chapter 7. 
The full implications of the test are shown in Chapter 7. In conclusion, the test 
was very successful in the sense that evidence of all 8 of the GEMA 
processes was found in the data, along with indicators of how each process 
was being carried out in line with the qualifying statements. It was necessary 
to clarify the meaning of the qualifying statement 'Evidence of verification and 
the management of change', as this was initially difficult to assess. Verification 
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evidence refers to any evidence other than the source currently being 
assessed, so if examining the exercise, that part of a process would be 
verified if evidence was also seen in the emergency plan, or in other evidence. 
Management of change refers to the ability of the organisation to still carry out 
that process if something changes. The loss of electrical power, absence of a 
team member or climatic change could are examples of this. 
There was a major advantage of testing the framework in a different type of 
organisation than had been used in its design. This test would not only show 
that the processes and framework functioned as intended, but would also 
indicate the viability of using the framework to assess EM systems outside 
MAHI. The framework did perform as expected, and the results were 
encouraging. Wider application of the framework will be discussed later in 
Chapter 9, Conclusions and suggestions for further research. 
Although LAA were disappointed that they did not achieve maturity level 3, 
their overall maturity level of 2 compares very well with general CMM 
performance of industry reported in the literature. Certainly none of the other 
organisations involved in this research would have been likely to show 
evidence of maturity above level 2, from a cursory examination of the data. 
A large survey of maturity levels of the organisations that have been assessed 
for the CMM framework gives some indication of the maturity of the software 
industry as a whole. SEI data indicates that 75% of organisations assessed 
with SW-CMM (Paulk et al. 1995) are categorised at level one (GEMA level 0) 
- the ad hoc, initial unstructured state of maturity. Success of the organisation 
at this level is entirely dependent on skills of individuals to deal with problems 
and manage solutions. 15% of organisations are placed at level two (GEMA 
level 1), which shows they are disciplined and have repeatable processes. 
Planning and managing of new projects is based on previous experience of 
similar projects. 
Level three (GEMA level 2) is home to 8% of organisations, whose processes 
are defined and consistent. There is a standard, documented means of 
developing and maintaining software which is used throughout the 
organisation. Only 1.5% of assessed organisations reach level four (GEMA 
level 3), where their software process and products are quantifiable and 
predictable. It is monitored to operate within these quantitative limits. 
Quantitative goals for productivity and quality are set, measured and changes 
implemented. A meagre 0.5% of organisations achieve level five (GEMA level 
4), which dictates that they must be continuously improving their processes 
and products. Identification of weakness and strengthening of processes must 
happen proactively at this level and prevention of defects is the common and 
overriding goal (Paulk et al. 1995). 
8.3 Limitations of the chosen methods 
This section will explore the boundaries and limitations of the chosen research 
methods. 
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8.3.1 Ethical considerations in emergency exercises 
While it is recognised that exercises should represent a realistic simulation of 
an emergency, there are limits beyond which that realism should not extend. 
There has been a wealth of psychological research carried out on stress and 
trauma on how it affects performance of individuals. Hodgkinson and Stewart 
(1995) present straightforward discussion of the planning and response 
implications for reducing stress and trauma. There is an argument that 
exposure to stress in an exercise reduces stress in a real incident, but this is 
countered by the knowledge of PTSD, a clinical condition which results from 
repeated exposure to stressful situations. The important limitation was that 
although the researcher had no control over the scenario and how it was 
conducted, the University's ethical guidelines for qualitative research demand 
that an intervention should be made if any participant were placed under a 
dangerous level of stress. Happily there was no such occurrence, and the 
exercises did not attempt to recreate the stress of an emergency situation. 
One of the difficulties was sanitising the data to a sufficient extent to make it 
unlikely that any of the participating organisations could be identified. Many of 
the sites could have been identified by their building names, the names of 
members of the EMT, date of the exercise or the chemicals and processes 
involved. All of this information had to be standardised in the data, to respect 
the confidentiality required by the companies involved. 
8.3.2 Method and reliability of sampling 
It could be argued that the sample of organisations involved in the research 
was skewed, as they all either worked with OCTO Ltd, the research sponsor, 
or had a link to Cranfield University or one of the professional societies or 
groups interested in the EM field. This involvement indicates that they are 
predisposed to be interested in EM improvement, and so the research only 
used examples of organisations that were already improving, and so the 
group of organisations that had a poor system and were unwilling to change 
was not represented. 
This limitation can be answered with several points. Firstly, any organisation 
that has no interest in improvement or development of their EM system is 
unlikely to agree to participate in research on that subject, so efforts to recruit 
those in the lower end of the maturity range would be likely to fail. Secondly 
the Data Analysis shows that in the analysis of the plans and exercises, the 
processes which were identified with greatest frequency in the sample of keen 
organisations were the low maturity processes, and there were few higher 
maturity processes identified in the sample. This suggests that even if efforts 
to involve a greater number of less enthusiastic organisations had been 
successful, it is unlikely that they would have added a great deal of value, as 
they would be probably only show evidence of levels 0 or 1. 
A further limitation to the scope of the sample was the resources available for 
this project. The propensity of MAHI to hold exercises over the winter season 
limited the number of exercises that could be observed in one year. Each visit 
took up to three days, including travel to and from the site. This was 
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compounded by the previously mentioned difficulties in 2001-2 which brought 
an unexpectedly sharp end to the access to some sites. 
Carthey (1998) trained and employed a team of observers to assist in her 
research in nuclear EM control rooms. Her work was concerned with 
communication, and so extra observers could observe individuals in the 
response and compile their observations to construct a map of the incident 
communications. This research was concerned with wider process-based 
observations, and so an increased number of observers might not directly 
increase the reliability of the conclusions, as it is far more subjective than 
recording a conversation between two people. Secondly, a greater number of 
observers would have been impractical at most of the sites, as the ECC was 
not large enough to accommodate more than one observer without 
inconveniencing the EMT and causing unnecessary disruption to the exercise. 
In large response systems, such as the Local Authority emergency response, 
there could be merit in observing the response at the different levels of 
operations, known as gold, silver and bronze. On a small hazardous site 
however, one could gain little additional information from observing three fire 
operatives simulating the extinction of a fire. 
The effect of the observer's presence on the members of the EMT can not be 
discounted in the exercises. The Hawthorne experiments were carried out at 
the Western Electric Company, USA by Harvard Business School researchers 
between 1924 and 1932. The researcher credited with the main contributions 
from these experiments was Elton Mayo (Mullins 1996: 50). One of the 
discoveries was that if management or another body paid increased attention 
to the workers in the plant, their rate of productivity increased. The experiment 
was designed to test the effect of changes in the workers environment to 
increase productivity. The productivity of all the groups, including the 
experimental control groups where there had been no environmental change, 
increased, and the effect of observation was identified as the causal factor. 
In the emergency exercises, the observer usually occupied a corner of the 
room from where they can see and hear the key aspects of the response. 
They could not however observe from a remote location, and no matter how 
discrete, the EMT are aware of their presence and have been introduced and 
briefed on the purpose of their visit. There were a number of EMT members 
who said during the feedback that they were a little more nervous because 
they were being observed; however in the fast-moving atmosphere of the 
exercise it is not expected that the presence of the observers had a serious 
impact on EMT behaviour. 
Lyons (2002) recommended video recording of exercises to allow full 
transcription. This may be practical on smaller sites, but this research has 
found that on larger sites the effort would outweigh the value. For research 
which is exploring the role and function of an individual in an emergency, then 
a transcript of their actions would be essential. For organisational or system- 
based research, such a level of detail is not desirable and would require an 
unnatural and intrusive level of recording technology in the ECC. Video 
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cameras and sound equipment, along with the necessary tasks of adjusting 
them, turning on and off and repositioning would detract from the high level of 
realism that is desirable in an exercise. Validating the experience of limitations 
discussed above, Carthey (1998) also discussed the problems of field 
research in emergency exercises, and highlighted four key limitations as 
" How to develop a data collection method that allowed data to be collected in 
a robust and consistent manner. 
" The researcher being unable to control certain variables, most importantly, 
the exercise scenario 
" Fitting the research aim and resources together, 
" Ensuring consistency and controlling for subjectivity in the analysis of the 
data. 
Carthey (1998) 
Carthey concludes by suggesting that research based in the emergency 
control room does not capture the complexity of the nuclear EM process, and 
there is a niche for research which takes a more organisational perspective on 
the accident management process. 
8.4 Problems encountered and overcome 
This section presents a discussion of the problems encountered in this 
research. They are divided into two groups. The research and subject related 
problems are dealt with first, followed by the personal development issues and 
achievements. 
8.4.1 Research and subject problems 
An initial problem related to the research and theory behind the original CMM. 
The capability maturity concept had been designed intuitively, rather than 
based on any solid research method or data, so it was not possible simply to 
go back to the original research and understand how the processes were 
designed, or how the levels were structured and compiled, as it was all based 
on ideas and theory, not data. Although this raises questions about the basis 
for the model, the results from the implementation of CMM indicate that even 
although the concept is not grounded in data and research, it actually works 
well. 
A survey of organisations that have used SWCMM and implemented change, 
SEI (Paulk et al. 1993) has shown quantified improvement in the performance 
of those organisations. Their analysis shows that when organisation moves 
from maturity level one to level three (GEMA level 0-2), their ability to meet 
schedules improves from 32% to 80% and the perception that their product 
quality is good or excellent improves from 64% to 100%. 
A second problem with the original model was that it was written using 
language that is common amongst management professionals in the USA, but 
somewhat wordy and jargon-rich to everyone else. Changes to the language 
of the framework had to be carefully considered to make it appropriate to a 
new field without altering the meaning of the levels, processes and 
requirements. These language changes were carried out in discussion with a 
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number of research colleagues, and went through a great number of revisions 
before arriving at the GEMA terminology in Chapter 6, the Results. 
8.4.2 Data collection challenges 
There were a number of problems in collecting consistent and robust data in 
exercises, as there was little standardisation and many factors carried out 
differently on individual sites. The chemicals and manufacturing processes on 
most sites were different, and so a whole language of acronyms had to be 
learned for each exercise, and replaced before visiting the next site. It was 
also challenging to assimilate the functions of the site, the hazards and the 
response in time to fully document a live exercise and ask any clarification 
questions. This also had to be carried out within the short space of time 
available with the organisation. If the research were to be carried out again, 
one recommendation would be a wider sample of exercises and even the use 
of documented exercises from the past, to spread the burden more evenly 
over the time available, and allow time to study the site and documents in 
greater depth before observing an exercise. 
A further problem in the exercises was that the researcher had no input into 
the design or running of the simulation. Most of the organisations who 
participated provided well written and challenging scenarios, which resulted in 
a high level of realism. Each exercise was however unique, which did not 
make it easy to carry out any sort comparison. As discussed previously, there 
was no guarantee that staff had not been pre-warned or briefed on the 
contents of the scenario, or whether the EMT on the day was made up of the 
most competent and experienced staff in the organisation. Although it was 
mentioned above that the efforts of sites should be taken as genuine, most of 
the exercises were conducted primarily as inspection opportunities for the 
regulator, and so there is a clear incentive to present a smooth and problem- 
free performance. 
The researcher also encountered the problem that there was not a great deal 
of academic literature on emergency planning and emergency management 
systems. There was a significant quantity of material presenting anecdotal 
comment from practitioners, especially from the United States, and from 
emergency services personnel. Apart from a small number of key texts on 
emergency management and lessons from industrial disasters, most of the 
remaining work was case-study based, examining one particular incident. 
There was however some excellent analysis found in the official inquiries to 
UK disasters, despite the reports themselves being rather lengthy and written 
in pseudo-legal format. 
The literature which was written by EU bodies was by far the longest, and 
often super-strategic in nature. EU documents were mainly focussed on 
environmental factors, and there was a lot of material that was specific to 
certain chemicals. Undergraduate level study in Disaster Management had 
taught the researcher that often, very good disaster management papers are 
written by specialists in other fields whose subject impinges on disasters and 
emergencies, and so a wide trawl through unlikely journals harvested a 
number of interesting and valuable papers. 
190 
From the search and study of other UK doctoral research in this area, it was 
found that the majority of work has also been carried out by individuals with a 
specialist background in other areas, such as psychology, natural hazards, 
engineering, computing or politics who have looked at a disaster related 
problem in the context of their field. This unfortunately meant that there was 
also little guidance from the literature on appropriate methodology to use for 
this research. There is very little work at this level which has been approached 
from a multi-disciplinary perspective, which is one of the novel contributions of 
this thesis. 
8.4.3 Personal development issues and achievements 
There was ongoing challenge of choosing an area of research from the large 
number of demands throughout the field. The subjects of risk and emergency 
management both offered a wide choice of potential research topics, and a 
number of them were briefly investigated but later abandoned. These included 
the study of the comparative success of different methods of rescue from the 
sea, and risk assessment and emergency planning for underground transport 
systems. These are discussed further in section 9.3.3. 
One personal achievement from this research was overcoming the tendency 
to look for perfection in a subject that is at times, by its very nature, chaotic. 
Later in the research it became apparent that no matter how perfect the 
model, well trained the team or how well equipped the site, there can always 
be an unexpected event or a 'beyond design basis accident' which would 
push any EM system beyond its limits. When challenged on the purpose of 
emergency management, and the reason for this research it is now clear that 
the risk term 'ALARP' is not a negative excuse for failing to plan or prepare or 
manage risks, it is an upper limit of investment and commitment to ensuring 
that the organisation use all possible resources to do everything practicable to 
limit and reduce risk. 
The importance of preparedness as a researcher was also highlighted by this 
study. All of the emergency exercises studied were unrepeatable, single 
events with one chance to record the valuable data. It was essential that the 
researcher was well prepared and briefed in order to appreciate the events 
and features of the scenario. A full awareness of the site processes and EM 
system structure was crucial, and in the exercise a full transcript of events 
was kept, with as much extra detail and photographic evidence as possible 
recorded. A useful rule throughout the data collection was that if one has too 
much information, some can be deleted; however if one has too little, there is 
no way to go back and collect it again. 
The researcher has also learned the importance of professionalism when 
carrying out research with any collaborators, industrial or governmental. As an 
academic in an industrial environment some people assumed that we should 
know all the answers, and it is far better to admit that we do not know, than 
claim knowledge and expertise we do not have. It has been the researcher's 
experience in emergency management that industry and practitioners 
welcome academic input as a means of recording, consolidating and 
structuring the vast amount of knowledge and experience they have. 
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Especially in this field, it has been vital to appreciate the value of 
interdisciplinary work and seeking the best aspects of other fields and 
systems, and designing ways of making them appropriate and useful in the 
chosen issue. 
The task of observing people in exercises was also challenging and one which 
taught the researcher a lot. The difficulties are in keeping an impartial record 
of the proceedings, and not allowing oneself to be influenced by those who 
spoke louder, appeared to be busy and involved in the scenario or asked the 
most questions. Often in the emergency response it was the members who 
were standing back from the table, thinking and reflecting quietly who had the 
more important contributions to make with a few choice words. The skill in 
observation was to record as much of the scenario as possible, and interpret 
which parts were more influential with hindsight, when analysing the data at a 
later stage. The louder members of the team, or those who appeared to be 
always busy were usually not working effectively, and not able to handle the 
situation in a calm, reflective manner which is required in intense, stressful 
situations. This was clarified in the feedback, when it emerged that such 
characters are generally unaware of the wider strategic picture, and so unable 
to adapt their contribution to it. 
8.5 Implications and value of the research 
This research has met several recommendations and objectives set out by 
other authors throughout the subject literature. These implications of the 
research study are outlined in the following section. Many of these points were 
raised initially in the literature review, Chapter 2 and full discussion of the 
context of each recommendation can be found there. 
Alexander (2002b) recommended that some of the well researched and 
developed organisational management theory be applied to the study of 
disaster and emergency management. The CMM has a proven success rate 
in organisational improvement, and this study has shown through the use of 
the CMM principals and structure, that management theory is transferable to 
improve EM practice, so long adequate attention is paid to the issues of 
language, context and focus. 
Clarke (1999) found that some emergency plans are based on crude 
estimation and the manipulation of inappropriate data to achieve a convincing 
response plan. The fact that the plan could never be effective in the 
occurrence of the real threat was rarely realised by the authors of the plan, but 
they were equally ignorant of the consequences of their actions or the severity 
of the threat. Clarke recommended that all emergency plans should have a 
risk-basis and high level of accountability to their stakeholders, which is met 
by the GEMA framework through the inclusion of the key processes 'risk 
identification and analysis' and 'Definition of requirements', and the GEMA 
focus on the risk control diagram that links processes at all levels of 
emergency management. 
Use of the GEMA framework enables organisations working in separate 
societies and sectors to compare aspects of their response capability, and 
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learn from each others' experience. This desirable advance was alluded to in 
the work of Beck (2001), who described the concept of a world risk society, in 
which many different groups were suffering from the same risks in different 
environments, and with differing levels of ability to cope. Such comparison of 
EM systems between countries and cultures might enable resource poor 
societies to learn the lessons of accidents without having to suffer the costs 
and consequences, which are invariably higher when coping ability is low (as 
discussed in 2.2). 
Douglas and Wildavsky (1983), Pidgeon (1998) and Renn (1998) discuss the 
merits of public participation in risk management and liaison between the 
bodies which are responsible for the risk, and the people who could suffer the 
consequences of the risk. The GEMA processes of 'Definition of requirements' 
and 'Response Assurance', described in 6.3.2 highlight why this level of 
interaction is necessary, and link it closely with the other processes in the 
framework. 
In a similar trend, Alexander states that 
`... the emergency planner should first and foremost strive to create an environment in 
which people can work constructively together in a state of mutual understanding and 
collaboration. This is the key to solving the disasters problem. A 
Alexander (2002b: 304) 
This attitude of constructive dialogue and understanding is important to the 
response assurance process, and the achievement of collaboration to a scale 
recommended by Alexander would indicate a high level performance in the 
GEMA framework. 
Turner and Pidgeon (1997) agree with the original theory that prompted the 
conception of the CMM. They state that management edict and external 
regulation can not bring about permanent organisational learning or cultural 
change, and such change can only be brought about by the long term process 
of self-design. CMM was conceived because of the repeated failure of 
management fashions and fads, which were imposed on organisations and 
failed to have any improvement effect. Continual, structured development was 
seen as the way forward, and that ethos began CMM, discussed in 3.2. 
Turner and Pidgeon (1997) also quote Douglas (1992), whose argument 
makes it clear that blame must be avoided if there is to be any significant 
learning from an accident or incident. The GEMA does not seek to attribute 
blame or fault for the cause of any incident, although it confirms that it is the 
responsibility of the organisation to identify the causal factors and trigger 
events for any incident, in order to learn from the mechanisms of failure. 
Finally, Turner and Pidgeon (1997) state that a `good' safety culture might 
both reflect and be promoted by at least four facets; 
/$ Senior management commitment to safety 
4 Shared care and concern for hazard and solicitude over their impacts upon people 
/Y Realistic and flexible norms and rules about hazards 
and continual reflection upon practice through monitoring, analysis and feedback 
systems. 
(Turner & Pidgeon 1997: 188) 
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All of these four facets are all found in the GEMA framework. Each process is 
examined on the strength of the leadership and commitment evident in 
carrying it out. Concern for the hazard and care over the impacts it might 
have, is reflected in the processes of Risk identification and assessment, and 
also the response assurance process. The Definition of Requirements 
process and the Risk Identification and Analysis process ensures that the 
norms and rules are realistic, and the model itself aspires to creating a flexible 
EM system and response, by ensuring that there is 'continual reflection' on 
practice, using monitoring, feedback and analysis systems. 
The final chapter of this thesis will clarify the original contribution this thesis 
has made to the scientific field, distil a set of conclusions that can be drawn 
from the study, and offer suggestions of how this work can be used as a basis 
for future wider research. 
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9 Conclusions and suggestions for further research 
9.1 Contribution to knowledge 
As a Doctoral thesis, this research must make a clear and significant 
contribution to scientific knowledge. 
The significant contribution to knowledge from this research has been to take 
an established model from one field and adapt it to make it suitable for use in 
a novel situation. 
The People Capability Maturity Model has been widely used for a number of 
years to assess the maturity and capability of an organisation's workforce. It 
adopts a process-based, continuous improvement focus and aims to create a 
workforce that is continually optimising, and adapting to respond to new 
situations. 
The structure of the model was adapted by using original data from the 
emergency management field to build a new set of key processes. These 
processes represent what an organisation must accomplish to create an 
emergency response. The language and the practical assessment protocol of 
the model were adapted to make them suitable for use in a new field, and 
across a number of different sectors where emergency management is carried 
out. 
A test assessment using the model was conducted, in which the researcher 
gathered data from an organisation's emergency documents and plan, at a 
live emergency exercise and during the exercise feedback and learning 
sessions. These data were analysed using the draft model and conclusions 
were drawn with relation to that organisation's capability and maturity in 
emergency management. The structure of the model enabled the researcher 
to identify which of the organisation's processes required improvement, and 
which stage of the emergency management cycle required the greatest 
attention. 
The new model was finally discussed with a panel of industrial and academic 
specialists from the field of emergency management in the UK, and their 
opinions and feedback on the structure and applicability of the model were 
sought. Refinements were accordingly made, and the model is now ready for 
further, large scale testing and application in the field. 
Additional contributions that this research has made include the assessment 
of an organisation's risk analysis and management process as an indicator of 
their emergency management capability. The research showed that a risk- 
basis for emergency management is an important determining factor in the 
sustainability and resilience of their system. The process set incorporates Risk 
Identification and Analysis, and shows how a risk-basis provides the 
foundation for the other processes in the framework. 
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The development of the GEMA framework is also the first time a maturity 
assessment approach has been applied to Major Accident Hazard Industry 
emergency management. Maturity assessment examines how the system has 
been developed, how it is currently performing and how it learns and is likely 
to develop in the future. From this information the assessment can indicate 
how the system is likely to develop, and what improvements are required to 
reach a higher level of capability. 
Finally, the GEMA framework provides a generic assessment basis through 
which dissimilar industrial organisations can compare their emergency 
management capability. The framework is process based, and so the 
assessment is the same, irrespective of the final scale, type and nature of the 
emergency response. Such comparison and benchmarking capability could 
encourage the sharing of information and learning throughout UK hazardous 
industry and the associated agencies. 
In addition to its contribution to knowledge, the study also satisfies the 
aspirations of applied research, defined by Patton (1990) as 
"... Improve practice in industry by identifying more efficient ways of doing things". 
(Patton 1990: 197) 
It is intended that by following the GEMA framework and the improvement 
guidelines that result from an assessment, an organisation can achieve more 
efficient and effective emergency management. 
9.2 Conclusions 
The conclusions will begin by discussing the extent to which the research has 
met its original objectives, before going on to make further conclusions based 
on the design and testing of the GEMA framework and the general data 
gathered in this study. 
9.2.1 Achievement of the aim and objectives 
The aim of the thesis was to develop a risk-based, continuous improvement 
framework for the assessment of capability and maturity in emergency 
management systems. The data was collected from collaborating 
organisations within the UK Major Accident Hazard Industry. The model was 
intended to assess the organisation's current emergency management 
capability and also provide structured improvement guidance. The model was 
also required to have should have a people-focussed approach. The 
objectives are summarised in Figure 9-1. 
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Figure 9-1 Summary of thesis objectives. 
The Results of the data analysis, Chapter 6, shows clearly how the first three 
objectives of the thesis have been achieved, and a thorough explanation of 
how this was carried out has been presented in Chapter 8, the Discussion of 
the research process. The test of the model met with some initial difficulties, 
and it was not possible to test the model in the same environment that was 
used for the data collection. The model was however tested in a Local 
Authority emergency management system, which gave the additional 
advantage of testing the generic nature of the GEMA framework. The test was 
conducted successfully and the results are presented in full in Chapter 7, 
Application of the framework. The model was then subjected to a final test, 
which involved seeking a critique of the framework from a panel of industry 
and academics with expert knowledge of the emergency management field. 
This test also yielded satisfying results, and the refinements that arose both 
from the test and the panel exposure were made to give a final version of the 
model, presented in Chapter 6, Results of the Data Analysis. 
From the evidence, the objectives of the thesis have been met in full, and this 
section can now make conclusions from the research. 
9.2.2 The use of GEMA in different organisations 
The GEMA framework has been designed to assess EM capability and 
maturity in MAHIs and has been tested on a LA emergency management 
system. It has shown that the model provides useful and important information 
of the weaknesses and strengths of those emergency management systems, 
and gives a structured indication of how the system can be improved. 
The framework is generic, as it focuses on the processes an organisation 
uses to develop its emergency management system, rather than the type and 
nature of the specific response. This generic quality allows assessments of 
dissimilar industries to be compared, and inter-sector as well as intra-industry 
sharing of lessons and knowledge. This potential extension of the learning 
throughout the Major Hazard operators can only have positive effects in 
reducing the number of common-cause failures and emergencies that occur 
across the UK. 
The GEMA framework could also be applied to 
agency response. This would indicate any 
coordination of the response, and identify 
each organisation in a multi- 
weaknesses in the overall 
areas for joint or shared 
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improvement between collaborating agencies. Joint response overview is a 
useful way of finding the source of a problem, whether it is an individual 
agency that requires improvement, whether it is a phase of the Trident 
sequence which is weak, or whether a process has not been addressed 
adequately by one or more agencies. In large scale, multi-agency response 
training is often recommended as a solution to many problems. More often 
than not, training is not the answer and resources are wasted. The ability of 
the GEMA framework to identify weak processes within a system is a great 
advantage, as it can lead to specific and appropriate solutions, rather than 
resources being wasted on inappropriate measures that may not solve the 
problem. 
9.2.3 Benefits of improved emergency management capability 
The higher levels of the GEMA framework require a competency-based 
approach to emergency management training and development, and an 
integrated approach to the human resource management, organisational 
learning and research and innovation processes. If developed and improved 
in the context of emergency management, these processes could also have a 
positive impact on how similar processes are carried out in the regular 
business of the organisation. This can be especially true in the case of 
competency development. Anecdotal evidence was provided by the research 
sponsors of the proven benefit of competency development on individuals and 
teams. It not only improves their ability to carry out their emergency 
management role, but also his or her ability to fulfil the requirements of their 
usual jobs. This competency-crossover could be a way of quantifying a 
tangible benefit of improving emergency management. 
The formalising of an emergency management human resources process was 
an important step in recognising the value of people within an emergency 
management system. There should be no reason why an individual's 
emergency management role should not treated in the same way as his or her 
usual job in terms of selection, qualification, development and promotion. In a 
similar respect, their occupational health and safety concerns should also be 
formally addressed within the context of their emergency management role. 
They should also be clearly informed of the legal implications of their actions 
in their emergency role, and their legal responsibility and liability (if any) for 
actions taken during emergency response. Continual development of their 
role, involving mentoring, additional education and accreditation and 
promotion should also be addressed in a similar fashion as their usual position 
in the organisation. PCMM has proven that these factors positively influence 
the performance, satisfaction and reliability of an individual within an 
organisation, and so one could expect that similar benefits will be realised if 
these human factors are taken into account in emergency management. 
The highest level of maturity in the GEMA framework also embraces this 
concept of narrowing the gap between regular organisational management 
processes, and emergency management processes. The narrower that gap is, 
the easier, quicker and more efficiently an organisation is able to respond 
fluctuations or trigger events that could lead to an emergency situation. 
Gaining control of such events reduces the likelihood of an incident occurring, 
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and reduces the disruption to organisation's regular business. In a level four 
organisation which optimising and adaptable, emergencies are stopped before 
they occur, and they appear as minor disturbances with little or no 
consequence to the organisation or the wider stakeholders. 
Finally, the adaptation of the GEMA framework from the PCMM has shown 
that research and models developed in the organisational management field 
have the potential to be adapted for effective use in the emergency 
management sector. This issue will be explored further in the following 
section, with the ultimate hope that further research will be carried out on the 
use of other management models and principals to the ultimate benefit of the 
emergency management field. 
9.3 Suggestions for further research 
9.3.1 Further work on this concept and contribution 
The GEMA framework follows the PCMM endorsement of competency-based 
training and development. There has been insufficient time in this research 
however to fully explore the concept of emergency management competency. 
As mentioned earlier, accreditation of emergency managers is a matter being 
driven forward by the UK Institute of Emergency Managers, and this valuable 
work will no-doubt call for further research to define and measure the 
competencies necessary for emergency management. This is another area 
that could benefit from research already carried out in the management and 
management psychology fields, and should be more thoroughly investigated. 
Examples of competencies which have been identified through the data 
collection in this research include: 
" Communication 
" Information management & analysis 
" Leadership 
" Teamwork 
Dealing with pressure 
Decision-making 
Negotiation and conflict resolution. 
The GEMA framework, in a similar way as the PCMM, is designed for 
implementation by a professional with knowledge and experience of 
emergency management systems. It could however be adapted into a self 
assessment programme, which once introduced into the organisation could 
provide an ongoing database which can be built and used to record and log 
improvement against targets. Such a self-assessment programme would 
require a software basis to enable the user to enter and retrieve information, 
and enable the computer to compare the data entered with the inbuilt set of 
rules, conditions and examples that identified each process set. The 
advantage of such a system is that the organistiation can adapt elements of 
the framework to reflect their situation and achievements more accurately, 
whilst maintaining the generic capability at a higher level. Further testing of 
the model in an industrial setting, and longer term collaboration and 
development with a small sample of organisations would be necessary to 
define the scope and value of such a project. 
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As a continuation of this study, the framework would benefit from reassessing 
some of the organisations that had participated in the research back in 1999- 
2001. The collaborators did not receive individual improvement feedback from 
the final model, as there were very few organisations that contributed data to 
all three stages of the Trident sequence for an assessment. Such 
reassessment would identify how emergency management systems develop 
without CMM-type intervention, and would provide a useful baseline against 
which to judge the future impact of the model. 
Finally, the generic capability of the framework would be tested thoroughly if it 
were applied to a MAHI organisation operating in a different culture and 
society within, or outside Europe. The CMM and PCMM methodologies have 
been proven to be effective in organisations round the world, however it would 
be valuable to conduct research to establish if the basic principals of the 
GEMA processes take place to a similar or lesser scale in organisations 
where the society is less affluent that the UK and USA, or has different 
standards of behaviour and work ethics. If it was found that the basic 
principles still apply, then the GEMA framework could be used as a tool in 
newly industrialising countries, to develop their industrial emergency 
management capability from a low level. 
9.3.2 Further work in the field of Major Hazard EM 
Although the model was tested in one Local Authority emergency planning 
department, the standard exhibited was by no means representative of the 
field. This conclusion can be supported by the data collected from LA 
emergency plans and analysed in Chapter 5. Further testing in other LA 
systems would show how appropriate the framework was, and the value of 
carrying out the assessment. There should also be some consideration here 
of the newly established regional operations established by the Civil 
Contingencies Secretariat. Their full remit is not yet clear, however if it 
involves the coordination and standardisation of regional efforts in multi- 
agency emergency response, this could be a potential application for the 
GEMA framework. Further research would have to be conducted on the level 
of response and planning, however the application to this new development 
appears promising from the outset. 
Recent world events have illustrated the importance of response phase 
decision-making in major emergencies. This is especially relevant in response 
to terrorism, where secondary hazards are likely to exist and compromise the 
safety of the responders. Recognising the model used in GEMA to illustrate 
how processes interact at the different stages of the Trident sequence, further 
research should be undertaken to explore exactly how process development 
in the preparedness stage influences the undertaking of that process in the 
response stage. Clearly there are advantages to developing process 
capability in the preparedness phase, where time is available and there is no 
immediate threat. This then could improve process capability in the response 
stage, where timely, considered actions are essential to control the situation 
and prevent escalation. 
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9.3.3 Further work on wider Emergency Management Issues 
Various projects have been undertaken during the researcher's registration 
period, some of which were abandoned in the proposal stage due to lack of 
funding or collaboration. Some of these pre-proposal projects highlighted 
interesting areas for further research in the field, and possible applications for 
the methodology developed in this thesis. 
A large volume of data is collected each year in the UK and overseas, by 
coastguards and lifeboat groups, detailing the rescues in offshore and inshore 
waters. Some of the data are given basic statistical analysis, but little further 
work is carried out. Some of the current standards and norms for rescue at 
sea are based on very old data from military experiments. There were recently 
proposed changes in the ways that offshore platforms respond to rescues at 
sea, including changes in the use of helicopters and fast-rescue craft in 
addition to personal distress beacons and sensor technology to detect and 
warn of man-overboard situations on platforms and vessels. Such changes 
would require clear, statistical and quantitative evidence of the costs and 
benefits of different methods, and any additional procedural changes which 
could preserve life. Analysis of this problem using the Trident sequence and 
the eight process GEMA framework could identify aspects of the 
preparedness, response and learning from 'man-overboard' incidents that 
could be addressed by using simple and efficient means. Helicopters are a 
costly option and are inefficient in a number of different offshore scenarios. 
Addressing the problem through preparedness and learning is clearly more 
desirable, and the process-oriented approach could assist in this. 
The management of emergencies in tunnels was a second research issue that 
was explored. Examples across Europe show that although the technology to 
construct and operate tunnels has advanced continually over the past century, 
there has been less attention paid to developing evacuation and safety 
systems. 
"... it seems we build a lot underground, but few countries have general rules for fire and 
life safety principals" 
(International Tunnelling Association, 1998: 217) 
Over the past 24 years a number of accidents have drawn attention to the 
vulnerability of people travelling underground, whether in trains or cars. The 
recent increase in awareness of terrorism following September 11th 2001 has 
amplified public concern about their safety when underground, with particular 
reference to the Tokyo incident involving Sarin gas. 
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Figure 9-2 History of underground tunnel emergencies 
Date Location Incident type Consequences 
1979 Nihorzaka, Japan Fire in road tunnel 7 Dead 
(Carvel, Beard & Jowitt 1999) 189 vehicles destroyed 
1987 King's Cross, London Fire in underground 31 dead 
(Fennel, 1988) station 100 injured 
1995 Baku, Azerbaijan Fire in underground 300 Dead 
(Atwell & Khanlou, 1995) tunnel 260 injured 
1995 Tokyo, Japan Terrorist release of Sarin 12 Dead 
Policastro & Gordon, 2001) gas on underground trains 5500 injured 
1999 Mt. Blanc HGV fire in road tunnel 39 Dead 
(Duffe, 1999 38 vehicles destroyed 
2000 Kaprun, Austria Fire in ski train tunnel 155 dead 
(Anonymous, 2001) 
2001 St. Gothard Tunnel, Fire following collision in 11 dead 
Switzerland road tunnel 
(The Times, 2003 
Cranfield continues to work with partners to establish advanced safety 
systems and emergency protocols for underground transport systems. The 
possibility of applying GEMA to various underground EM systems in the UK is 
currently being discussed. It is not thought that the model would require a 
large amount of adjustment to be used in the assessment of capability and 
maturity of an underground emergency management system, as the principals 
of risk-based planning and improvement focussed response still apply 
strongly. 
9.3.4 Further work in Risk and Disaster Management. 
The narrow void between industrial and natural hazards is illustrated simply by 
Lillibridge, in Noji (1997: 360). He discusses the case of Lake Nyos in 
Cameroon, Africa. Nyos is a volcanic crater-like depression in active field, 
which has formed a lake. In 1986 a massive release of from under the lake at 
night is thought to have asphyxiated 1700 people as they slept. 
Although an industrial site with such quantities of CO2 is likely to be more 
closely monitored and have safeguards in place, there are lessons which 
practitioners on both sides of disaster management can learn from sharing 
analysis of such incidents. It is likely that the literature would reveal a number 
of natural disasters and man made emergencies that share many common 
elements. The 1983 disaster at Bhopal in India bears a close resemblance in 
its immediate effects to the cyclone on the Gujarat coast in 1998. In both 
cases a vulnerable population was living in a location where a known hazard 
existed, and political factors influenced the effectiveness of the warning 
system, resulting in thousands of people being unable to escape in time from 
a deadly force. Clearly, vulnerable impoverished populations are more likely to 
suffer the effects of any disaster, however comparison between the 
organisational and political factors involved in both natural and industrial 
disasters could reveal interesting lessons for both disciplines. 
Focus on processes rather than products of a response opens a new 
perspective and prospect for the comparison and learning across sectors are 
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regions in emergency management. There is no structural reason why the 
eight processes identified in the GEMA framework could not be used in an 
assessment of national response strategy, or a system designed for response 
to a large-scale natural disaster. 
Events over recent years in the UK agricultural industry have illustrated that a 
disaster does not have to have human victims for the suffering and damage to 
be felt by the nation. The foot and mouth disease crisis showed inadequacies 
in the response systems that were a direct result of failure to learn the lessons 
of the last outbreak. Risk, emergency planning and emergency response are 
not common terminology in the agricultural sector, however the frameworks 
developed for dealing with epidemics and emergencies in the human 
population are likely to be as effective when applied to agricultural systems. 
The principals of a risk-based, continuously improving maturity approach 
might easily be applied to farming systems. This would require a significant 
research commitment from the appropriate body; however the potential 
applications and benefits are encouraging. 
9.4 Concluding remarks 
Successful emergency management, which is often attributed to luck and 
good training, has been distilled into eight measurable processes, which 
operate across three phases of development and provide an indication of an 
organisation's position on a scale of five levels of capability and maturity. 
It has been a privilege to carry out research in a field where the results can be 
applied directly to improving an important aspect of industrial activity. 
Although the GEMA framework is not yet thoroughly tested in MAHI, it 
provides the basis for a more accountable and broad-based assessment of 
capability and maturity in EM, which if implemented will enable organisations 
to establish and continuously improve their emergency management systems. 
A continually improving emergency management system enables 
organisations to more effectively and efficiently achieve the ultimate aim of 
every person working in the field of disaster and emergency management - to 
protect the environment and assets from damage and to save life. 
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ßo. 1 Exercise analysis data 
The following section presents the full analysis of data collected at the 
emergency exercises, concluded in Chapter 5. Each organisation visited has 
been assigned a two-letter code to identify their data throughout the thesis. 
For each site a paragraph of background information is given to set the 
scenario for the exercise. A table then gives the background information to the 
site. This will be followed by a summary of the processes that have been 
proven in the exercise. These processes should be similar to those identified 
in the PCMM, detailed in Chapter 3. Any novel emergent processes will be 
discussed at the end of the chapter. This structure will be repeated for all 8 
exercises used in this study. 
10.1.1 Analysis of emergency exercise DA 
The following paragraph describes the scenario of the exercise at DA. 
The scenario involved an explosion in a plant which dealt with radioactive 
materials. Fire and radiation alarms sounded, and the muster indicates a 
number of missing members of staff in the incident building. The team are 
expected to carry out the necessary monitoring, determine the nature of the 
incident and rescue the casualties. Risk to the casualties, rescuers and the 
rest of the site should have been considered throughout. Cooperation with the 
external emergency services was required to rescue the casualties. The 
scenario was realistic, detailed and well planned. The EMT appeared to work 
very efficiently and effectively but the rescue of the casualties by the fire 
brigade was late and uncoordinated. The exercise ended after two hours 
twenty minutes. 
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10.1.2 Analysis of exercise MA 
The exercise was an extrapolation of a near-miss event which had occurred, 
and as such was a realistic risk-based test of the response. The information 
feeds to the ECC were prompt and very straightforward however, and the EM 
and EMT were not noticeably pushed beyond their comfortable range of 
experience in managing this incident. 
The scenario began with a reported fire in a storage area containing 
flammable and toxic chemicals. The weather conditions were dry and clear, 
with a strong wind blowing across the site. The ECC was staffed within seven 
minutes of the pagers being activated. Within a minute of arriving at the ECC, 
the Environmental technician on the team had ensured that the drainage 
system had been switched to contain all contaminated fire-water. Within 13 
minutes of the exercise, the team are informed that the fire has been 
extinguished, but the plume has now activated the gas alarm. Sixteen minutes 
into the exercise, the external fire brigade arrive at the site and are given a 
very effective and succinct briefing. They are directed to a holding area until 
the nature of the plume is identified. Simulated calls from the public and press 
made to the ECC were handled well and the exercise ended after 50 minutes. 
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10.1.3 Analysis of exercise RA 
The scenario began with a release of a toxic gas on the site. This release was 
detected by the alarm system. The exercise was an out-of-hours test, 
primarily to test how long it would take to call-out the full EMT. The alarm 
sounded and the call-out was made at four minutes past midnight. The fire 
Team Leader arrives at the scene within 7 minutes of the alarm sounding. He 
initiates gas monitoring around the access points to the building. There is was 
a heavy load of information fed into the ECC. 
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10.1.4 Analysis of exercise HA 
The scenario involves the leakage of a flammable gas which is stored in liquid 
form. This leak finds ignition a pool fire starts underneath one of the large 
tanks of this gas. The fire soon escalated and produced large amounts of 
dense smoke. The initial muster results at 11 minutes reveal that two men are 
missing. At 13 minutes, the gas cloud was above the acceptable 
concentration and drifting beyond the perimeter. The offsite warning was 
sounded. After 21 minutes the FCP reported to the ECC that there were a 
total of five people missing from the incident area, comprising three 
contractors and two site personnel. The pool fire was extinguished after 30 
minutes, and engineers were unable to access the leak until the area was cool 
and tank pressure had receded. Despite strong pressure from the police to re- 
open a nearby public road, the EM refused to declare the area safe until the 
leak has been sealed. The exercise ended on that stalemate. 
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10.1.5 Analysis of exercise HB 
The exercise HB was carried out over a year later at the same site as HA, so 
the background details of the site (fig. 48) remain very similar. The ECC has 
since been refurbished, and had been fitted with new lighting and a GIS 
computer system which contains photographs of all areas of the plant. These 
pictures could be projected onto a large screen or printed and annotated for 
the emergency services or FCP use. Each EMT member also has a checklist 
for their role. This exercise could be a useful indicator of how a site capability 
changes over a period of time, an issue which will be discussed in Chapter 9. 
This exercise is based on a real incident that resulted in offsite consequences. 
It involved a liquid flammable leak from storage tank pipework located before 
the emergency shut-off valve, so it could not easily be controlled. Personnel 
investigating the incident are trapped nearby and injured when the leak ignites 
and causes a jet-fire impinging directly onto the tank. The deluge system has 
recently undergone repairs, but the nozzles are clogged with corrosion 
product and not functioning effectively. The jet fire is 45m long, and leakage 
into the containment pit around the tank also catches fire, burning to a height 
of 4.5m. 
The exercise was preceded by a video showing footage of large fires on 
chemical plants, the intensity with which they burn and the damage caused. 
The impact of this was good, as it provided a mental picture of the likely 
consequences of the incident. Twelve minutes into the incident, the FCP 
confirm that the two engineers attempting to isolate the leak before it ignited 
are now missing. 
The LFB are stood down after one hour 30 minutes, when the relief valves 
close and the risk of BLEVE dropped. The EM instructs FCP to carry out 
environmental impact estimate and assess any remaining fires. The exercise 
ended after 1 hour 45 minutes. 
227 
N 
N 
co 
i im C) 
CD 
O-> (D 
3 -0 
- 9 
CD 
ju 
(D 
a :E 
CD-0 I 
(0 CL -1 
w 
:E 
CD 
in (ý 
i 
0 
N -{ O OS 
oO -ý 0ß 
S S Nf S SS M3Q (D (D 0m "3nm CD Np (D nm pm 
(D CD fD (D m 
0(DLn. ý ý"c < 
NT ! 1J 
3 (D 
C D O 
(D 
f0/ß ! 
pn 
O 
fD - 
N 
ä_ ON 
' 
-' O Z CD 
(D z3 
A FD O ý ?O 
CSO aO 
0 < 
°N - 
(D 
N 
/ý .«a ( 
C) Oö 
M 
O 
NO (D n 
N'< Nm 
p° S 
:3d '0 
p 
O IIý 0 
p 
<n 
fD 
N °3 N 
O0N 
(p °C 
(D n 
S-o 
: v, 
n 
m 
(D O 
-. 3O 
? n 
CD 
SmQ 
O 
ý S ,pS7 `< 
CD N 
9 (n ý 
_. 
ý oOv 
QO 
7r Z(0 
mN 
9 k0 °m 
T 
Of 
(D ZT d 
3ý 
No ? <n' 
M 0a CD < oS 
x m '0(D - up, Zr 
n (p 
3OO Od paN 
n 
2 
x -3 n % S pý c) 
o CCD Z (D 3 m 
cQ ýp ° 
CD o --e «1 
CD 
ý- S m (D 
ýp 
0-ý 
< 
v2 
co S 
0 zr 3 r< CD 10 :3 «n <D 
CD m 
=r 
m 
(D 
ný n 0 Co m 
Cl 'r° CD mx pN 
p C) N CD CL N3yN 
+ CD 
C C '< xn (D 
" 
p 
N 
cpO eNZ 
_°- p 
:3 
+O CD S 50 
" 
zr mQ 
(D 
ON 
rj, (D 3 
-M 
CD C) 
(D 
O 
5 
zr 
«D O 3 «2 m 
(D -C3 Sp 
°N 
zr 0 
° -0 m 
m(0 3 
-, ä ff, O 
m 
m - CÖ m a< . 
p+ 
N 
N 
3 
pNö ?c 
(n 
' 
-. mn ° S 
an < N ° 
Qn 
rn m 
n w 
°- cD 
? 
CD D v, pý S 
MO ?" 
n f° 
N? n 
O9 
N U) N (D dQ ß N 
-' (n O 
ä 
N 
O 
° 
O 
() M (D 
pN 
(D pO 
OOO (D 
° fD 
mN -e 
8 
O 
(p .+ 
<0 (0 n 
O (D 
pßQ 
fp n 
n 
.. 
nO 
. 
p. 3 N 
cD 
on O 
?Nw n- 
SS O 
N2 
o ý 
n _S pN 
CDD 
o 
N"2«2 
NSO 
p ju 
Cl 
-w 
nä 
fD (D 
fC -+ 
(D 3 
=3 3 . f 
Cl 
(p 
aV 
3 
M üý 
öO -N 
C» cu 
9m 7. fD C_ c -0 CD (D 7 ýp 
. CD :Z 2 
O öy 0 
O. CD ° N o= c) 
a 
0 
CD S 
0 (D C) (D (n 
MmO 
DO 
3a 
N 
CD 
D CD O O 
. 
p. O °' n 
p° 
ö- 
C (? 
0 
f 
-v 0c = 
C - 
0 -1 
0 CD 0. 3 
x . =- 
Q 
Cý C ) (D - o 0 -z O C0 -ý an0 Cb 
c' nS 
N 
3 
CD p O f° 
co 
3Q 
to mO 
Uf 
zr 
O (i 
'< 
mý , 
ýä 
co 
= 
n. 3 
CO 
. 
C. (D ?o 
C° 3 
rný 0 nv ° C: 1- c]. @- N- m cn r-3 
(Dn 0p 
öa. (A °3 
N o 
ýD E*r fD oX vö 7ý .. 
2 
x x- 
T2: 5 
.Lm. < ý <C CD m° 3 
N m 
Z 
mo om c3 N r« ö 3 o (D m 
m .° 
cQ 
n (0 fö cý N ä 
Z O 
n 
° " 
CD vcö 
n (n 
äc 
S ;: p fD p m 
p 
o 
n 
0 :E 
Q(D0 m 
m 
ZT ý öß 3 
CD 
3O 
S "'i 3S 
CD (D 
D 
ÖO 
r- (n 
N cu 
c cr 
3 CVN i 
Cl. y 
O CD 
O? fD p) S3 
OyO (D Co 
0 
C 0) ä pO 
a ý ; or c 3co 3m rnco ý2 
Öoo O C N3 (D O 
c: (D 
CD 'O 
a 
CD (D 
ß 
OO 
i v 
'ý O p 
CD (D 
pO 
ap j n ONN 
Ö CD 
°ý 
fD m N 
g» 
O ý, 
CD 0 
pO 
CD 
. -. 
3 ( A m c äm moo N sc ý CO ýo N 3 
Z 
° m 3 ° ^. ä m ° ° -~ co ca m m .<ý 0 M CD O rn 
(1) 
m 0O O 
m 
to, 
C 
1 
0 
C, 
CD 
N 
H 
fD 
H 
0 
Q 
N 
tD 
2 
CD 
CL 
m 
Ov 
10.1.6 Analysis of exercise ZA 
The scenario was challenging for the team, because was different to the 
chemical leak and fire exercises they usually used in training. The scenario 
simulated the catastrophic failure of one of the electrical transformers which 
supplied the site and some of the surrounding area with power. The 
transformer was located in an area of the site containing mainly occupied 
temporary 'Porta-cabin' type buildings, one of which had been set alight and 
the entrance blocked by debris during the explosion. Due to the loss of all 
power, the vast office population of the site had made a decision to leave work 
early, as the power was off. Failure to take action to control the site population 
exasperated the scenario and traffic attempting to leave the site on this road 
had skidded on the oil causing a RTA which blocked the road and prevented 
the ambulance from getting through. By 44 minutes the Porta-cabin is 
engulfed in flames, and rescue is not yet possible due to poor communication 
between the EMT and site fire service. The rescue of the people trapped in 
the portacabin was not possible until one hour and five minutes after they had 
become trapped. The exercise ended after one hour and forty minutes 
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10.1.7 Analysis of exercise WA 
The scenario began with a loss of power across the site. Within three minutes 
the EM and DEM had arrived at the ECC, and the UPS had engaged. After 
nine minutes the EM called a time-out and informed the team that the alarms 
were indicating a radioactive release, and their immediate priority was to 
determine the location, scale and cause of the release in order to stem it. At 
the end of the T/0 the site alarms were sounded, and a report was received of 
an explosion in a building housing a radioactive coolant pipe. There will also 
be a requirement to move the ECC, as the UPS will only last for 2 hours. 
Attention should also be given to the matter of controlling the release. There 
was also a request to evacuate 102 contractors who were suffering because 
of the heat and lack of air circulation in the building where they had sheltered. 
The exercise ended after 2 hours forty-five minutes, following confirmation 
that the leak was sealed and air quality was returned to normal. 
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10.1.8 Analysis of exercise GA 
The scenario began with a leak reported in the loading area. Within 9 minutes 
a loud explosion was heard and the EMT were informed that the leak had 
ignited and a 60m vertical jet fire from one of the vehicles containing a 
refrigerated flammable gas. Media response and business response teams 
were activated and the current site inventory was checked to ensure that 
production could continue without need for the now disrupted delivery. Two 
casualties are awaiting rescue near the vehicle. The exercise ended after one 
hour and five minutes, when the fire was brought under control. 
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10.2 Programme for Expert Validation Panel meeting. 
Ecotechnology Bldg 37, central conference room. 
<ä_ Set up room and owerPoint ensure Coffee has 
}r. ha 
10 -10.30 Welcome and introduction - Prof. JE Strutt 
10.30 -11.15 Presentation 1- research background and model 
- Brian Jones 
11.30 - 12.00 Presentation 2- Methodology for scoring and 
assessment - Brian Jones 
12.00 - 12.45 Questions and discussion of Presentation 1 i1°; '. 'pLi.:::. s u Ehe methä-'d ti. °i 'i..!.. an e t: -, ' Itn.... ,' 1'i? ode &. data . used. Ow . 
to kick-start- opinions on use of emergency exercises 
as indicators (COMAH and LA), EPs and their 
Rotrad table. 
ý 12.45 - 13.45 Lunch 
13.45 - 14.30 Group discussions of Presentation 2 
t: tic St. 
'- 
a) Jeremy & Helen, Ed, (& Mark) 
b) JVS, Les & Ian 
14.30 - 15.00 Summary of group of discussions 
o., if iCý tý'S a0llnute to Si 3limanse ma :i iv'ttta indcating: 
additions, subtractions to 
indicators/processes/levels. Suggestions for 
assessment methodology. AOB including other uses, 
info they would like to see to assure them of 
technique. 
15.00 Closing comments and thanks. 
15.310 La Qi 1 4VC: S IVi 
0C{ dul 
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10.3 Pilot interview transcripts 
This note summarises the proceedings of three meetings held by OCTO and 
Cranfield University for the emergency planning and management project. 
The meetings were with a MAHI Pipeline operator (1), Constabulary A (2) and 
Fire Service A (3). Helen Shannon (HS) of OCTO and Brian Jones (BJ) 
interviewed the following persons representing their respective organisations: 
" JH- Emergency Planning Advisor (1) 
"- Pipeline Network Manager (1) 
" Inspector - Emergency Operations (2) 
" Inspector - Emergency Policies (2) 
" Divisional Officer (3) 
Key issues are identified in bullet point form, under the relevant meeting title. 
PIPELINE OPERATOR MEETING 
Q Pipelines currently regulated under the Pipeline Safety Regulations. HSE 
is the official regulator. The issues of testing / exercising these plans, and 
charging for the tests have been omitted from the regulations. Reason was 
to await the implementation of COMAH (1999) and attempt to issue a 
blanket recommendation for the exercising of all emergency plans, 
COMAH & PSR. HSE has not yet made that recommendation concerning 
PSR. 
Q The point is raised by Pipeline operator 1 that the only legislative duty of a 
Local Authority to plan for a major incident is in the Cardiff Judgement, 
which is based on case law and states that if there is a plan in place, it 
must be capable of adequately fulfilling its role. BJ adds that secondary to 
this Local Authorities have a general 'duty of care' to their constituents, 
under which the preplanning for emergencies is usually considered. 
o HS stresses that HSE are interested in the adequacy of the plan, and do 
not expect that each authority should respond in a textbook fashion to any 
incident which may occur. The difficulty in defining and measuring 
preparedness is recognised. 
Q Issue of HSE assessing and commenting upon the effectiveness and 
contribution of the Emergency Services is political, as Em. Services and 
County Emergency Planning are under the Home Office guidance, and 
Industry is under HSE guidance. 
o Pipeline operator 1 as an operator expresses concern at the disparity 
amongst Local Authorities in their styles and types of emergency planning. 
Different Local Authorities perceive Pipeline operator 1's response to be 
different, whereas in reality it is the same for each of their pipelines. 
Q Roles & Responsibilities, terminology, command structures and modes of 
operation all differ between different LA's and emergency services regions. 
Q The primary objective of Pipeline operator 1's response in any incident is 
to protect life. 
o The Pipeline operator 1 system of call-out is illustrated in other documents 
and it is stressed that it is uniform for all responses. A number of LA's have 
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not recognised this response in their emergency plans, and have imposed 
a separate response structure on Pipeline operator 1. Pipeline operator 1 
will follow their own procedures in event of an emergency. 
Q Taking this into account, Pipeline operator 1 exercise the same initial 
response for ANY leak report, and so practice it many regularly. This 
situation is similar in the case of many operators, who regularly respond to 
alarms and activate their emergency control centres on almost a daily 
basis. In these circumstances, it would be difficult to justify a regulation 
(COMAH or PRS) which demanded the testing of these aspects. 
Q It should be the responsibility of the Pipeline operator 1 engineer to identify 
the safe areas in a leakage from their network. The Emergency services 
do not have the necessary training or equipment to diagnose the extent of 
a leakage. Pipeline operator 1 are not capable, or responsible for 
identifying leaks from other operators. This is beyond the capabilities of 
their equipment and training. 
o HS defines the major difference between an Offsite plan for a chemical 
plant, and a plan for a pipeline is that the epicentre of the chemical plant 
incident is defined, whereas the pipeline incident could have occurred 
anywhere across the route spanning a geographical region. (SEE 
DIAGRAM) 
Q BJ questions whether Pipeline operator 1 has the technology to detect 
leaks in their system by pressure indicators. PW responds that the 
pressure of system depends upon how many consumers are being served 
at one time. If a large consumer comes on-line, there may be a sharp 
decline in pressure, and so pressure sensors would not be useful in 
detecting leakage. 
Q JH informs the meeting that the Gas Management Safety Regulations 
demand a yearly testing of the emergency plan. (Under COMAH only one 
plan is required to satisfy whatever different regulations may be in place, 
so why not one test satisfies all? -bj) JH is concerned that the LA 
Emergency Planning is a separate issue, and therefore should be tested 
under a different regulatory framework to the Operators response. If the LA 
confuses the mandates of the parties involved, introducing new 
procedures and alien concepts, the other authorities will have a low level 
of ownership of the plan, and not use it to maximum potential. 
It is considered important to draw the distinction between Pipeline Incident 
Response and Emergency Response. Both require testing & regulating, but 
separately and in different ways. 
Police Meeting. 
Q The 'A' Constabulary has three levels of control - bronze, silver & gold. 
Bronze is the operational command, and is lead by an officer with the 
minimum rank of inspector. The location of Bronze will be as close to the 
scene as is safe. Silver is the tactical command, and is located at the 
safest, most convenient district police station (DPS). A is a reasonably 
compact county, and so the DPS's are never very far from conurbation. 
Fire, local authority, ambulance and the operators' representatives are 
present at silver, and sufficient communications are available to enable 
links with bronze and other locations. The fire brigade response is led from 
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the scene, and so a liaison officer is all that is required at silver. A 
command also included a location know as the Emergency Services 
Reinforcement base (ESRB) which was usually located at the nearest fire 
station to the incident. It's role was similar to silver, but the location was 
inconvenient and had poor communications links, so was not fully used in 
the event of an incident. In the new plan, ESRB is a resource muster & 
holding point. 
o Gold is the police strategic command, and is rarely used. It is located at 
the County Police HQ in Atown, and lead by an officer of Assistant Chief 
Constable or higher. It would be attended by the Local Authority Chief 
Executive, senior staff from the other emergency services, PR 
representatives and appropriate persons from Central Government and the 
regulator. The police have an overall co-ordination role in the incident. 
o The District Offsite Emergency Centre (DOSEC) is usually owned by the 
Local Authority. This causes some minor confusion in terms of co- 
ordination of the staff operating from that centre, and what level of control 
it should represent. This role is being redefined in A in current revision of 
the Major Incident Plan. 
o Unless a guarantee is received from the Fire Brigade that the incident site 
is safe, the police will not send an officer there. 
o It was stressed that once the emergency phase is finished, then the role of 
the emergency plan is finished. Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of 
property and communities should be taken care of by the local authority, 
with necessary investigations and reports taken care of by the responsible 
services as appropriate. 
o The Police were keen to stress that their response to an incident is 
primarily to save life, and so many of the procedures which form part of 
that response are performed and practised by officers every day 
throughout the course of their duties. Performing exercises for all the 
emergency plans would result in a high level of duplication and 
unnecessary expense. 
Q The police do not see the County Emergency plan as a working document. 
It is seen as a summary of the Incident procedures of all the services 
involved, and part of its purpose is to illustrate to the regulator that the 
necessary planning has been carried out. The plan is too large and 
verbose to be referred to in an incident for guidance, so the police have an 
A5 booklet describing their Major Incident Procedures in a clear and 
concise format. 
o HS suggested a scenario where the saving of life had to be prioritised 
between locations A (where there was little chance of the victims living 
through the ordeal) and location B (where there was increased chance of 
the victims living through it). The question of who would make that decision 
to prioritise was raised. The police responded that it would be a Silver 
control level decision, made jointly by the leading police, fire and 
ambulance officers with the Local Authority. If there was disagreement, 
then the Gold level control would be consulted and the basis of the 
decision would have to be outlined in policy and justified. 
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o 'A' Constabulary has an Emergency Planning Resource Group that has 
been found to be a useful interface between the organisations. The 
presence of this group is considered to be an indicator of best practice. 
o The information gained from the interviews with the police, fire service and 
operators has released information and perspectives which could not have 
been obtained from reading the plan alone. This is an important point to 
make to HSE. 
Q The police consider the Home Office Publication 'Dealing with Disaster III' 
to be their target performance level for emergency response, and are 
happy that they satisfy the requirements in that document. 
o Fire Brigade Meeting 
o The fire brigade plans and procedures have to be flexible enough to deal 
with major or minor incidents. A great deal of their response strategy is 
based around the experience of the officers in other incidents, and what 
actions they consider appropriate. 
o The standard Chemical incident response is to get the officers to the scene 
safely. They can then achieve their aim of preserving life & the 
environment. The judgements about the safety of the officers will be based 
around advice from their control centre, who will seek specialist 
information from chemical data services such as CHEMSAFE and 
CHLORAID, in addition to telephoning local sites for assistance and 
advice. The appliances are equipped with Draeger Gas Tubes for 
diagnosis of several types of gas, and the officers have three levels of 
safety equipment from PPE to full gas-proof suits and BA. 
Q The proportion of Industry that is cutting the resources of its emergency 
response teams is detrimental to the quality and speed of service which 
they can provide, and adds increased pressure on the local fire brigade to 
respond. 
0 
o The Fire Brigade system of calling in appliances and resources from other 
regions (known as draw-down) enables them to access a vast number of 
vehicles and officers. 'A' Fire Brigade has the capability of getting 38 
appliances with crews, and the largest foreseeable incident would require 
30 appliances. 
o HS observed that the Pipeline maps included in the plan do not use 
contour lines, only spot heights. This is agreed to be a potential problem, 
and noted for report. 
Q The Fire brigade are not responsible for the decontamination of casualties. 
They have decontamination showers for the purpose of cleaning their 
officers, who will be in protective clothing. The equipment is not suitable for 
use on persons who are not wearing protective clothing. It is therefore the 
responsibility of the ambulance service to decontaminate casualties. 
o Fire Brigade performance standards are summarised in an attendance 
target figure. Postal regions are given a code, according to the value of 
property located in that area. 'A' requires a response of 2 appliances 
within 5 minutes and a 3rd within 8 minutes. 'B' requires an appliance 
within 5 minutes and a 2nd within 8 minutes, 'C' requires one appliance 
within 8-10 minutes and D requires an appliance within 20 minutes. 88% of 
'A' Constabulary is category D, and there is a further category of Remote 
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Rural, which is a longer response. Areas of special risk may be designated 
a higher initial response. These are nationally applied standards. 
Q The Hazard Briefing mentioned in the plan is a short message to the crew 
informing them of the level of safety equipment required, and the nature of 
the hazard. A Hazchem response is usually carefully considered and 
executed, in contrast to a fire response, which can be dealt with rapidly, 
within the procedural envelope and based on previous experience of the 
officers. 
QA more user friendly and incident-hot use version of the emergency plan 
might be useful, but would require further research on the best way of 
achieving this. 
QA further performance standard of the fire response could be the time 
taken to get the knowledge to the site. 
10.4 Practical recommendations for exercise design, conduct and 
observation and emergency plan design 
This section presents a set of recommendations for improving emergency 
planning and exercising. Other texts, reviewed and discussed in this thesis, 
provide guidance on emergency plan construction and emergency exercise 
conduct. The objective of this section is to bridge the gap between what is 
regarded as best practice, and the standard of emergency management that 
has been observed over the period of this study. The aim of these 
recommendations is to highlight the common areas where current industry 
practice in the UK deviates from the recommended best practice. 
10.4.1 Recommendations for emergency exercise design 
Exercises must be designed to facilitate learning. Motivation for exercising 
should be learning and development, rather than satisfying regulations. There 
should be defined exercise objectives, means of measuring the success of 
those objectives and established structures through which the lessons from 
the exercise can be learned and used. The majority of exercises reviewed for 
this study concentrated time and effort on preparation and implementation, but 
spent hardly any time on learning. Adopting a concept of 'value' in exercising 
would ensure that for every hour or pound invested in the exercise, there 
should be a measured outcome and benefit. Exercising is a cost-effective 
means of learning, if correctly structured and applied. 
The design of exercises should involve or consult each of the parties who will 
be involved in the actual exercise. A number of operational staff involved in 
the various exercises observed for this study likened the experience to 
performing in a circus. They felt as though they were going through a 
choreographed act for the benefit of the observers. Unless the participants 
feel that the exercise is an appropriate learning medium, contribute to the 
planning and feel ownership for the outcome, then they are unlikely to pay 
much attention to the lessons from the experience. 
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10.4.2 Recommendations for emergency exercise conduct 
Some of the exercises that were observed for this thesis showed an 
unrealistic attitude towards the time constraints of, and precision and 
decisiveness required in, a real incident. The offshore industry and some of 
the nuclear operators in the UK manage to bring this aspect of realism and 
urgency into their exercises by strict time management, rapid development of 
events and basing the exercise on a real sequence of events. A well 
researched, well planned and meticulously implemented exercise is likely to 
invoke a realistic response in the participants, and therefore recreate a likely 
response and learning environment. 
While realism is important to emergency exercises, it is also important to 
recognise that the participants have limitations as humans. In the exercises 
observed for this study, while no problems were directly experienced, the 
organisations did not formally account for ethical considerations, 
measurement of stress in participants, and the realism of the demands they 
could place on their staff. While the majority of the organisations involved paid 
due attention to the refreshment and personal comfort of their exercise 
participants, it was necessary to draw this crucial matter to the attention of a 
small number. 
10.4.3 Recommendations for exercise observation 
It is critical that the exercise is planned with observation and measurement in 
mind, as without this forethought it can be difficult to document and record 
events for further analysis and learning. 
Rules for observation techniques and methodology can be found in a variety 
of psychology texts; however it is most important for the observer to research 
the scenario in preparation, maintain meticulous records and keep a low 
profile during the exercise and participate fully in the debriefing session. 
Debrief sessions can also reveal the unobservable aspects of the exercise, 
which include interpersonal characteristics of the participants, subtle technical 
points and tacit knowledge within the organisation. In addition to debrief 
sessions, interviews with participants can also augment observer's results. 
10.4.4 Emergency plan design recommendations 
Extrapolation of a small incident emergency plan for use in a larger incident 
must not be accepted without more detailed examination of the issues and 
consequences involved. Full risk assessment is the only way of ensuring that 
the plan will enable the organisation to cope better with the circumstances. 
Testing of the emergency plan can be part of the exercise regime schedule, 
but should not make up the entire exercise regime. Exercises can be 
beneficial for training purposes, and the emergency plan can be 
communicated to, and tested by staff without the use of full exercises. 
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Finally, a plan is not a static document, and should be adapted and changed 
in line with the results of a response, as well as being used as a guide for the 
response. Updating the plan using the experience gained in an exercise or 
incident (on-site or in line with best industrial practice or experience) is an 
important knowledge storage method, and will help ensure the relevance and 
validity of the plan. 
An emergency plan should be structured and presented to make the 
necessary knowledge available to the reader, and guide their course of action 
in a direction that best addresses the risk. There is no ideal example of a well 
structured and presented emergency plan, it should be appropriate to the 
hazard that it is designed to protect against. 
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